Bolton v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co.

Decision Date02 December 1963
Docket NumberMISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS,No. 23841,23841
Citation373 S.W.2d 169
PartiesEarl D. BOLTON and Rosalie M. Bolton, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v.RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Poague, Brock & Wall, Barkley M. Brock, Julius F. Wall, Clinton, for appellant.

James B. Wilson, Windsor, for respondents.

MAUGHMER, Commissioner.

Plaintiffs, Earl D. and Rosalie M. Bolton, husband and wife, had the verdict and judgment in the amount of $1895 for damages to improved pasture and fencing on their 93 acre farm located in Pettis County, Missouri, from fire allegedly caused by defendant Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Corporation. The defendant has appealed.

The amended petition on which plaintiffs went to trial was in three counts. It was alleged in Count 1 that on April 27, 1960, defendant's employees were burning grass and weeds along defendant's right-of-way which adjoins plaintiffs' farm and left the fire unattended; that it spread onto plaintiffs' property, burning and destroying four acres of improved pasture to plaintiffs' damage in the sum of $160. It was alleged in Count 2 that on December 4, 1960, sparks of fire escaped from defendant's engine and set fire to the right-of-way; that defendant permitted the fire to escape onto plaintiffs' property 'burning over twenty-two acres of improved pasture'. Plaintiffs asked $880 in damages for this burning. It was alleged in Count 3 that on April 19, 1962, sparks of fire escaped from defendant's engine and set fire to the right-of-way. 'That said fire was allowed by defendant to spread onto the property of plaintiffs, burning over sixty-two and one-half acres of improved pasture, burning five hundred hedge posts and five hundred rods of fence', thereby damaging plaintiffs to the extent of $2830.

The answer was a general denial. During the trial defendant did not actually deny that it started the fires and its counsel in the argument before this court conceded that it had. The verdict was for plaintiffs on each count with damages of $40 on Count 1, $376 under Count 2, and $1479 under Count 3, making a total of $1895.

On its appeal defendant makes three assignments of error. It says (1) Given Instruction 1 as to Count 3, was erroneous because it permitted the jury to consider damage to hedge posts and fencing, when there was no evidence of such loss. (2) Instructions 1, 2, and 3, failed to inform the jury 'of the method of arriving at the damage to plaintiffs' improved pasture and fences' and hence were erroneous. (3) The damages allowed were excessive 'for the reason that the land was in the Soil Bank Program, no crops could be produced at the time of the fires, nor at the present time and no Soil Bank Program checks have been reduced or stopped'. Plaintiffs are not in this proceeding seeking recovery for loss of annual crops but instead for damages to their farm for destruction of or injury to their 'improved pasture', which is a quasi-permanent improvement. This is permissible even though the farm is under the Soil Bank Program.

The testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Bolton was that Mr. Bolton worked regularly 'off the farm' at the Whiteman Air Force Base; that the whole farm was in grass--in improved pasture--including about four acres in alfalfa and the balance in a combination of grasses, including lespedeza, red top, alsike clover, timothy and fescue. The Boltons harvested no crops off the land since it was all in the Soil Bank Program. They received annual payments of $1540.35 from the government. They were not permitted to take a crop--hay or seed--from the farm but were required to mow the weeds. It is conceded that plaintiffs received their full Soil Bank payments each year and, based upon their tax returns, these payments constituted almost the entire income from the farm.

We shall quote the brief testimony of Mr. Bolton on the question of fence damage and as to the value of the fences destroyed or damaged. Except for the general statement of Mrs. Bolton that some of the fences were burned 'clear to the ground', this testimony of Mr. Bolton was the only evidence presented on this particular issue.

'Q. How much fencing was burned during the fire?

'A. About 500 rods of fencing.

'Q. Do you know the price of posts at the present time?

'A. I don't.

'Q. Do you know the price of wire at the present time?

'A. I looked it up in the catalog.

'Q. Could you tell us what the price is?

'A. For the kind that I had, thirty some odd dollars, thirty-one or two dollars, somewhere in that neighborhood, in Kansas City in the Montgomery Ward catalog for 20 rods, that is 39 inch 6-inch stay, heavy fencing that I had.

'Q. Have you investigated the cost of replacing the fence that was burned?

'A. I estimated it.

'Q. And what is the cost per rod?

'A. If you were started from scratch, putting in a fence would cost approximately a dollar and a half a rod.

'Q. These fences aren't completely destroyed, they have been damaged some, is that correct?

'A. That's true, with the exception of the east fence, which is a partnership fence.

'Q. That was an old fence?

'A. It was an old fence, but it served the purpose.

'Q. It's not your testimony that all the posts were ruined or that all the wire was ruined?

'A. No, I'm not claiming that they were all ruined'.

