Bonam v. Southern Menhaden Corporation

• Decision Date: 05 August 1922
• Docket Number: 1505.
• Parties: BONAM v. SOUTHERN MENHADEN CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

284 F. 362

BONAM v. SOUTHERN MENHADEN CORPORATION.

No. 1505.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

August 5, 1922

Marion B. Jennings, of Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff.

Marks Marks & Holt, of Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant.

CLAYTON District Judge.

This cause now comes on for hearing on the motion of the plaintiff to strike the third plea to the fifth count and the third plea to the sixth count of the declaration upon the ground that each of the said pleas are frivolous and present no issue in the cause. Each of said pleas sets up as a defense that the suit was not brought within three years after the cause accrued. Rev. Gen Stats. Fla. Sec. 2939.

It may be that the question could have been more properly raised by demurrer than by motion to strike. But, without going into the differences of the office of a motion to strike and the office of a demurrer, it may be said that the pleas cannot be met by the motion here interposed (Hubbard v Anderson, 50 Fla. 217, 39 So. 107; Guggenheimer v Davidson, 62 Fla. 490, 56 So. 801), because it seems to me that the pleas of the statute of limitation are valid (Palmer v. Jackson, 62 Fla. 249, 57 So. 240).

If there is no federal statute of limitations, the federal courts will give effect to the statute of the state. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 17 L.Ed. 261; Michigan Ins. Bank v. Elred, 130 U.S. 693, 9 Sup.Ct 690, 32 L.Ed. 1080; Harrison v. Remington, etc., 140 F. 385, 72 C.C.A. 405, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 954, 5 Ann.Cas. 314. But it is only where there is no federal statute that the limitation prescribed by the state statute is applicable. Atlanta v. Chattanooga, etc., 127 F. 23, 61 C.C.A. 387, 64 L.R.A. 721; Chattanooga Foundry, etc., v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 27 Sup.Ct. 65, 51 L.Ed. 241; Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 15 Sup.Ct. 217, 39 L.Ed. 280.

However, the plaintiff insists that the statute of limitations cannot be allowed to defeat recovery here for the reason that the cause of action arose under maritime law and regulation, and that there is no statute of limitations in admiralty. It is true that there is no such statute known to admiralty jurisprudence, but even there the court may, in its discretion, apply the doctrine of laches as equivalent. Hence statutes barring old or stale claims are persuasive but are not controlling in admiralty causes.

When this cause was before Judge Call of this court on former hearing (284 F. 360) on another demurrer which is not now considered, it was held by him that, as it appears from the declaration that the plaintiff was a seaman, his rights to recover must be gaged by the maritime rather than by the common law, and that under the maritime law a seaman injured is entitled to recover his wages, his maintenance, and cure; that he is entitled to recover for indemnity for injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Now here for the first time is pleaded the statute of limitations (Rev. Gen. Stats. Fla. Sec. 2939).

I agree with Judge Call that the cause of action arose under maritime law; that the declaration shows as much; and that the maritime substantive law is properly resorted to in order to define the defendant's liability. However, the plaintiff has not sought redress in admiralty, but has elected to come into the law court. The determining feature of the questions is whether any enforcement of the statute of limitations would be in derogation of the right or would merely operate upon the remedy he has selected.

It is settled law that a statute of limitation, strictly so called excluding certain cases, for instance, where the title is acquired by...