Bolz v. Hatfield

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Bolz v. Hatfield, 41 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. App. 2001)
• Decision Date: 27 March 2001
• Docket Number: SD23614
• Parties: Bradly S. Bolz and Patricia Bolz, Plaintiffs/Respondents v. Isaac R. Hatfield, Defendant and Sang Leininger, Defendant/Appellant.Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District 0

Bradly S. Bolz and Patricia Bolz, Plaintiffs/Respondents v Isaac R. Hatfield, Defendant and Sang Leininger, Defendant/Appellant

No. 23614

Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District

03/27/2001

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Phelps County, Hon. John S. Beeler

Counsel for Appellant: Lee H. Bushie

Counsel for Respondent: Joel B. Laner

Opinion Summary: None

Shrum and Montgomery, JJ., concur.

John E. Parrish, Presiding Judge

Bradly S. Bolz and Patricia Bolz (plaintiffs) sought determination of their and Sang Leininger's (defendant) respective interests in certain real estate situate in Phelps County, Missouri. The trial court entered summary judgment declaring plaintiffs to be holders of "fee simple interest in the Property." Defendant appeals. This court affirms.

Prior to November 7, 1994, Isaac R. Hatfield, a single person, held title in fee simple absolute to the real estate in question. On November 7, 1994, Mr. Hatfield executed a beneficiary deed to the property, as grantor, to defendant, as grantee beneficiary. The purpose of the beneficiary deed was to effect a nonprobate transfer of the real estate as permitted by sections 461.003¹ to 461.081, the "Nonprobate Transfers Law of Missouri." Section 461.033.1,² as it existed at the time the beneficiary deed was executed, provided:

Provision for a nonprobate transfer may be revoked in whole or in part and the beneficiaries changed during the lifetime of an owner or surviving joint owner unless it is expressly made irrevocable with consent of any transferor involved . . . . [Emphasis added.]

The beneficiary deed from Mr. Hatfield to defendant included the provision:

This Beneficiary Deed is executed pursuant to Chapter 561 [sic] RSMo. It is not effective to convey title to the above-described real estate until Grantor's death or the death of the last to die of two or more Grantors. This deed is hereby expressly made irrevocable and not subject to change unless Grantee fails to pay the property tax due on the property within thirty days of the yearly payment date for said tax or Grantor suffers a financial emergency which requires the sale of this property to cure the financial emergency. [Emphasis added.]

Thereafter, on March 15, 1996, Mr. Hatfield executed a general warranty deed conveying the same real estate to plaintiffs. The March 15 deed did not recite the reservation of any interest by Mr. Hatfield or that it was subject to any interest of defendant.

The parties to this litigation were parties to a prior action that determined the beneficiary deed dated November 7, 1994, conveyed "a conditional remainder interest" to defendant. Judgment in the prior case was entered November 4, 1997. It declared, as is applicable to this case:

F. The intent and effect of the Beneficiary Deed from Isaac Hatfield to [defendant] dated November 7, 1994 and recorded in Document Number 9407298, is found by this Court to have the intent and effect of a conveyance of a conditional remainder interest in and to the following real estate situated in Phelps County, Missouri, more particularly described as follows:

All of the NW 1/4 of, Block 80 in Bishop's Third Addition to Rolla, Missouri.

G. That [plaintiffs] retain and hold all remainder of the right, title and interest in and to the above-described property by virtue of the General Warranty Deed dated March 15, 1996 from Isaac R. Hatfield to [plaintiffs] recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of Phelps County, Missouri in Document Number 9601482, subject to the conditional remainder interest of [defendant].

Plaintiffs filed the case that is the subject of this appeal January 29, 1999. Plaintiffs' petition sought determination of "their rights, title, and interest and the rights, title, and interest of [defendant] in the Property, specifically vesting fee simple title in them" and their costs and attorney fees.

