Bonas v. Town of N. Smithfield

• Decision Date: 14 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 01-2139,01-2139
• Citation: 265 F.3d 69
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2001) CHRISTINE BONAS ET AL., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD ET AL., Defendants, Appellants. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 69

265 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2001)

CHRISTINE BONAS ET AL., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD ET AL., Defendants, Appellants.

No. 01-2139

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Heard Sept. 14, 2001

Decided September 19, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Marc DeSisto, with whom Kathleen M. Powers, and DeSisto Law Offices were on brief, for appellants.

Howard A. Merten, with whom Eric M. Sommers and Vetter & White were on brief, for appellees.

Before Selya and Lipez, Circuit Judges, and Doumar,^* Senior District Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, four registered voters residing in North Smithfield, Rhode Island (the Town) seek to compel the holding of an election in November of 2001. The plaintiffs claim that the Town's charter requires such an election and that the refusal of the defendants -- the Town and various Town plenipotentiaries -- to comply with the charter abridges the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to vote and to associate.¹ In an effort to parry this thrust, the defendants make four main arguments. First, they question the justification for federal court intervention. Second, they point to a 1998 referendum, approved by the voters of North Smithfield, which switched municipal elections to even-numbered years starting in the year 2002, and assert that this vote erases any need for an election in 2001. Third, the defendants claim that the voters ratified the plan to forgo the 2001 election during the 1999 election (in which the ballot mentioned lengthened terms for certain elected officials). Finally, the defendants interpose a series of equitable defenses -- waiver, estoppel, and the like.

The district court found no merit in the defendants' contentions, see Bonas v. Town of North Smithfield, No. 01-241, slip op. at 11-12 (D.R.I. Aug. 20, 2001), and ordered the Town to hold a regular election for town council and school committee in 2001. On this expedited appeal, the defendants renew the same arguments that the district court rejected. We heard oral argument on September 14, 2001, and ruled ore tenus that the Town must hold the election in question. This opinion explains the basis for our ruling. All applicable time periods (e.g., the time for filing petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc) shall run from the date of this opinion rather than from the date of our oral advisory.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1998, the voters of North Smithfield affirmatively answered four related referendum questions designed to transition the Town from an odd-year election cycle to an even-year cycle. The text of these referendum questions (three of which refer to the amendment of specified sections of the Town's charter) follows:

Article II, Section 2 - Shall the regular town election be held the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in even numbered years beginning in the year 2002?

* * *

Article V, Section 1 - Shall the term of the town administrator begin on the first day of December next following his/her election and extend to November 30th of the year 2002 and every two years thereafter?

* * *

Article XIV, Section 1 - Shall school committee members be elected at large at the regular biennial elections in even numbered years, keeping their staggered terms beginning in the year 2002 and serve for a term of four (4) years and until his/her successor is elected and qualified?

* * *

Shall all other provisions of the charter relating to the election, such as declarations, endorsements, nomination papers and primary date, be amended to be consistent with the state election calendar?

At the time of the referendum, Article II, section 2, of the Town's charter stated that "a regular town election shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in odd-numbered years." The charter further provided that town council members would be chosen at these "regular town election[s]," and Article IV, section 1, mandated that town councillors, once elected, would "serve for a term of two (2) years, such term to begin on the first day of December next following their election, or until their successors are elected and qualified." Article XIV, section 1, decreed that each school committee member "shall be elected at large at the regular biennial elections in odd-numbered years to serve for a term of four (4) years and until his successor is elected and qualified," and staggered the terms so that three of the five school committee slots were filled in one regular biennial election and the remaining two were filled in the next.

The charter amendments resulting from the 1998 referendum make clear that the first even-year town election is to take place in 2002. Those amendments do not explicitly mention any changes in the election schedule leading up to that year, other than a one-time lengthening of the Town Administrator's term (which would run from 1999 to 2002). Had the amendments contained similar language with respect to the town council and school committee terms, this case would not have seen the light of day.

Three school committee members had been elected in 1997, each to serve a four-year term in accordance with the charter provisions in effect at that time. Two school committee seats, and all the town council seats, were up for election in 1999. Despite the absence of any explicit voter mandate approving lengthened terms for town council and school committee members, the official ballot for the 1999 municipal election listed the terms for these offices as three and five years, respectively.² These inscriptions appeared out of thin air: neither the town council nor the board of canvassers had taken any official action aimed at lengthening the terms for these offices, and the meeting minutes for the relevant periods do not reflect that the matter was even considered. Notwithstanding this lack of documentation, however, the defendants assert -- for what it may be worth -- that this one-time extension was openly discussed in various official venues both before and after the referendum; that one candidate for office in the November 1999 election distributed a flyer stating that "[t]he next election will be held in November 2002"; and that much of the electorate plainly understood that the extension was part of the transition package.

Relying on this "understanding" and on the language that appeared on the 1999 ballot, the defendants decided not to hold a municipal election in 2001. The plaintiffs -- four registered voters in the Town of North Smithfield who desire to exercise their right to vote for town council and school committee in the 2001 election -- maintain that they learned of the Town's intention to forgo the election in February of 2001, at which point they unsuccessfully petitioned the town council and board of canvassers for redress.³

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs then filed suit in the federal district court, claiming a denial of their right to vote and their right to political association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The district court heard the matter on cross-motions for summary judgment, filed after the parties had stipulated to the pertinent facts. Ruling from the bench on August 3, 2001, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion, denied the cross-motion, and ordered the defendants to hold a regular town election in the year 2001 for town council and three school committee seats. The court further explained its rationale in a written decision issued two weeks later. This appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION

The first -- and most formidable -- obstacle in the plaintiffs' path is the question of federal jurisdiction.⁴ Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and therefore must be certain that they have explicit authority to decide a case. See Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1998) (en banc). Thus, we subject the plaintiffs' choice of a federal forum to careful scrutiny.

An earlier election case, Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978), sets forth the analytic framework. First, because the jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), parrots the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal jurisdiction hinges upon the existence vel non of a substantial claim under section 1983. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1070. In other words, federal courts have jurisdiction over claims arising out of a state or local electoral dispute if, and to the extent that, the complaint limns a set of facts that bespeaks the violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right.

It is certain that the right to vote -- the wellspring of all rights in a democracy -- is constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court long ago described that right as a "fundamental political right." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). Thus, the Constitution "protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964). Since municipalities are political subdivisions of state government, this means that the right to vote in local elections (including referenda elections) is constitutionally protected. See Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1075.

Despite this bedrock federal interest, a federal court may not inject itself into the midst of every local electoral dispute. Election law, as it pertains to state and local elections, is for the most part a preserve that lies within the exclusive competence of the state courts. Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1970). Thus, with only a few narrow and well-defined exceptions, federal courts are not authorized to meddle in local elections. Consequently, they normally may not superintend the step-by-step conduct of local electoral contests or undertake the resolution of "garden variety election...