Bonenberger v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 08 July 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:12CV21 CDP.
• Citation: 956 F.Supp.2d 1059
• Parties: David BONENBERGER, Plaintiff, v. ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

956 F.Supp.2d 1059

David BONENBERGER, Plaintiff,

v.ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:12CV21 CDP.

United States District Court,

E.D. Missouri,

Eastern Division.

July 8, 2013.

C. John Pleban, Lynette M. Petruska, Pleban and Petruska Law, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

Dana W. Tucker, Attorney General of Missouri, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CATHERINE D. PERRY, District Judge.

Plaintiff David Bonenberger, who is white, claims that he was not given the position of Assistant Director of the St. Louis Police Academy because of his race. Bonenberger has sued the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, the Board of Police Commissioners, six former and current members of the Board of Police Commissioners and three officers of the Police Department: Chief Daniel Isom, Lt. Col. Reggie Harris, and Lt. Michael Muxo. Bonenberger's five-count complaint alleges racial discrimination and conspiracy in violation of federal and state statutes.

Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that Bonenberger has not adduced sufficient evidence on any of his claims and also claiming qualified immunity. I conclude that Bonenberger has established issues of fact regarding racial discrimination and civil conspiracy, and so I will deny summary judgment as to those issues. I also conclude that the individual police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. However, Bonenberger has not shown any genuine disputes of fact that would allow his claims of municipal liability to go forward, so I will grant summary judgment on Count V.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sgt. David Bonenberger, a white male, alleges that he applied for the Assistant Directorship of the St. Louis Police Academy and was denied the position because of his race. The Assistant Director reports to Lt. Muxo, the Director of the Academy. Muxo reports to Lt. Col. Harris, who, in turn, reports to Chief Isom.

The Department posting for the Assistant Academy Director position listed minimal qualifications that included three years of supervisory experience. Three candidates applied for the position: Sgt. Bonenberger, Sgt. Angela Taylor (an African American female), and Sgt. James Buckeridge (a white male). None of the three candidates met the minimum threshold of three years of supervisory experience. Only Sgt. Buckeridge was interviewed; during this interview he was told that he would not be considered because he lacked the full three years of supervisory experience. Lt. Muxo eventually recommended to Lt. Col. Harris that Taylor be detached, meaning temporarily placed into the position. Lt. Col. Harris passed that recommendation along to Chief Isom, who instead transferred, or permanently assigned, Taylor into the Assistant Directorship.

Bonenberger filed a grievance with the Department requesting an interview with unbiased personnel present. In his grievance, he did not mention racial discrimination, but merely complained that departmental procedures were not followed. He also filed a race-discrimination complaint with the EEOC, which issued a right-to-sue letter. In response to Bonenberger's grievance, Chief Isom stated that he transferred Taylor because of his own knowledge of Taylor's qualifications and Lt. Muxo's recommendation. Isom specifically cited that Taylor had “the most time in rank and a clean disciplinary background.” Neither of those things was actually true.

Bonenberger alleges that after the position was posted, but before he applied, Lt. Muxo told him that he “shouldn't put in for it because the position was going to a black female” and that the decision came from Lt. Col. Harris. Bonenberger further testified that after he filed his grievance within the Department, Lt. Muxo sought him out and told him that the position went to Sgt. Taylor because Lt. Muxo “had to bring color to the Academy.” Sgt. Deborah Boelling, the Assistant Director immediately preceding Sgt. Taylor, stated that when she recommended Bonenberger for the position, Lt. Muxo responded that “Lt. Col. Harris wanted a black female in the position ... [and] that there was no way Lt. Col. Harris would put a white male in the position.” ¹ Lt. Muxo denies making these statements. The Department has written policies prohibiting discrimination of all types and setting forth procedures for addressing discrimination in the workplace.

II. DISCUSSION

The standards for summary judgment are well settled. In determining whether summary judgment should issue, the court must view the facts and inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party has the burden to establish both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in the pleadings but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material facts exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). At the summary judgment stage, I will not weigh evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but rather I need only determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

A. Claims Against the Board of Police Commissioners and Title VII Claims Against Individual Defendants

As a preliminary matter, some defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they are being sued under improper names or in capacities for which they are exempt from liability.

Defendant Board of Police Commissioners argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all counts, because it may only be sued through its members. Plaintiff has named the individual members as defendants, but also named the Board itself. The Missouri Court of Appeals has specifically held that “the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners may only be sued by bringing an action against the individual members of the Board in their official capacity.” Best v. Schoemehl, 652 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Mo.Ct.App.1983). “An action against the ‘St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners' in that name does not lie.” Id.; see also Edwards v. Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir.1988) (“The St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners is not a suable entity. Jurisdiction can only be obtained by suing its individual members.”) (internal quotation and alteration omitted). Therefore, the Board of Police Commissioners, in that name, is entitled to summary judgment on all counts.

Bonenberger's complaint makes discrimination claims against officers Isom, Harris, and Muxo and against commissioners Battle–Turner, Gray, and Slay in their individual and official capacities. Bonenberger's complaint also asserts claims against former board members Gerdine and Lee in their individual capacities only. All of these claims are based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.,42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), R.S. Mo. § 213.010, et seq.Title VII, unlike the other statutes, does not authorize liability against individual supervisors or coworkers. Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1995). For that reason, the Title VII claims against those defendants, in their individual capacities only, will be dismissed.

B. Discrimination Claims

Counts I, II, and III of Bonenberger's complaint allege that he was discriminatorily denied consideration for the position of Assistant Director because of his race, in violation of Title VII, the MHRA, § 1983, and § 1981. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Bonenberger cannot show direct evidence of discrimination or establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Discriminatory intent is common to each of Bonenberger's claims in these counts, and each claim uses the same analysis. See Tipler v. Douglas Cnty., Neb., 482 F.3d 1023, 1027 (8th Cir.2007) (applying similar analysis for Title VII and § 1983 claims based on equal-protection violations); Evans v. Siegel–Robert, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1124 (E.D.Mo.2001) (Title VII, MHRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1981) (citing Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1055 (8th Cir.1997) and Finley v. Empiregas, Inc., 975 F.2d 467, 473 (8th Cir.1992)); Midstate Oil Co., Inc. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Mo.Banc 1984); see also Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 665 (Mo.Banc 2009) (holding that the MHRA provides greater protection for workers than Title VII). Therefore, I will analyze Bonenberger's Title VII, § 1981, MHRA, and § 1983 Fourteenth–Amendment claims together.

A plaintiff in a race discrimination case can proceed under two alternative theories. First, the plaintiff can present evidence demonstrating that race was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989)). In order to do so, the plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence “showing a specific link between discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the challenged decision.” Philipp v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir.1995) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Stacks v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, 996 F.2d 200, 201 n. 1 (8th Cir.1993)). If the plaintiff makes this threshold showing, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it would have made the same decision even without the...