The trial court found defendant did not pay 1996 or 1997 city or county real property taxes as required by the beneficiary deed by which defendant claimed an interest in the property. It concluded defendant thereby failed to satisfy the condition imposed by the beneficiary deed; that defendant had forfeited her "Conditional Remainder Interest" in the property so that the interest "re-vests in Mr. Hatfield." The trial court concluded that plaintiffs, "as a result of the Warranty Deed by Hatfield, obtained all of . . . Hatfield's interest in the Property, subject to the Conditional Remainder Interest of [defendant]." The trial court entered judgment dated March 28, 2000, declaring:

1. As a result of the forfeiture by [defendant] under the requirements of the Beneficiary Deed, her Conditional Remainder Interest in the Property now lies in [plaintiffs], who now hold a fee simple interest in the Property.

2. As a result the granting of a fee simple interest in [plaintiffs] in paragraph one herein above, all other claims are rendered moot. . . .

The trial court denied plaintiffs' request for attorney fees. Costs were taxed to plaintiffs.

Defendant's first point on appeal argues that the issues purportedly adjudicated in this case had been determined in prior litigation between the same parties; that the doctrine of res judicata precludes the determination the trial court made.

Defendant correctly points out that the doctrine of res judicata precludes a party from relitigating a previously litigated claim.

Res judicata is based on the principle that a party should not be able to litigate a claim and then, after an adverse judgment, seek to relitigate the identical claim in the second proceeding. State ex rel. Shea v. Bossola, 827 S.W.2d 722, 723[1] (Mo.App. 1992). "Res judicata thus protects the adversaries of parties who have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims from 'the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits.'" Bendis v. Alexander and Alexander, Inc., 916 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Mo.App. 1995) (citing Fleming v. Mercantile Bank & Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Mo.App. 1990)). Moreover, res judicata "'conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.'" Bendis at 217 (citing Fleming at 933-934).

The effect of res judicata is to prohibit the same parties from bringing a subsequent proceeding as to "'[e]very issue of fact which was or might have been litigated in the first proceeding . . . . Furthermore, a former judgment is not only conclusive as to matters in issue and embraced within the issue, but as to all matters which the parties could have alleged to sustain their action or defense.'" Barkley v. Carter County State Bank, 791 S.W.2d 906, 910-11 (Mo.App. 1990)(citations omitted).

Delhagen v. Miracle Recreation Equipment Co., Inc., 924 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Mo.App. 1996).

Res judicata bars a second action if "four identities" are present: (1) an identity of the thing sued for; (2) an identity of the cause of action; (3) an identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) an identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the claim is made. Id. A fact question that was actually and directly in issue in a former suit and was judicially determined in that suit is conclusively decided so far as the parties to the action and persons in privity with them are concerned. Norwood v. Norwood, 353 Mo. 548, 183 S.W.2d 118, 123 (1944).

The November 4, 1997, judgment determined the respective interests of the parties to that case (who are the parties to this case), as of that date, in the real estate in question. It did not determine what would constitute a future failure by defendant to meet the conditions imposed by the beneficiary deed regarding "pay[ment] [of] property tax due on the property." It could not have addressed whether defendant had complied with those conditions with respect to 1997 property taxes. The date that judgment was entered was not "within thirty days of the yearly payment date for said tax."³ It is not necessary to address whether defendant's non-payment of 1996 taxes could have been addressed in the prior litigation. Whether defendant paid those taxes has no bearing on defendant's failure to pay subsequent years' taxes.

Res judicata did not bar the trial court's March 28, 2000, determination of the respective interests of the parties in the real estate in question. The first case sought and obtained determination of the parties' respective interests in the real estate at the time that action was brought and tried. The present suit relates to the parties' respective interests in the real estate at a later point in time. In making the determination required by the present suit, defendant's actions, or inaction, since the first suit are considered. The first suit determined the condition of title on November 4, 1997. The present suit determined the condition of title on March 28, 2000. The identity of the thing sued for was not the same. Point I is denied.

Point II bases its claim of trial court error on the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. Point II is 25 lines long. It extends onto a second page of defendant's brief. It does not comply with directives of Rule 84.04.

Rule 84.04(d)(1) directs:

Where the appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court, each point shall:

(A) identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges;

(B) state concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and

(C) explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error. [Emphasis added.]

The point shall be in substantially the following form: "The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error]." [Emphasis in original.]

Defendant's Point II identifies the ruling...