Bond v. Cerner Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02-1379.,02-1379.
• Citation: 309 F.3d 1064
• Parties: Linda D. BOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CERNER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1064

309 F.3d 1064

Linda D. BOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CERNER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-1379.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 12, 2002.

Filed: November 6, 2002.

Martin M. Meyers, argued, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Todd A. Brenner, argued, Columbus, OH (Philip F. Brown, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BYE, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Linda Bond appeals the district court's¹ adverse grant of summary judgment upholding the plan administrator's denial of her claim for total disability benefits under her former employer's employee welfare benefit plan. We affirm.

I.

Bond began working for Cerner Corporation on December 12, 1994, as a clinical marketing specialist. Cerner offered its employees total or partial disability benefits in accordance with its employee welfare benefit plan as follows:

What Constitutes Total Disability?

You are considered totally disabled and eligible for total disability benefits:

During the first 36 months for which benefits are payable and during the applicable elimination period — if you are unable to perform the substantial and material duties of your regular occupation and do not engage in any other work for wage or profit for which you are or become qualified by education, training or experience.

After the first 36 months of benefit payments — if you are unable to perform the substantial and material duties of any occupation for which you are or become qualified by education, training or experience.

Partial Disability Benefits

You can receive monthly benefits if your disability allows you to return to your regular job in a reduced capacity or on a part-time basis. Partial Disability benefits are payable in the same manner as the total disability benefit less a percentage of your monthly earnings during partial disability.

Appellant's App. 55.

The policy defines total and partial disability as follows:

"Partial Disability," means that the Insured Employee, because of Injury or Sickness, is:

(1) continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of his regular occupation;

(2) under the regular care of a licensed physician other than himself; and

(3) gainfully employed in his regular occupation on a partial and/or part-time basis.

"Total Disability" means that, during the Elimination Period and the Insured Employee Occupation Period ... the Insured Employee, because of Injury or Sickness, is:

(1) continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of his regular occupation;

(2) under the regular care of a licensed physician other than himself; and

(3) not gainfully employed in any occupation for which he is or becomes qualified by education, training or experience.

After the Monthly Benefit has been payable for the Insured Employee Occupation Period [as it was in Bond's case] ... "Total Disability" means that, because of Injury or Sickness, the Insured Employee is:

(1) continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of any occupation for which he is or becomes qualified by education, training or experience; and (2) under the regular care of a licensed physician other than himself.

Id. at 53-54.

The plan does not define "continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of [his or any] occupation."

It is undisputed Bond became temporarily totally disabled in April, 1996, and drew short-term disability benefits. She returned to her job on a part-time basis in September, 1996, and was paid partial disability benefits for over three years until her position was eliminated and she was terminated in December, 1999. Thereafter, Bond applied for and was denied total disability benefits because she was able to engage in part-time work. The plan administrator (Cerner) also denied benefits claiming Bond was able to perform full-time, low-level work.

Bond argued her ability to engage in part-time work did not mean she was unable to meet the definition of total disability, i.e., "continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of any occupation." Indeed, in order to obtain partial disability benefits Bond had shown she was "continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of her occupation" and "gainfully employed in her regular occupation on a partial and/or part-time basis." Therefore, Bond argued she could be employed part-time and still be continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of an occupation. Furthermore, Bond pointed out that the definition of total disability for the first 36 months included a prohibition against part-time work in any occupation, but the prohibition was eliminated for the period after 36 months, thereby implicitly indicating an intention to allow partial or part-time work.

The district court rejected Bond's arguments finding she failed to grasp the significance of the single word distinction between the definition of partial disability and total disability, i.e., "her" [occupation] versus "any" [occupation]. The district court determined that a substantial and material part of Bond's occupation was the ability to work eight hours a day, five days a week. The court further determined she had proven she was only able to work part-time in her occupation, and was therefore, "continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of her occupation." But the court determined Bond had failed to meet her burden of proving "that a `material and substantial' duty of all occupations ... is to work eight hours a day, five days a week ...." (Emphasis in original). In other words, the district court found Bond did not qualify for total disability benefits because, even though her occupation required full-time employment, she failed to prove all occupations required full-time employment.

We agree the district court properly denied Bond's request for total disability benefits, but affirm on an alternative basis. See Cooksey v. Delo, 94 F.3d 1214, 1218 (8th Cir.1996) (holding we may affirm the district court on any basis supported by the record).

II.

The parties agree the plan at issue is governed by the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. We review the denial of ERISA benefits under a de novo standard unless the plan gives the plan administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan. Delk v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104, 105 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989)). Bond asserts, and Cerner does not contest, that the plan contains no such grant of discretion, and therefore, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.

The parties agree Bond qualified for and received partial disability benefits for over 36 months. The parties also agree Bond was "continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of her regular occupation" and able to work part-time. Building on these facts, Bond argues her receipt of partial disability benefits proves a claimant can work part-time and still qualify for total disability benefits, i.e., be continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of any occupation.

It is the plan's second definition of total disability, applicable after receipt of benefits for 36 months, that applies to Bond's claim for total disability benefits. To obtain benefits under this definition, Bond must show an inability to "continuously... perform the substantial and material duties of any occupation ...." Cerner...