Bond v. State ex rel. Wilson

• Decision Date: 21 November 1932
• Docket Number: 1760
• Citation: 45 Wyo. 133,16 P.2d 53
• Parties: BOND, ET AL. v. STATE EX REL. WILSON, ATTY. GEN., ET AL
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

16 P.2d 53

45 Wyo. 133

BOND, ET AL. v. STATE EX REL. WILSON, ATTY. GEN., ET AL

No. 1760

Supreme Court of Wyoming

November 21, 1932

ERROR to District Court, Converse County; C. O. BROWN, Judge.

Action by the State on the relation of William O. Wilson, Attorney General, and others, against Wallace C. Bond and others members of the Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming. To review a judgment in favor of plaintiffs defendants bring error.

Case remanded and judgment modified.

For the plaintiff in error there was a brief by Corthell, McCollough and Corthell, of Laramie, Wyoming, and oral argument by Mr N.E. Corthell.

The case turns on the following questions of law. (1) Whether the Act of 1929 establishing the Higgins Memorial foundation is constitutional; (2) In what state agencies the administration of the property accruing to the state under the Higgins will is vested. It is understood that defendants in error make the following contentions, (a) that the questions here presented have been adjudicated in former actions; (b) that the Act of 1929 is void, being in conflict with Article VII, Sections 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8 and Article III, Section 27; (c) that the Act of 1929 is in conflict with the Act of 1927, directing that grants to the State not otherwise appropriated shall be kept as trust funds for the benefit of public schools, as impaired vested rights, and is therefore void; (d) that the Act of 1929 is further in conflict with Article VII, Section 13, and Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, vesting control of State lands in the Board of Land Commissioners, and is therefore void. Other subsidiary contentions will be noticed during the course of the discussion. All of the parties regard the State as the owner of the property. The proceeding is in the nature of quo warranto for a solution of questions of distribution, official authority and the allocation of the funds accruing to the State. Chap. 157, Laws 1929 established the Higgins Memorial Foundation, and expressly repealed all conflicting legislation. The effect of the Act was to supersede the Act of 1927 and all prior Acts regulating the administration or disposition of the property. Mau v Stoner, 41 Wyo. 183; Marsh v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo 119. No question of vested rights is involved. The occasion for considering them usually arises under such provisions as Section 6, Article I or Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. Ross v. Trustees, 31 Wyo. 464, 482 et seq.; Cooley, Const. Limitations (6th Ed.) 436 et seq., 12 C. J. 955; Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 673. The State's discretion is not exhausted by the Act of 1929. A natural approach to the solution of the controversy is from the standpoint of the donor. Wyndehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 396; Wilson Bros. v. Branham, (Va.) 109 S.E. 189; Cowles v. Morris, (Ill.) 161 N.E. 150; Mason v. Finley, (S. C.) 124 S.E. 780. A direction to create a trust is enforceable as a trust. Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 300; Murphy v. Carlin, (Mo.) 20 S.W. 786; Trustees v. School Dist., (N. H.) 75 A. 100. A statute will not be declared void unless its injury appears beyond reasonable doubt. Zancanelli v. Co., 25 Wyo. 511; State v. W. S. Buck Merc. Co., 38 Wyo. 47, 57. Courts are not concerned with questions of policy. State v. Irvine, 14 Wyo. 318, 387; Budge v. Commrs., 29 Wyo. 35. School districts are not especial wards of the Constitution. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Dist., 37 Wyo. 269, 270. The primary question is whether the Act of 1929 is in conflict with the Constitution which involves three constituent questions: (a) whether the beneficial interest is automatically allocated by Article VII of the Constitution; (b) whether custody of lands is vested by Art. XVIII in the Board of Land Commissioners; and (c) as to the personal property, whether any exclusive provision is made for its custody or administration. Article VII, Sec. 2, Const., declares certain funds to be perpetual of which the income only can be appropriated, making up five classes of accessions. The general contentions of plaintiffs on final submission of the causes was that the grant to the State is absolute, and unconditional divested of any trust funds imposed by the will or decree. This contention is based on the assumption that the decree superseded the will and precludes resort to its terms for any purpose, whatsoever. Statements of authority by plaintiffs are apparently not pertinent to questions presented in this cause, the finality of the probate decree is to be taken with the restraint inherent in probate proceedings. But the judgment or decree must be confined to the issues. In re Fitzgerald's Estate, (Calif.) 119 P. 96, 98; Town of Newcastle v. Smith, 28 Wyo. 371. The sole function of the probate court was to designate distribution in accordance with the will and nothing more. Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222; Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 300; Armstrong v. Grandin, 39 U.S. 368. So far as we are informed, Judge Tidball never entered any order or judgment in the probate proceeding. Neither the oral statements of the judge concerns the effect or scope of his decisions, Sewall v. McGovern, 29 Wyo. 62, nor his letters, Stevens v. Laub, 38 Wyo. 182, can be used to explain, contradict or modify his judgment. They are comparable to the affidavit of an attorney, Gustavenson v. State, 10 Wyo. 300, or the affidavits of jurors, Bunce v. McMahon, 6 Wyo. 24; Pullman Co. v. Findley, 20 Wyo. 456, not admissible to explain, impeach or interpret a verdict, aside from the limitations inherent in the nature of the state as the representative of the people, there are numerous injunctions laid by the constitution upon the State agencies with respect to the disposition of its property and funds somewhere to be found in Art. I, Sec. 19; Article III; Sec. 30, 35, 38, 39, 40; Article XV, Sec. 8; Article XVI, Sec. 6 and Art. XVIII, Sections 1 and 2, and indicated in decisions of this court. Farm Invest. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110; Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496; State v. Irvine, 14 Wyo. 318. The significance of the words of the decree of distribution is that the remaining property is thereby vested by full and absolute title in the state will be clarified by reference to the pleading in Ross v. Trustees, 31 Wyo. 464. In grants of this character to the state, the word "absolute," does not import an unconditional ownership. A trust is attached limiting the power of disposal. If the bequest follows within the provisions of Article VII, Sec. 3, a trust for school purposes under Sec. 6 is automatically attached, and no other distribution could be made of the property. If the discretionary trust expressed in the will is given effect, the legislative power over the subject matter is enlarged and not limited to the school fund. A trust is an obligation arising out of a confidence reposed to apply properly, faithfully and according to such confidence. Walter v. Thurmond, 17 Wyo. 268; Tibbals v. Keys, 40 Wyo. 524; Tentative Restatement Trusts, Sec. 2, p. 14 et seq. Courts will construe wills and enforce trusts. 3 Pomeroy's Eq. 1156. Such jurisdiction is not ousted by the pendency of probate proceeding. Rosenberg v. Frank, 58 Cal. 387. District Courts have original jurisdiction. Littleton v. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58; Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222; In re Ewer's Will, (Cal.) 171 P. 683; Bentley v. Whitney Benefits, 41 Wyo. 11. The provisions of Art. VII of the Constitution, we believe was intended to refer to Federal Grant lands and grants falling within the purview of Sec. 3 of the article were intended to refer to grants from public or private sources. Interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499; Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379; Church v. U.S. 143 U.S. 457; Towne v. Eisler, 245 U.S. 418; Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368; Cooley Const. L. (6th Ed.) 51; State v. Carter, 30 Wyo. 22; State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199; U. S. v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572. The conclusions of the trial court set forth in a letter from the judge thereof were not raised or discussed in the arguments with reference to the scope of the Act of 1929; moreover, they would defeat the purpose of the Act, and produce an absurd result, which is not permissible. Houghton Bros. v. Yocum, 41 Wyo. 57, 61; Griggs v. Thulemeyer, 41 Wyo. 36. Long continued and uniform legislative or administrative interpretation are entitled to great weight. People v. Shawver, 30 Wyo. 366; Meyers v. U. S. , 272 U.S. 52; Hampton v. U.S. 276 U.S. 394; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304. Sundry grants of land were made by Congress to the State in the Act of admission. These grants were in the thoughts of those who formed and adopted the Constitution and have received a uniform interpretation by legislative action, all of which are subjects of judicial notice, People v. Shawver, supra; State v. Schnitger, 17 Wyo. 65, and are persuasive in the interpretation of the Constitution. Spratt v. Power Co., 37 Mont. 60, 94 P. 631; People ex rel. Jackson v. Potter, 47 N.Y. 375. The Higgins bequest was for discretionary use as appears from the language of the will. The gift is not comparable to that of the lands received under congressional grants. The lands were improved and suited to certain purposes and the court should look at the circumstances under which will was made. Strain v. Sweeney, (Ill.) 45 N.E. 201; Murphy v. Carlin, (Mo.) 20 S.W. 786. Plaintiffs rely upon Section 3 of Article XVIII to support the contention that the lands of the Higgins estate are placed thereby under the control of the Board of Land Commissioners. With the exception of Sec. 2 of the Article, no reference is made to land grants from any other source. The point is discussed in Ross v. Trustees, 30 Wyo. 433. If ...