Bonhac World Corp. v. Mellin Works LLC

• Decision Date: 20 January 2023
• Docket Number: 21 CV 9239 (NSR)
• Parties: BONHAC WORLD CORPORATION Plaintiff, v. MELLIN WORKS LLC, DBA EAZYHOLD Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

BONHAC WORLD CORPORATION Plaintiff, v. MELLIN WORKS LLC, DBA EAZYHOLD Defendant.

No. 21 CV 9239 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

January 20, 2023

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Bonhac World Corporation (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant Mellin Works LLC, DBA Eazyhold (“Defendant”). Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) unfair and deceptive trade practices under New York law; (2) monopolistic contracts under New York law; (3) common law unfair competition; and (4) tortious interference with contractual relations. (ECF No. 1, at 6-10.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (“Compl.”) (ECF No. 1) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 22.) For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED due to Plaintiff's failure to state a plausible claim that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the Complaint and are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of this motion.

Plaintiff is a New York corporation and, since 2017, has been a third-party seller on Amazon.com (“Amazon”). (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12.) Defendant is a California limited liability company with its principal place of business at 4212 East Los Angeles Avenue, Suite 3653, Simi Valley, California 93063. (Id. ¶ 11.)

Defendant contacted Plaintiff via e-mail in December 2020 informing Plaintiff that Plaintiff's grip support devices on Amazon infringed on Defendant's design and utility patents (U.S Design Patent No. D848815 and U.S. Patent No 9694485).^[1] (Id. ¶¶ 13, 19.) Plaintiff responded via email to Defendant on September 2 2021, apparently to dispute Defendant's claim.^[2](Id. ¶ 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that a side-by-side comparison of its products and one of Defendant's patents shows that there is little similarity between them. (Id. ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff's allegations seem to suggest that some sort of action by Defendant in response to Plaintiff's allegedly infringing conduct caused Amazon to remove Plaintiff's product listings; however, Plaintiff does not specify which product listings Amazon removed. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 18, 48.) Plaintiff, for instance, simply alleges that Defendant “misuse[d] the patents to intimidate the competition and notify Amazon to make a fraudulent claim under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).” (Id. ¶ 3.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the inquiry for motions to dismiss is whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. The Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,'” to credit “mere conclusory statements,” or to accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a district court must consider the context and “draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

II. Materials Considered

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002); and Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999)). A document is incorporated by reference where the complaint “make[s] a clear, definite and substantial reference” to it. Thomas v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 232 F.Supp.2d 273, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (collecting cases). “[E]ven if not attached or incorporated by reference, a document ‘upon which [the complaint] solely relies and which is integral to the complaint' may be considered by the court in ruling on [a motion to dismiss].” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)). “A document is integral to the complaint ‘where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect.'” Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153).

Additionally, the Court may take judicial notice of certain publicly available documents, including, for example, a plaintiff's arrest reports, indictments, and criminal disposition data. Corley v. Vance, 365 F.Supp.3d 407, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting cases); see Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that courts may “look to public records, including complaints filed in state court, in deciding a motion to dismiss”) (citing Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d Cir. 2002); and Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998)). When taking judicial notice of such documents, the Court does so “not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.” Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 1991)).

DISCUSSION

Defendant's primary argument in favor of dismissal is that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it in this action. Although Plaintiff claims that “the Court has personal jurisdiction over both Defendants as Defendants transact business in the State of New York and flagrant violations of law occurred in New York” (Compl. ¶ 8.), Defendant argues that its contacts with New York are insufficient for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it. (ECF No 22, at 10.) For the reasons discussed infra, the Court concurs with Defendant that Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

I. Legal Standards for General and Specific Personal Jurisdiction

The Court determines whether personal jurisdiction exists by first applying the long-arm statute of the forum state-here, New York-and then analyzing whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Spin Master Ltd., 463 F.Supp. at 362 (citing Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010); Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2010); and Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013)). “Under the New York long-arm statute, a court in New York can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant based either on general jurisdiction, under CPLR § 301, or specific jurisdiction, under CPLR § 302.” Wallert v. Atlan, 141 F.Supp.3d 258, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

a. General Jurisdiction: N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301

Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 (“§ 301”), a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if she is domiciled in New York, served with process in New York, or continuously and systematically does business in New York. See Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 33, 563 N.Y.S.2d 739, 565 N.E.2d 488 (1990); Pichardo v. Zayas, 122 A.D.3d 699, 702, 996 N.Y.S.2d 176, 180 (2d Dept. 2014); see also Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. Computer Training.Com, Inc., No. 04-CV-0982, 2004 WL 1555110, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004). General jurisdiction permits a court to adjudicate any cause of action against a defendant that meets these criteria, “wherever arising, and whoever the plaintiff.” Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 2016).

b. Specific Jurisdiction: N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (Business Activities)

N.Y.C.P.L.R § 302(a)(1) (“§ 302(a)(1)”) provides that personal jurisdiction exists over a non-domiciliary defendant that “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.” Plaintiffs must meet two requirements to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1): “(1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” Eades v. Kennedy PC Law Offices, 799 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2015). A defendant “transact[s] business” in the state if it has engaged in “purposeful activity” by “purposefully avail[ing] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 246-47 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotingMcKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 229 N.E.2d 604, 607 (N.Y. 1967)). Where a defendant is alleged to have “transacted business” through a website, courts apply a “sliding scale” test to determine whether operation of a website accessible in New York constitutes purposeful availment. Spin Master Ltd. v. 158, 463 F.Supp.3d 348, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The more “interactive” the website in soliciting information from potential buyers in New York, the more likely a...