Bonasorte v. City of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 15 April 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-0243
• Parties: CHARLES BONASORTE and THE PITTSBURGH STOP, INC., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

CHARLES BONASORTE and THE PITTSBURGH STOP, INC., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-0243

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 15, 2019

Judge Nora Barry Fischer

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this civil rights action, the U.S. Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") on February 7, 2019 recommending that Defendants, the City of Pittsburgh and Guy Costa's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Charles Bonasorte and the Pittsburgh Stop, Inc.'s Second Amended Complaint be granted, in part and denied, in part. (Docket No. 41). Presently before the Court are Defendants' Objections to the R&R, (Docket No. 42), and Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition, (Docket No. 43). After conducting a de novo review of the R&R and having carefully considered all of the parties' submissions, this Court adopts the R&R, in part, to the extent that it recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' declaratory/injunctive relief and due process claims (Counts I and II) be granted but declines to adopt the R&R to the extent that the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' equal protection and Monell claims (Counts III and IV) be denied. For the reasons more fully stated herein, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss and all of Plaintiffs' claims will be dismissed, with prejudice.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

As the facts are sufficiently set forth in the R&R, the Court starts its analysis with the relevant legal standard. (See Docket No. 41). To this end,

[w]hen objections are filed to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see alsoUnited States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980) (explaining the standard for a district court's review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation). The district court may accept, reject or modify—in whole or in part—the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations. § 636(b)(1)(C). Although the standard of review is de novo, § 636(b)(1) permits whatever reliance the district court, in the exercise of sound discretion, chooses to place on a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676; see alsoGoney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the discretion district courts have in their use of magistrate judges' reports).

Jerry-El v. Luther, No. 16-404, 2017 WL 5589090, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2017) (quoting Hinton v. Mark, No. 3:10-CV-305, 2017 WL 4342204, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2017)).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "Thus, 'only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).

Although the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, it is "not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause ofaction, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts which permit the court to make a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57.

Consistent with these principles, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has prescribed a three-step analysis for purposes of determining whether a claim is plausible. First, the court should "outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). Second, the court should "peel away" legal conclusions that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations."). Third, the Court should assume the veracity of all well-pled factual allegations and then "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 365 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This third step of the analysis is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

III. DISCUSSION

At the outset, the Court adopts the R&R insofar as it recommends dismissal of Plaintiffs' Counts I and II for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Docket No. 41). Plaintiffs did not timely object to the dismissal of either claim by the established deadline of February 21, 2019 and therefore waived the cursory arguments to reinstate Count II they have put forth in their response to Defendants' objections filed on March 7, 2019. See Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority v. General Elec. Intern. Inc., 561 F. App'x 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2014) (party waives objections to a Magistrate Judge's order by failing to properly object to same before DistrictCourt). With that said, the Court overrules Plaintiffs' untimely objections and grants the motion to dismiss Counts I and II.¹

In their Objections, Defendants reassert the defense of qualified immunity on behalf of Costa as to the class of one equal protection claim at Count III. (Docket No. 42). Although it was raised below, this defense was not specifically analyzed in the R&R and Defendants put forth a more robust argument for dismissal in their Objections. (Docket No. 41). At this stage, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs have failed to meet either prong of the applicable test to defeat the qualified immunity defense as they have not sufficiently pled their claim nor shown that the asserted rights were clearly established at the time. (Docket No. 42). Plaintiffs respond that they have sufficiently pled a "class of one" equal protection claim and while they admit that "'class of one' jurisprudence is still being fleshed out," they claim, without citing any authority, that their rights to not be subject to targeted, selective enforcement are "well-established." (Docket No. 43 at 6). Having considered the matter, the Court agrees that Count III is subject to dismissal as Plaintiffs cannot overcome the asserted qualified immunity defense.

As this Court recently articulated,

Qualified immunity [...] attaches "when an official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 200 L.Ed.2d 449 (2018) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77 (3d Cir. 2018); Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 2015); El v. City of Pittsburgh, No. CV 15-834, 2018 WL 3707420, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018).

...

In resolving questions of qualified immunity, "courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff sufficientlyalleged the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was 'clearly established' at the time of the official's conduct." Bland, 900 F.3d at 83 (citing L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016)). A court may evaluate these two prongs "in the order [it] deem[s] most appropriate for the particular case before [it]." Santini, 795 F.3d at 418 (citation omitted).

Kelley v. O'Malley, 328 F. Supp. 3d 447, 454 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2018). Further, "while issues of fact may preclude a definitive finding on the question of whether the plaintiff's rights have been violated, the court must nonetheless decide whether the right at issue was clearly established. Failure to do so is error." Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637, n.4 (3d Cir. 2015).

Although "[the Supreme] Court's caselaw does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." White, 580 U.S., at —, 137 S.Ct. at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted). "In other words, immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). [The Supreme] Court has "'repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.'" City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. —, —, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1775-1776, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)); see also Brosseau, supra, at 198-199, 125 S.Ct. 596.

Kisela, 138 S.Ct. at 1152. "Moreover, at the time the action is taken, the 'legal principle [must] clearly prohibit the officer's conduct in the particular circumstances before him. The rule's contours must be so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.'" Bland, 900 F.3d at 83 (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 577, 590, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

When addressing qualified immunity in the context of equal

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