Bolton v. the Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 30 April 1878 |
| Citation | 1 Ill.App. 193,1 Bradw. 193 |
| Parties | JAMES BOLTONv.THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, DIST. NO. 3. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding.
Mr. B. D. Magruder, for appellant; as to recitals in the bonds and rights of innocent holders, cited Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 2 Otto, 484; Marcy v. Township of Oswego, 2 Otto, 637; Humboldt Township v. Long, 2 Otto, 642; Mary et al. v. Williamson Co. et al. 72 Ill. 207; Cairo & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. City of Sparta, 77 Ill. 505; Mason et al. v. City of Shawneetown, 77 Ill. 533.
That the court erred in refusing to admit as evidence the answer of the defendant, filed in a proceeding in chancery to enjoin the collection of a tax levied to pay bonds issued by the defendant: Robbins v. Butler et al. 24 Ill. 428.
Mr. H. C. Irish, Mr. E. M. Haines and Mr. Ira W. Buell, for appellee; upon the power of municipal corporations to issue bonds, cited 1 Gross' Stat. 697, § 47; 1 Dillon on Mun. Cor. 524; School Directors v. Miller, 54 Ill. 338; Bissell et al. v. Kankakee, 64 Ill. 249; Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468; Marsh v. Fulton Co. 10 Wall. 676; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 437.
As to proof of the authority under which the bonds were issued, and recitals as evidence: School Directors v. Taylor, 54 Ill. 289; School Directors v. Sippy, 54 Ill. 287; Bissell et al. v. Kankakee, 64 Ill. 249; School Directors v. Fogleman, 76 Ill. 189; Town of Middleport v. Ætna Ins. Co. 82 Ill. 562.
That the officers of a corporation cannot by their own act create an estoppel against the corporation: Bissell et al. v. Kankakee, 64 Ill. 249; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160; Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 468; 1 Dillon on Mun. Cor. 524; Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 9 Chicago Legal News, 290; County of Dallas v. Mackenzie, 9 Chicago Legal News, 298; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 199; Marsh v. Fulton Co. 10 Wall, 676; Chisholm v. City of Montgomery, 2 Woods, 584; Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 437.
That the bonds in suit were not issued for a corporate purpose: Gross' Stat. 695, § 43; School Directors v. Sippy, 54 Ill. 287.
That a purchaser of municipal bonds is bound to take notice of the extent of the powers exercised by the officers of a municipal corporation: 1 Dillon on Mun. Cor. 464, note.
As to the constitutional prohibition against municipal corporations issuing bonds: Law v. The People ex rel. 10 Chicago Legal News, 171; Constitution of 1870, Art. IX. § 12.
This was an action of debt, commenced in the Superior Court of Cook county, to the November term, 1875, by the appellant against the appellee, to recover on four bonds issued by the appellee in November, 1870, for the sum of $500.00 each, for money borrowed, as appears by recitals on the face of the bonds, for the purpose of building a school house in said district. They are made due and payable four years after their dates, respectively, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, payable annually.
The declaration contains four counts to which the defendant pleaded: first, non est factum, sworn to; second, nil debet; third, that the bonds were not issued for the purpose of borrowing money to build a school house, etc.; fourth, that said bonds were not issued in pursuance of a majority vote of the legal voters of said School District No. 3, etc.; fifth, that at the date of said bonds, the sum of money already borrowed during said year of 1870, by said district, including previous indebtedness of said district, exceeded five (5) per cent. of the taxable property of said district. To the appellee's 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th pleas, the appellant filed demurrers, which were sustained by the court, and the appellee, abiding by its demurrers as to said pleas, the cause came on for trial upon the plea of non est factum, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the appellees, and the appellant brings the record here, and assigns for error the giving by the court, on its own motion, of an instruction: “That the verdict should be for the defendant,” and that the court erred in requiring the plaintiff to prove an election before admitting the bonds in evidence. There are other errors assigned; but it will be unnecessary for us to consider them.
The declaration alleges that the defendant is the successor-in-law of the school directors of district No. 3, township No. 37, county of Cook and State of Illinois, who issued the bonds counted upon; that on or about the first Monday of April, 1873, the defendant became and was duly organized as a body corporate and politic, by a vote of the legal voters of said district, under the name of the Board of Education of District No. 3, Township 37, county of Cook and State of Illinois, and thereby became liable for the payment of these bonds.
It appears that these bonds were issued by the directors of this district, for the purpose of borrowing money to aid in the construction of a school house in that district, and that the appellant is a bona fide purchaser for value.
The bonds involved were issued under and by virtue of Section 47 of Chapter 98, of Gross' Statutes of this State, which is as follows: “For the purpose of building school houses or purchasing school sites, or for repairing and improving the same, the directors, by a vote of the people, may borrow money, issuing bonds, executed by the officers, or at least two members of the board, in sums of not less than $100.00, but the rate of interest shall not exceed ten (10) per cent., nor shall the sum borrowed in any one year for building school houses, exceed three per cent. of said taxable property.” By which it will be seen that a vote of the people in favor of such action, is necessary as a condition precedent to the exercise of such power by the officers of such district.
By the provisions of section 42, of the same chapter, the mode of taking a vote of the people is provided for, and directing how it shall be conducted, and by whom, in the following terms: From the provisions of the statute it is apparent for what purpose and under what circumstances the directors of the school districts may issue bonds, borrow money, and incur a valid liability against the district they represent. It is only for the specified objects of building school houses or purchasing school sites, or repairing and improving the same, that this power can be exercised at all, and then only by the consent and direction of the legal voters of the district (formally expressed), at an election for that purpose, called and conducted by the directors, as required by the statute. It is to be observed that the question is between the district and a person claiming through the action of its agents as a bona fide purchaser, for value of commercial paper issued and put in circulation by them, and taken in the market by appellant upon the faith of their apparent authority.
From the foregoing statute it is obvious that the right to issue the bonds by the directors was made dependent upon a vote of the people of the district whether they would borrow money for the purpose therein expressed, and the first question is, how is it to be ascertained, whether these conditions have been complied with; whether, indeed, there has been any election held for such purpose as required by law; and if so, whether a majority of the votes cast at such election were in favor of the issue of these bonds in controversy.
These are questions which must be settled and determined by the officers who by the law are required to perform these acts, and to whose judgment and determination they are submitted by law. It is important to know when these facts are to be ascertained, whether before or at the time of their issue, or after, and whether they must be ascertained every time payment is demanded either of principal or interest on such bonds. It is plain that the Legislature intended to vest the power to determine these questions somewhere, and authorize somebody to settle and determine them, and when once determined, to be a final determination of the question as to all bona fide purchasers for value.
The only persons spoken of in the act as having anything to do in posting the required notices...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Rauh v. Ritchie
-
Turner v. the Peoria
...due Smith, who negotiated the same from the former receiver. Schenck v. Supervisors, etc. 1 Biss. 533; Id. 292; Bolton v. Board of Education, etc. 1 Bradw. 193. A receiver's certificate is negotiable, and when payable to bearer is transferable by delivery, and possesses all the ordinary att......