Bonayon v. The Boeing Co.

• Decision Date: 01 August 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:22-01577-RMG-MGB
• Parties: Julius Bonayon, Plaintiff, v. The Boeing Company, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

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Julius Bonayon, Plaintiff, v. The Boeing Company, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:22-01577-RMG-MGB

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

August 1, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Julius Bonayon (“Plaintiff”), through counsel has filed this lawsuit alleging: race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”); national origin discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII; discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3-16.) Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas on March 17, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No 1-1.) The case was removed to federal court on May 18, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.)

Currently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum. (Dkt. No. 3-3.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND^[1]

This action arises out of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant from 2007 through 2020. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff is Filipino. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff began working for Defendant in June 2007 in Structure Assembly. (Id.) In approximately September or October 2019 Timothy Mason became Plaintiff's direct supervisor. (Id. at 5.) In November 2019, Plaintiff alleges that he had an argument with Alvaro Hormazo, a “temporary manager” who would “fill[] in for Mason from time to time,” (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 5), and that the argument occurred when Plaintiff did not complete work that Hormazo instructed Plaintiff to do. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6.) Plaintiff contends this is because Plaintiff was completing other work for Mason. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he met with a senior manager, Anthony Coney, to discuss this incident, and when Coney asked if Plaintiff wanted to report the incident to Human Resources, Plaintiff declined. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he chose not to report the incident because he feared retaliation. (Id.)

Around this same time, Plaintiff informed Mason of his plans to take a trip to the Philippines from December 3, 2019 to January 9 2020. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he understood he was short on leave, so in addition to vacation and sick leave, Plaintiff told Mason that he wanted to use Leave Without Pay (“LWOP”). (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Mason agreed to this and asked Plaintiff to send Mason an email with the information. (Id.) Plaintiff states he sent Mason the email but failed to mention using LWOP, and that Mason did not respond to the email. (Id.) A few days before Plaintiff was to leave for the Philippines, Plaintiff reminded Mason, both in-person and via email, of his pending trip and Plaintiff's plan to use a combination of vacation leave, sick leave, and LWOP. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Mason did not indicate that Plaintiff could not use LWOP, and that Mason again did not respond to Plaintiff's email. (Id.)

On December 3, 2019 Plaintiff traveled to the Philippines. (Id. at 7.) On January 8, 2020 Plaintiff missed a call from Mason, and he texted Mason back. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Mason believed Plaintiff was to have returned to work the previous day, January 7. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Mason his flight back to the United States was the next day, January 9, and that Plaintiff would be back at work on “Monday.” (Id.) The next day, while waiting at the airport in the Philippines, Plaintiff suffered a panic attack and was taken to the hospital. (Id.) While at the hospital, Plaintiff received a medical certificate from the doctor to give to Defendant detailing Plaintiff's hospital visit. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7; see Dkt. No. 8-1 at 11.) After leaving the hospital, Plaintiff booked another flight and texted Mason to inform him of Plaintiff's hospital visit. (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 5.) According to Plaintiff, Mason told Plaintiff to “contact . . . Total Access” if Plaintiff was intending to use FMLA time and “to go onto ETS to sign [his] time.” (Id.)

Plaintiff returned to the United States on January 15, 2020. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 8.) Upon landing in Atlanta, Plaintiff had a text message from Mason informing Plaintiff to call Mason immediately. (Id.) Plaintiff called Mason from the airport, and Mason informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff's employment was being terminated due to excessive absences.^[2] (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he later received his termination notice by mail. (Id.) This termination notice, an Employee Corrective Action Memo (CAM) signed by Mason and dated January 15, 2020, states that Plaintiff was discharged because he “accrued extended absences considered unacceptable.” (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 12.)

On February 19, 2020, Plaintiff met with Boeing investigators to provide a statement on his termination and course of employment with the company. (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 5-6.) Plaintiff alleged that Mason, who is African American, and Hormaza, who is Hispanic, did not like him because he is Asian. (Id. at 6.) He further alleged that he was treated differently than other employees, who were allowed to do less work with no repercussions. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he and the only other Asian employee working under Mason had previously complained to management. (Id.; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10.) On the same day as his meeting with Boeing investigators, Plaintiff also filed a Charge of Discrimination against Defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination based on his race and national origin, and that his termination was based on his medical condition. (Dkt. No. 8-1 at 2-3.) The EEOC issued Plaintiff's right-to-sue letter on January 14, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5.)

As noted, Plaintiff filed this action in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas on March 17, 2022, (Dkt. No. 1-1), and the case was removed to federal court on May 18, 2022 (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff's complaint brings claims against Defendant for: race discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981, and national origin discrimination under Title VII; discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); hostile work environment based on national origin under Title VII; retaliation for his complaints about race and national origin discrimination under Title VII; and violations of the FMLA. (Dkt. No. 1-1.)

Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum, which was filed on May 18, 2022. (Dkt. No. 3-3.) After requesting and receiving an extension of time to respond, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion on June 13, 2022. (Dkt. No. 8.) Defendant filed its Reply to Plaintiff's Response in Opposition on June 21, 2022. (Dkt. No. 9.) As such, the motion before the Court has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal Standard

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the complaint are ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the district court must “take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “In considering a motion to dismiss, [the court] accept[s] the complainant's well-pleaded allegations as true and view[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Stansbury v. McDonald's Corp., 36 F. App'x. 98, 98-99 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993)). However, while the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it need not accept the “legal conclusions drawn from the facts, . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 298).

II. Consideration of Documents Outside the Complaint

With its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant submitted as attachments Plaintiff's EEOC Charge of Discrimination and the Medical Certificate Plaintiff received detailing his January 2020 hospital visit in the Philippines. (Dkt. No. 3-1; Dkt. No. 3-2.) In his Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff submitted as Exhibit A this same EEOC charge with further attachments. (Dkt. No. 8-1).

There are “limited circumstances, when resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, [where] a court may consider exhibits without converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment.” Brennan v. Deluxe Corp., 361 F.Supp.3d 494, 501 (D. Md. 2019) (citing Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 791...