Bomba v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 3:16-CV-01450
| Decision Date | 11 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | 3:16-CV-01450 |
| Parties | DENISE BOMBA Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE MARIANI)
On July 13, 2016, Plaintiff, Denise Bomba, brought suit against Defendants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"), the State Correctional Institution at Waymart ("SCI Waymart"), John E. Wetzel, Secretary of DOC, in his official capacity, Wayne Gavin, the Superintendent of SCI Waymart, in his individual and official capacity, Rhonda Ellett, the Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management at SCI Waymart, Paul DelRosso, Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services at SCI Waymart, Laura Banta, the Community Corrections Program Manager at SCI Waymart, Joseph Villella, a Lieutenant at SCI Waymart, Joseph Silva, a Nurse Supervisor at SCI Waymart, and Brad Soden, a Corrections Officer at SCI Waymart. Defendants Ellett, DelRosso, Banta, Villella, Silva, and Soden were each sued in his/her individual and official capacities. (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶¶ 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17).
The Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 18) on May 26, 2017. The First Amended Complaint did not add or drop any defendant.
An Answer to the Amended Complaint was filed on June 20, 2017 (Doc. 19).
On August 30, 2017, the Defendants collectively filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24). Briefing by the parties on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was completed on November 6, 2017. Thereafter, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was referred to Magistrate Judge Martin J. Carlson for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R").
On September 4, 2018, Magistrate Judge Carlson issued his R&R (Doc. 51) wherein he recommended that "Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 24) be DENIED as to a sole ADA privacy claim against Defendants Villella and Soden found in Count I of the Amended Complaint and as to the corresponding RA claims against the DOC and SCI Waymart filed in Count II, but that the motion should be GRANTED in all other respects." (Doc. 51, at 47). In so recommending, the Magistrate Judge also noted that Plaintiff Bomba, in her brief in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 49, at 13-14 n. 2), voluntarily withdrew her claims against Defendant Gavin. (Doc. 51, at n.1).
Plaintiff and Defendants both timely filed Objections to the R&R. (Docs. 54, 56).
For the reasons explained herein, the Court will adopt in part and reject in part the pending Report and Recommendation.
A District Court may "designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition" of certain matters pending before the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party timely and properly files a written objection to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the District Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id. at § 636(b)(1)(C); see also, Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3.
Here, timely objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R were filed by Plaintiff and Defendants. (Docs. 54, 56). Plaintiff and Defendants have fully briefed their respective objections. Plaintiff, in doing so, has stated both in her objections and in her brief in support thereof, that she does not object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendations "with respect to the disposition of her claims against Defendants Silva and DelRosso and her Title VII and equal protection challenges in Courts IV and VIII, respectively." (Doc. 54 at 5, n.1; see also, Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of her Objs., Doc. 55, at 3, n.2).
Thus, at issue here are Plaintiff's objections as to the recommendation that summary judgment be granted to Defendants with respect to Counts III, V, VI, and VII, and Defendants' objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that summary judgment be denied as to Counts I and II. Bomba does not object to the grant of summary judgmentto Defendants DelRosso and Silva, and as to her Title VII and equal protections claims in Counts IV and V, has withdrawn all claims against Defendant Gavin and does not object to the dismissal of Defendant Wetzel.1
The Court will address the parties' Objections in turn.
As with the analysis of Defendants' Objections, which will follow the analysis of Plaintiff's Objections, the Court begins by noting that the statement of material facts submitted by Defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment (Doc. 25) has been admitted by the Plaintiff in her response (Doc. 48) with the exception of paragraphs 28 and 69, which were denied by Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff, in responding to Defendants' statement of material facts ("SOMF") has attached statements to each of her admissions which dispute any "suggestion or inference", "characterization", or other conclusion which Plaintiff believes Defendants have drawn from the undisputed facts, such argument following an admission in response to Defendants' SOMF is unnecessary and may well be improper in a response to a statement of material facts. In any event, such additional argument does not convert Plaintiff's admissions into non-admissions. Nonetheless, the Court understands that several of the paragraphs of Defendants' SOMF present recitations of deposition testimony of various Defendants as to which Plaintiff's admission is limited to acknowledging that the testimony was accurately quoted. (See, e.g., SOMF, ¶¶ 74, 75, 78).
Plaintiff's first objection requests that this Court reject the Magistrate Judge's suggestion that Defendants be permitted to file a second dispositive motion on Plaintiff's claims in Count I and Count II against Defendants Villella, Soden, DOC and SCI Waymart, for improper disclosure of her confidential medical information, specifically, Bomba's use of Klonopin. (Doc. 55, at 4). Plaintiff argues that the Defendants "had a full opportunity in their summary judgment and reply briefs to provide detailed argument that these Defendants violated the ADA and RA by disclosing her confidential medical information." (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff asserts that allowing Defendants another opportunity to seek summary judgment on these claims would "significantly delay the resolution of the merits of this case, resulting in undue prejudice to Bomba." (Id. at 5).
In response, Defendants assert that they afforded "limited treatment to the specific subsections of the statute at issue because Plaintiff never properly raised the claim under the ADA subsection referenced (and corresponding RA provisions)." (Defs.' Br. in Opp. to Pl.'s Objs., Doc. 59, at 19). While the substance of Defendants' objections to the R&R's recommendation that summary judgment be denied to them on Counts I and II of Plaintiff's Complaint will be addressed in the Court's analysis of the Defendants' objections, the Court declines to adopt the Magistrate Judge's suggestion that Defendants be allowed an additional opportunity to obtain summary judgment on Counts I and II through supplemental briefing. While it is unclear whether the Magistrate Judge intended this suggestion to bepart of the formal Recommendation (see Doc. 51, at 47, n.15), to the extent it may be considered as part of the Recommendation to this Court, it is not adopted.
Next, the Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that Defendants had reasonable suspicion to conduct alcohol testing of Bomba. Plaintiff argues that the record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her, shows that "after conducting a reasonable suspicion analysis following Bomba's positive ion scans, Defendants concluded that she was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and was fit for duty, thereby refuting any reasonable suspicion to require a breath alcohol test." (Doc. 55, at 5)(emphasis in original). Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Defendants' alcohol test requirements, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion, furthers Defendants' interest in maintaining a safe and secure work environment and that Defendants, in any event, had reasonable suspicion to conduct the Plaintiff's alcohol testing. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff further challenges Defendants' claim that they have established a basis for their belief that all employees with a positive ion scan pose a safety risk due to alcohol use and, instead, Plaintiff argues that the Drug Interdiction Manual does not support Defendants' position. (Id. at 6-7).
Plaintiff additionally asserts that Defendants found that Bomba was not under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs and was fit for duty and that a drug test, but not an alcohol test, was recommended. (Id. at 7). Thus, Plaintiff argues that a dispute of fact exists as towhether the Defendants had a legitimate business reason for requiring Bomba to submit to an alcohol breath test when individualized reasonable suspicion for such test was absent.
The Defendants respond that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff's alcohol breath test and Defendant Villella's fitness for duty inquiries were job related and consistent with business necessity. In support of these assertions, Defendants maintain that the Drug Interdiction Procedural Manual (Doc. 26-1) in Sections 5 and 7 provide for automatic drug and alcohol screenings where there are two positive ion scans, citing the testimony of Laurie Hilsinger, the DOC's 30(b)(6) witness regarding Section 5 of the Drug Interdiction Manual. (Doc. 59, at 6). Defendants argue that ...
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