Bonds v. Walton Verona Indep. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 12 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-53-DLB-CJS |
| Parties | TODD BONDS PLAINTIFF v. WALTON VERONA INDEPENDENT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
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This matter is before the Court regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (R. 15, 18). Plaintiff filed a joint Response to both Motions. (R. 20). Defendant Walton Verona filed a Reply. (R. 21). These motions have been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Referral Order in this case. (R. 12). For the reasons explained below, it will be recommended that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (R. 15, 18) be GRANTED.
Plaintiff Todd Bonds was employed as a teacher by Defendant Walton Verona Independent Board of Education ("Walton Verona") for the 2011-2012 school year. (R. 15-2). Bonds was employed on a one-year contract. (Id.) At the conclusion of the 2011-2012 school year, WaltonVerona opted not to renew Bonds's contract for the following year. (R. 15-3).
After Plaintiff was informed that his contract would not be renewed, he filed an EEOC complaint against Walton Verona for racial discrimination and sent 16 requests for records to Walton Verona under Kentucky's Open Records Act. (R. 15-1, at 2). Between October 2, 2013, and April 28, 2015, Bonds sent at least 51 emails to Walton Verona or members of the School Board with various records requests, accusations of misconduct, and offers for settlement. (See id.). As of the parties' briefings on the current Motions, Plaintiff was involved in two lawsuits against Walton Verona in Kentucky state court. (Id.). One lawsuit, filed by Walton Verona on May 13, 2014, in the Boone Circuit Court, is an appeal of the Kentucky Attorney General's decision on one of Plaintiff's many open records requests. (Id. at 14-15). The other lawsuit, filed by Bonds on December 22, 2014, and also in the Boone Circuit Court, alleged various employment claims, including that Walton Verona was engaged in racial discrimination and had retaliated against him for whistle blowing. (Id., at 8). Additionally, Bonds has filed three unsuccessful complaints with the Kentucky Bar Association against Defendant Donald Ruberg, who serves as attorney for Walton Verona. (Id. at 2).
In response to Plaintiff's perceived harassment, Walton Verona banned Plaintiff from entering school board premises on December 31, 2013. (Id. at 4). Walton Verona later modified the ban to allow Bonds to enter school board premises only for the purpose of attending school board meetings open to the general public. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff's emails to Defendants indicate that he at some point intended to personally serve a school board member at her home with filings related to the various disputes between him and Walton Verona, but was informed by Defendant Ruberg that such action would constitute harassment and that he had been repeatedly instructed not to havepersonal contact with board members or other individuals named in the lawsuit. (R. 2-2, at 1-2). Bonds was informed via email on February 25, 2015, that all communication with school representatives should be made in writing or by email and forwarded to Defendant Ruberg. (Id.).
Bonds filed the Complaint in this case on April 16, 2015. (R. 2). The Defendants named in the Complaint were Walton Verona, Donald Ruberg, and Ruberg's law firm, O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan, and Sergent. (Id. at 1). The Complaint lists three counts, each against all named Defendants: Count 1 alleges "censorship," Count 2 alleges "ethnic bullying," and Count 3 alleges destruction of open records in violation of KRS § 519.060. Defendants Donald Ruberg and O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan, & Sergent have moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety (R. 15), as has Defendant Walton Verona (R. 18). Bonds filed a Response addressing both Motions to Dismiss. (R. 20). Defendant Walton Verona filed a Reply. (R. 21). The Motions are ripe for review.
Defendants Walton Verona, Ruberg, and O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan, & Sergent seek to dismiss Plaintiff Bonds's2 Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 11). When adjudicating a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although the complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In addition, in this case Bonds is proceeding pro se. While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, they still must satisfy basic pleading requirements. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)).
In considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the reviewing court is required to "accept all the Plaintiff['s] factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff." Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005). If an allegation is "capable of more than one inference, it must be construed in the plaintiff's favor." Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 575, 807 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (quoting Block v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)). The Court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot be plausibly drawn from the facts, as alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff has filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which says:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under this statute, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) Defendants were acting under color of state law, and (2) Defendants deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 2002).
Moreover, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a public entity, "[a plaintiff] must show that [the public entity] itself is the wrongdoer." Doe v. Claireborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). (emphasis added). "[The public entity] cannot be found liable unless the plaintiff can establish that an officially executed policy, or the toleration of a custom within the [public entity] leads to, causes, or results in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right." Id.
Bonds asserts that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in two different ways. First, Bonds alleges that he was censored by Defendants in violation of his First Amendment rights (Count 1 of the Complaint). (R. 2, at 4-5). Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to "ethnic bullying," which the Court interprets as a claim that his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated due to racial discrimination (Count 2 of the Complaint). (Id. at 5-6). In addition to his two constitutional claims, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated Kentucky state law by destroying public records (Count 3 of the Complaint). (Id. at 6-7).
Bonds brings his liberally construed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for "censorship" and "ethnic bullying" against all Defendants, including Walton Verona, Donald Ruberg, and O'Hara, Ruberg, Taylor, Sloan, & Sergent. (R. 2). However, because Defendant Ruberg and his law firm are notconsidered state actors for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, it will be recommended that the constitutional claims (Counts 1 and 2 of the Complaint) against those parties be dismissed.
It is firmly established that an attorney, while acting in that capacity for a state actor, is not in itself a state actor for the purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981). Additionally, "[l]awyers are not, merely by virtue of being officers of the court, state actors for Section 1983 purposes." Cicchini v. Blackwell, 127 F. App'x 187, 190 (6th Cir. 2005). Since Plaintiff cannot credibly maintain that either Ruberg or O'Hara, Taylor, Ruberg, Sloan & Sergent were acting under color of state law, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them cannot stand. Therefore, Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed against those Defendants.
Although the state actor limitation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires the Court to recommend dismissal of those claims as to certain defendants in this case, all of Plaintiff's claims should also be dismissed against all defendants based on their...
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