There was no showing as to when the fences were built. There was no evidence as to the value of the fencing immediately before or immediately after the fire, nor did any witness attempt to estimate the value of the farm immediately before and immediately after the fence burning. Neither did plaintiffs nor anyone in their behalf express any opinion as to the cost of repairing the fence to a condition as good and valuable as it was before the fire. The only testimony touching the point was as to the cost of a completely new fence. The evidence of Mr. Bolton himself is that the fencing was not entirely destroyed. He said he was 'not claiming that all the posts were ruined or that all the wire was ruined'. This fence or these fences have not been repaired or rebuilt or replaced except that portion which belongs to defendant railroad company.

Defendant urges that the proper measure of damages in this case respecting not only fence damage but damage to the permanent pasture as well, is the difference in the value of the farm immediately before and immediately after the fire or fires. While such a test is a proper one, we think it is not the only measure which plaintiffs may use. Our appellate courts have in somewhat similar cases approved recoveries based upon evidence as to the value of the fence or thing damaged or destroyed and under an instruction in accordance with such evidence. We shall refer to and quote from some such authorities.

From Gulf, M. & O. R. Co. v. Smith-Brennan Pile Co., Mo.App., 223 S.W.2d 100, 104, 105:

'The general rule, as heretofore stated, is that the measure of damage is the difference between the reasonable value of the property before and the reasonable value thereof after the accident. We are aware that in cases where the amount of damage is insignificant, as compared to the value of the property as a whole and involves only a small part thereof, there is an exception to the above general rule. However, before allowing plaintiff to rely solely on evidence of the costs of repair, there should be a showing of the comparative insignificance of the damage to bring the case within such exception to the general rule'.

And while plaintiffs here are not asking damages for either total or partial destruction of a crop, but rather for permanent damage to an improved pasture and to fences, we think the measure of damage rule as stated by the Supreme Court in Happy v. Kenton et al., 362 Mo. 1156, 247 S.W.2d 698, 704, 705, for annual crops might be applicable. The court said:

'* * * nevertheless, we think there can be no question but that the measure of damage for injury to or destruction of a growing annual crop is, in the case of total destruction: the value of the crop at the time and place of destruction; and as to injury or partial destruction: the difference between the value of the crop immediately before and immediately after the injury (citing cases)'.

This court in Beaty et al. v. N. W. Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 312 S.W.2d 369, 371, in discussing the measure of damages for the destruction of fence, and after citing cases in support, said: 'These cases hold, in effect, that the measure of damages...

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5 cases
  • Misch v. C. B. Contracting Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 28, 1965
    ...determining the damage suffered (see Langdon et al. v. Koch, Springfield Court of Appeals, 393 S.W.2d 66; Bolton v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., Mo.App., 373 S.W.2d 167, 174; De Long v. Broadston, Mo.App., 272 S.W.2d 493) and is sometimes the predominant criterion. Curtis v. Fruin-Co......
  • Wells v. Missouri Property Ins. Placement Facility
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1983
    ...property both before and after the casualty. Franklin, 627 S.W.2d at 113; Brown, 263 S.W.2d at 900. See Bolton v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad, 373 S.W.2d 169, 173-74 (Mo.App.1963); Johnstone, 34 S.W.2d at 1033-34. These statutes clearly affect private insurance contracts that result from......
  • Beck v. Lind
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • October 31, 1975
    ...theory applies both to damages to real estate and damages to perennial crops on pastureland. See Bolton v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, 373 S.W.2d 169 (Mo.App.1963); Harke v. Ewald, 51 N.D. 828, 200 N.W. 1009 (1924); Thompson v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 84 Neb. 482, 121 N.W. 447 (......
  • Payne v. Payne
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 19, 1987
    ...claimed were damages for the destruction of a fence, it was proper to allow the cost of repair. See Bolton v. Missouri-Kansas Railroad Company, 373 S.W.2d 169, 172-73 (Mo.App.1963). (b) Defendants Gary and Gina Payne also argue, in Appeal No. 14589, that the trial court erred in refusing to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Section 2 Diminution of Value—A Fair Market Value Measure
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Real Estate Fundamentals Deskbook Chapter 13 Damage to Real Property
    • Invalid date
    ...v. Wertz, 478 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1972) Iven v. Winston Bros. Co., 48 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Mo. App. W.D. 1931) Bolton v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 373 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Mo. App. W.D. 1963) Application of the diminution-of-value rule by Missouri appellate courts and MAI 4.02 [1980 Revision] requires a ......
  • Section 2 Diminution of Value—A Fair Market Value Measure
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Damages Deskbook Chapter 9 Damage to Real Property
    • Invalid date
    ...v. Wertz, 478 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1972) Iven v. Winston Bros. Co., 48 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Mo. App. W.D. 1931) Bolton v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 373 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Mo. App. W.D. 1963) Application of the diminution-of-value rule by Missouri appellate courts and MAI 4.02 [1980 Revision] requires a ......
  • Section 18.39 Fences
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Tort Law Deskbook Chapter 18 Property Damage
    • Invalid date
    ...before the damage also is sufficient. Either method should reach the same estimate as to damages. Bolton v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 373 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Mo. App. W.D....

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