Boneta v. Am. Med. Sys.

Decision Date21 May 2021
Docket NumberCASE NO. 20-CIV-60409-RAR
PartiesDEBORAH BONETA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, to Certify the Order for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) [ECF No. 145] ("Motion"), filed on March 19, 2021. Having considered the parties' written submissions, the record, and applicable case law, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED as set forth herein.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Deborah and Diego Boneta seek redress for injuries allegedly caused by Defendant's vaginal mesh devices. Defendant filed two motions for summary judgment. In the first, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs should be judicially estopped from proceeding on these claims because they failed to disclose the claims as assets in their joint bankruptcy proceeding.1 [ECF No. 68]. In the second, Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations because they accrued more than four years before Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in December 2015. [ECF No. 96].

On March 10, 2021, the Court denied both motions. Boneta v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2021 WL 917871 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2021) ("Order"). But Defendant takes issue with the Court's analysis of judicial estoppel. In its Order, the Court held that both parties erroneously cited to the judicial estoppel standard under federal law, which is inapplicable since this action is based solely on the Court's diversity jurisdiction. Id. at *10 (citing Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 902 F.3d 1342, 1358 n.7 (11th Cir. 2018)). Instead, Florida's judicial estoppel standard applies, which, as the Court explained, requires that the party seeking to invoke the doctrine also have been a party in the prior proceeding in which an inconsistent position was successfully maintained—a requirement that does not exist under federal law. Id. at *11 (citing Salazar-Abreu v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc., 277 So. 3d 629, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)). There exists a "special fairness and policy considerations" exception to the mutuality of parties requirement, which comes into play only where a party uses "intentional self-contradiction to obtain an unfair advantage in litigation." Id. at *12 (citing Osorio v. Dole Food Co., No. 07-22693, 2009 WL 48189, at *15 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2009)).

Applying Florida law, the Court found that because Defendant was not involved in any capacity in Plaintiffs' bankruptcy proceedings, Plaintiffs' failure to disclose this lawsuit did not prejudice them in any way. Id. at *11-12 ("Florida courts have consistently rejected the application of judicial estoppel to bar claims undisclosed in bankruptcy where the defendant seeking to invoke the doctrine was not involved in any way in the bankruptcy proceedings.") (collecting cases). Further, based upon an application of Florida law, the Court found insufficient evidence in the record to establish that Plaintiffs intentionally misrepresented the existence of their lawsuit to the Bankruptcy Court, and thus refused to invoke judicial estoppel to bar Plaintiffs' claims. Id. at *12.

Defendant moves the Court to reconsider its holding that Florida law applies on the application of judicial estoppel. Defendant believes that it was not given an opportunity to brief the issue of which law applies, and argues that the Eleventh Circuit "unequivocally" held in Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) that the federal standard applies for any case involving a prior bankruptcy proceeding. Mot. at 2, 6-9. In the alternative, Defendant asks this Court to certify its Order [ECF No. 144] to the Eleventh Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), seeking review of the following issue: "Whether the federal or state standard for judicial estoppel should be applied in a case involving a prior bankruptcy proceeding, pending in a later District Court proceeding pursuant to diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 14.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a non-final order—i.e., one that does not end the action as to any of the claims at issue—"may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). A district court has broad discretion to reconsider earlier interlocutory rulings under this standard, which, in this circuit, is equivalent to the standard controlling motions to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Grasso v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. 15-20774, 2016 WL 2625746, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2016) (citing Region 8 Forest Serv. v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 805-06 (11th Cir. 1993)). To balance the competing interests of finality on the one hand and "the public interest in reaching the right result" on the other, id., a party seeking reconsideration must demonstrate the availability of newly-discovered evidence, a manifest error of law or fact, or an intervening change in controlling law. Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 194 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

"Clear error or manifest injustice occurs where the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. Such problems rarely arise[,] and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare." Kottler v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, No. 19-61190, 2020 WL 3064769, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2020) (citation and quotations omitted). Disagreement with the court's decision, absent a showing of manifest error, is not sufficient to demonstrate entitlement to relief. See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic In'tl, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010).

Likewise, a motion for reconsideration is not appropriately used as a vehicle to "relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of [the order]. This prohibition includes new arguments that were previously available, but not pressed." Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009). For that reason, "[s]uch motions are particularly suspect where, as here, the movant is attempting to bolster a previously-rejected argument with points of elaboration that were available earlier but were not raised. . . . Simply put, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not afford a party against whom an issue has been adversely decided a second bite at the apple under the guise of a motion to reconsider." Kirksey v. Schindler Elevator Corp., No. 15-0115, 2016 WL 6462176, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2016) (citing Kight v. IPD Printing & Distributing, Inc., 427 F. App'x 753, 755 (11th Cir. May 24, 2011); Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn Estress & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985)).

An interlocutory appeal may be certified when three elements are present: (1) whether the case presents a controlling question of law; (2) whether there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) whether the appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A "controlling question of law" arises where the appellate court can rule on a controlling question of pure law without having to search deep into the record in order to discern the facts of the underlying case. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2003). Importantly, however, interlocutory appeal is a "rare exception" to the general rule that final judgment must precede appellate review. Id. at 1264. Thus, "there is a 'strong presumption against interlocutory appeals,' and both the district and circuit courts are afforded substantial discretion in certifying issues for this purpose," even when all three elements are satisfied. Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, No. 19-23590, 2020 WL 3489372, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 2020) (quoting OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1359 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also Rodriguez v. Proctor & Gamble Co., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2020 WL 6544475, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2020).

ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Reconsideration

Defendant believes that since this case involved a prior bankruptcy proceeding, the Court committed a manifest error of law in its Order by applying the Florida judicial estoppel standard instead of the federal standard. As to why Defendant did not raise this argument before, Defendant argues that "[n]either party had an opportunity to brief the issue of which standard should apply" since "[d]uring the briefing and argument, it was assumed by all parties that the federal standard for judicial estoppel controlled this Court's decision." Mot. at 2. In the words of a fellow jurist, to say that the Court finds this argument puzzling is to do a disservice to puzzles everywhere.2 Defendant extensively briefed its position on the issue of estoppel and was granted oral argument before the Court rendered its decision. It therefore strains credulity for Defendant to maintain that it did not have "an opportunity to brief the issue of which standard should apply." In other words, Defendant's misapplication of the law and misidentification of binding precedent does not indicate the absence of an opportunity to brief key issues before the Court.

Indeed, that both parties erroneously assumed the federal standard applies did not prohibit this Court from following Eleventh Circuit precedent requiring the application of state law on the issue of judicial estoppel in diversity cases. "When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the...

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