Bolton v. Van Heusen

• Decision Date: 14 June 1924
• Citation: 144 N.E. 384,249 Mass. 503
• Parties: BOLTON v. VAN HEUSEN et al. SAME v. VAN HEUSEN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

249 Mass. 503

144 N.E. 384

BOLTON

v.VAN HEUSEN et al.

SAME

v.VAN HEUSEN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 14, 1924.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; W. C. Wait, Judge.

Suit in equity by John B. Bolton against John M. Van Heusen and others, and action at law on contract by John B. Bolton against John M. Van Heusen. The equity suit was dismissed on plaintiff's motion, and defendant brings exceptions. An order was entered overruling answer in abatement in action at law, and the case was reported. Exceptions in suit in equity overruled, and order in action at law affirmed.

W. G. Thompson and G. E. Mears, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

R. G. Dodge and R. S. Wilkins, both of Boston, for defendants.

RUGG, C. J.

One of these cases is a suit in equity; the other an action at law. The suit in equity was instituted first. Summarily stated, the allegations of the bill are that the defendant Van Heusen (hereafter called the defendant) employed the plaintiff to invent a certain kind of collar and thereafter agreed orally with the plaintiff that, if he would apply for patents covering the invention and assign the applications for patents to the defendant, the latter would finance the obtaining of the patents and the marketing of the collar and pay the plaintiff 30 per cent. of the profits derived from the ownership of the patents ‘either by way of royalties upon the sale of said collars or in any other way’; that the patents were obtained; that the collar has been put on the market, and that the defendant has reaped large profits therefrom, but has paid the plaintiff nothing. The prayers are for ascertainment of the amount due, for jury issues, for injunction against the transfer of patents and a royalty contract, for specific performance of the royalty agreement in the future and for general relief. An interlocutory decree was entered restraining the defendant from assigning the patents and royalty contracts. The defendant filed an answer in which was embodied a demurrer based on the ground that the alleged agreement was not in writing and could not be performed within a year. The interlocutory decree as to injunction subsequently was modified, so as to permit the transfer of the patents upon specified conditions to a corporation owned by the defendant. A motion for the framing of issues to be tried to a jury was filed by the plaintiff. After hearing, the motion for jury issues was denied and the demurrer overruled. The plaintiff appealed and filed a bill of exceptions and the defendant appealed from the order overruling his demurrer.

After these proceedings the plaintiff filed a motion in substance for an order dismissing the bill without prejudice on payment of costs. Kempton v. Burgess, 136 Mass. 192. At the hearing upon this motion, the defendant presented several requests for rulings to the effect that the plaintiff's motion ought to be denied as matter of law, and that the plaintiff had no right to discontinue. These requests were denied and the plaintiff's motion to dismiss was allowed. The defendant's exceptions bring the case here.

[1] The principle of law governing the rights of parties as to the dismissal of a suit in equity is stated in the leading case of Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Foxborough Water Supply District, 171 Mass. 450, 452, 50 N. E. 1037, in characteristically lucid words by Knowlton, J:

‘The general rule seems to be that the court, on the plaintiff's motion, will dismiss his bill on payment of costs as for want of prosecution, unless something has been done in the case which entitles the defendant, on equitable grounds, to have the suit finally disposed of on the merits. If there have been decrees or other proceedings whereby a defendant's situation has been changed, and he has acquired rights which did not exist, or which had not been determined when the suit was brought, and which render it equitable that these rights should be fully secured by further proceedings in the cause, the court, at the defendant's request, will retain if for a decision upon the merits; but when nothing has been done by the court or the parties that changes the position in which they were when the suit was begun, the rule is different.’

This principle has always been followed. The only difficulty which arises is in its application to varying sets of facts. Worcester v. Lakeside Manuf. Co., 174 Mass. 299, 54 N. E. 833;Jackson v. Ensign, 199 Mass. 116, 85 N. E. 527;Kyle v. Reynolds, 211 Mass. 110, 97 N. E. 614;Steeves v. Bowen, 211 Mass. 116, 97 N. E. 744;Lumiansky v. Tessier, 213 Mass. 182, 190, 99 N. E. 1051, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1049;Keown v. Keown, 231 Mass. 404, 407, 121 N. E. 153;French v. Brooke, 241 Mass. 315, 317, 135 N. E. 168;Bullivant v. First National Bank, 246 Mass. 324, 141 N. E. 41, and cases there collected; In re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 44 Sup. Ct. 446, 68 L. Ed. 912.

[2] The case at bar had not proceeded to such an extent as to change the situation of the defendant in any substantial aspect.

The granting of a temporary injunction and its modification was a burden, not a right. While a restraint, it does not appear to have amounted to more than the inconvenience and annoyance incident to almost any proceeding in equity against any defendant. No advantage accrued to the defendant thereby with reference to the merits of the alleged cause of action.

[3] The denial of the plaintiff's...