Bond v. Messerman

Decision Date28 April 2005
Docket NumberNo. 1067,1067
Citation873 A.2d 417,162 Md. App. 93
PartiesWilliam C. BOND v. Gerald A. MESSERMAN, et al.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Timothy M. Gunning, Towson (Richard M. Karceski, on brief), for appellant.

Daniel J. Moore, Towson, for appellee.

Panel DAVIS, SALMON, RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR., (retired, specially assigned), JJ.

DAVIS, J.

Appellant, William C. Bond, filed suit against appellees, Gerald A. Messerman and Sheppard Pratt Health System, Inc. (Sheppard Pratt) on February 4, 2003 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud, stemming from Messerman's failure to expunge appellant's Ohio juvenile records. On April 11, 2003, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and a hearing on the motion was held on May 14, 2003. The Court (Matricciani, J.) held the matter sub curia, and issued a written Order on May 16, 2003, granting appellant's motion, ruling: "[U]nder the facts and circumstances of this case, the court can exercise neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction over [appellee]." On May 3, 2004, another member of the circuit court (Berger, J.) issued an oral ruling, granting the summary judgment motion filed by Sheppard Pratt Health Systems. From the circuit court's grant of Messerman's motion to dismiss and Sheppard Pratt's motion for summary judgment, Bond noted this appeal, presenting two questions for our review:

I. Did the circuit court err by ruling [that] it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Messerman?
II. Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment on Count V (negligence) in favor of [Sheppard Pratt]?

Finding no error, we shall affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

On June 19, 1981, in the garage of his grandparents' home in Chagrin Falls, Ohio, little more than seven months before his eighteenth birthday, appellant bludgeoned his father to death with a hammer. After murdering his father, appellant stuffed the body into the trunk of his father's car, drove it to an isolated location, and left the car there. A warrant for appellant's arrest was issued three days later.

Messerman, an Ohio attorney, was retained to represent appellant. On July 1, 1981, Judge Frank G. Lavrich, of the Juvenile Division of the Geauga County, Ohio Common Pleas Court, heard sufficient evidence "tending to show that there is reason to believe that William Rovtar[1] did commit the offense as charged in the complaint and that said act would constitute a felony if committed by an adult." The judge ordered that appellant be held at the Geauga Juvenile Center and undergo psychological testing.

The fact that the hearing occurred, but not its contents, was reported in a July 9, 1981, article in a local newspaper, the Chagrin Valley Herald Sun. The article stated:

Geauga County Juvenile Judge Frank Lavrich ruled last week that there is sufficient grounds for the arrest of William Rovtar, 17, charged with the murder June 19 of his father, Mirko Rovtar, Jr., 37, in Bainbridge Township.
Lavrich made his decision after hearing testimony and evidence for nearly 2½ hours. He also ordered psychiatric testing for Rovtar, required for juveniles under Ohio law.
....
According to Robert Shields, chief probation officer for Geauga County, psychiatric testing of Rovtar will begin next week at the Ohio Youth Commission's Scioto Village Diagnostic Center in Powell, Ohio.
Shields said that in addition to the psychiatric testing, a social investigation of the boy has begun.
Rovtar is a student at University School in Pepper Pike, where he was to begin his senior year in September.

On August 31, 1981, based on an agreement Messerman negotiated with the prosecutor, Judge Lavrich agreed to retain jurisdiction in the Juvenile Division, and he accepted appellant's guilty plea to his father's murder. Part of the plea agreement included appellant's commitment to a psychiatric hospital, and Messerman located and recommended Sheppard Pratt, in Baltimore County, Maryland, as a suitable hospital. Appellant alleges that he and Messerman "discussed the concept of expungement in 1981, prior to the proffer of the delinquent plea ..., its legal effects under Ohio law and the importance to [appellant] of being able to expunge his juvenile record."

The juvenile court's order described the disposition preliminarily imposed:

William Rovtar was committed to the permanent custody of the Ohio Youth Commission.... Execution of the commitment [sic] was suspended pending an evaluation of 60 day duration at a Mental Health facility, the Pratt Shephard Hospital [sic] regarding the suitability and feasibility of said William Rovtar being committed to such facility for treatment, care and counseling. Said hospital to submit to the Court a report accepting said juvenile as a suitable patient along with a diagnosis, prognosis, program of treatment and care and the projected duration of such program.

