Bond v. State
| Decision Date | 31 August 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 870S190,870S190 |
| Citation | 272 N.E.2d 460,257 Ind. 95 |
| Parties | Bessie Freeman BOND, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
C. Kent Carter, Bloomington, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., William F. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
On December 3, 1968, the appellant, Bessie Freeman Bond, was charged by affidavit in the Monroe Circuit Court with theft under the Offenses Against Property Act, Burns' Ind.Stat.Ann., § 10--3030, IC 1971, 35--17--5--3. On November 12, 1969, appellant waived trial by jury. On November 18, 1969, appellant was found guilty by the court. On January 12, 1970, the court entered the following judgment.
'The Court having heretofore found the defendant guilty of theft of property not from the person, of less than $100 in value, now fixes for her punishment that she be fined in the sum of $50. and the cost of this action and that she be sentenced to the Superintendent of the Correctional Department of the Indiana State Women's Prison for a period of one (1) year from this date.'
Appellant's only contention of error is that evidence was insufficient to support her conviction which rests solely on circumstantial evidence.
We must look to the evidence set forth in the record of the instant case to determine whether it is of such probative value that a reasonable inference of each element of the offense of 'Theft,' as set forth in Burns' Ind.Stat.Ann., § 10--3030, could have been drawn by the trial judge. Burns' Ind.Stat.Ann., § 10--3030, defines 'Theft' as follows:
'Theft in general.--A person commits theft when he (1) knowingly:
(a) obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner; or
(b) obtains by deception control over property of the owner or a signature to any written instrument; or
(c) obtains by threat control over property of the owner or a signature to any written instrument; or
(d) obtains control over stolen property knowing the property to have been stolen by another, wherever the theft may have occurred; or
(e) brings into this state property over which he has obtained control by theft, wherever the theft may have occurred; and (2) either:
(a) intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property; or
(b) uses, conceals or abandons the property in such manner as knowingly to deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit; or
(c) uses, conceals or abandons the property knowing such use, concealment or abandonment probably will deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit.' (Acts 1963 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 10, § 3, p. 10.)
The two essential elements necessary to prove that the appellant committed the offense of 'Theft' in the instant case are: (1) that she obtained or exerted unauthorized control over the property of another, and (2) that she did so with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of such property. Regarding the element of obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over the property of another, the record discloses the following evidence. On November 29, 1968, Robert Witherall, Manager of Whiteside's Clothing Store, in Bloomington, Indiana, observed is sales personnel discussing a certain 'pigskin' dress with a 'good' customer. Mr. Witherall then observed the customer leave the store to go next door to get something to eat and think about purchasing the dress, which was valued at from seventy-five ($75.00) to one hundred ($100.00) dollars. Shortly thereafter, three Negro women came in the store together. One of the three ladies engaged two of the three sales personnel in a conversation, in the rear portion of the store. The other two women remained in the front portion of the store, where only one of the sales personnel remained. There is no evidence as to where the appellant was at the time in the store. The women did not purchase anything while in the store and were seen leaving by Mr. Witherall. Immediately after the three Negro women had left the store, the woman who had been interested in purchasing the 'pigskin' dress, returned to purchase it. It was then discovered that the dress was no longer in the store. Mr. Witherall testified that he was in the store constantly and that no other customers, other than the three Negro women, were in the store after the customer interested in the 'pigskin' dress had left to think over the purchase and before her return to purchase the dress. Having learned of the disappearance of the dress, Mr. Witherall called the Bloomington Police, informing them of the circumstances preceding the disappearance. Mr. Witherall then sent a store employee to look for the three Negro women. Soon...
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Fox v. State
...the crime is not sufficient to allow an inference of participation. Conard v. State (1977), Ind.App., 369 N.E.2d 1090; Bond v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 95, 272 N.E.2d 460. However, we acknowledge that presence, coupled with other circumstances, may be sufficient. Thus, evidence of companionsh......
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Byrer v. State, 3-1080A322
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