In a September 1, 1981 article in the Geauga Times Leader, the prosecutor, Craig Albert, was quoted as saying, "Commitment cannot last beyond his 21st birthday."

In fulfillment of the juvenile court's order, after appellant spent approximately sixty days at Sheppard Pratt, Judge Lavrich received the following report from Kay Pak Koller, M.D., a psychiatrist at the hospital:

William Rovtar has been an inpatient at this facility since September 23, 1981. He has been receiving intensive psychiatric treatment which include [sic] three times per week individual psychotherapy and four times per week group psychotherapy, including 24 hour nursing care and other therapies.
William has been responding to the therapeutic approach. Currently, he uses less denial and has gained better insight into his problems. Without intensive psychotherapy in the hospital setting, he is considered to be suicidal as he became aware of his previous violent act. Thus, it is strongly recommended of [sic] long term hospitalization in order to work through his conflicts and depression.
His prognosis appears to be good since he is responding to the intensive psychotherapy in the hospital setting.

After receiving that report and holding a hearing, Judge Lavrich ordered final disposition on December 11, 1981:

The Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital having duly made its diagnosis and treatment plan for the respondent, William Rovtar and the Court finding same to be appropriate and in the best interest of the minor and the community interest, same is hereby approved. William Rovtar is hereby placed in the temporary custody of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital for care and treatment.

Sheppard Pratt released appellant from its custody on July 31, 1982; appellant spent less than a year in the hospital. Appellant's father's estate was settled in 1982. On June 14, 1982 (shortly before appellant's release), Messerman sent a letter to appellant at Sheppard Pratt, advising him that his grandfather, as executor of his father's estate, had filed a declaratory judgment action regarding the estate. Paragraph 9 of the complaint in that case alleged:

9. Plaintiff further states that on August 31, 1981, WILLIAM C. ROVTAR was found to be a "delinquent" by causing the death of his father, MIRKO L. ROVTAR, JR., and remanded to the permanent custody of the Ohio Youth Commission but the execution of the commitment was suspended pending an evaluation of sixty (60) days duration at a mental health facility; on December 11, 1981 the Juvenile Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Geauga County, Ohio placed WILLIAM C. ROVTAR in the temporary custody of the SHEPPARD & ENOCH PRATT HOSPITAL in Towson, Maryland for care and treatment, as is more particularly set forth in Case No. 81J379 of the Records of the Juvenile Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, Geauga County, Ohio.

Additionally, a motion to intervene in that case was filed by the Insurance Company of North America. The insurer's motion explained its dilemma:

Intervenor is uncertain as to whether or not it should pay insurance funds to, William C. Rovtar, due to the fact that said, William C. Rovtar, has been found delinquent by causing the death of decedent, intervenor's insured....

Messerman's June 14, 1982 letter informed appellant of these issues, and advised him to accept a settlement he was helping to negotiate with the other parties.

On September 13, 1982, after another hearing, the juvenile court placed appellant on probation until his twenty-first birthday, requiring him to continue his outpatient treatment with Sheppard Pratt. After appellant turned twenty-one, the court terminated his probation on February 22, 1985. Later that year, around December 4, 1985, appellant received a letter from his probation officer confirming that his probation had terminated, and explaining that appellant could "file an application, available from this Court, for the expungement of [appellant's] juvenile record two years from this action." In 1985, Messerman allegedly told appellant that his "juvenile record would be expunged" and that appellant "would never have to admit to the existence of the juvenile case once the record was expunged."

Appellant alleges that he called Messerman shortly after receiving the probation officer's letter, reminding Messerman of his desire to have his juvenile records expunged. In a letter of January 17, 1986, addressed to appellant at his St. Paul Street address in Baltimore City, and printed on "Messerman & Messerman" law firm stationery, Messerman asked, "Please remind me in two years to file an application for expungement and I will do so." Appellant called Messerman soon thereafter, saying that because Messerman had been paid $25,000 to represent appellant,2 Messerman ought to file for expungement without the necessity of a reminder. Messerman agreed.

Eight years later, appellant wrote to Messerman on May 12, 1994:

Dear Gerry,
Its [
...

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