Bonica v. Olesen
Decision Date | 22 November 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 16449.,16449. |
Citation | 126 F. Supp. 398 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Parties | Joe BONICA, doing business as Movie-of-the-Month Club, Movie-of-the-Month and Movie Newsreels, and John Bonica, doing business as 8 MM Movie Club and Movie Club, Plaintiffs, v. Otto K. OLESEN, individually and as Postmaster of the United States Post Office at Los Angeles, California, Defendant. |
Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., for the Southern Dist. of Cal., Los Angeles, Cal., by Max F. Deutz and Richard A. Lavine, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.
Gerald L. Kales, Hollywood, Cal., for plaintiffs.
This is an action to enjoin the United States Postmaster at Los Angeles from refusing to deliver mail to the plaintiffs.1
Since 1946, plaintiffs have engaged in the business of selling motion picture films by mail. The films consist of educational and scenic pictures, children's comedies, and a small class called pin-up pictures. They are sold primarily for home use. The uncontraverted affidavit of one of the plaintiffs indicates that more than ninety per cent of plaintiffs' expenditures have been in the production of musical, scenic, fishing, and similar types of films; and that their business has grossed almost one and one-quarter million dollars. All but eleven of their pictures have not been challenged in either the administrative hearing or the trial of this cause. Prospective buyers were solicited by advertisements in national magazines and by mailed circulars, and the orders were generally filled by mail.
In 1953, a complaint was issued by the Post Office Department charging that there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs were obtaining and attempting to obtain remittances of money through the mails for films of an obscene, lewd and lascivious character in violation of statute,2 and that therefore plaintiffs should be denied the use of the mails. In particular the complaint charged that eleven of plaintiffs' films were of the prohibited character.3 The plaintiffs responded denying that the specified films were obscene, lewd, or lascivious, and requested further information as to what parts of the named films were deemed objectionable so that such parts might be deleted. Despite this apparent willingness to accept the censorship sought to be imposed, no further information was furnished the plaintiffs. In December of 1953, an administrative hearing was held in Washington, D. C.4 and the Examiner found that the eleven films were obscene, lewd and lascivious. Pursuant to this finding, the Postmaster General ordered that all postal money orders and letters directed to the plaintiffs be returned to the senders with notification that payment and delivery was "unlawful" and had been forbidden by order of the Postmaster General. The order was prohibitive in terms and gave no opportunity for staying the full force of a total bar. There was no opportunity afforded the plaintiffs to cease the distribution of the questioned material as a condition of avoiding the drastic action of being totally barred from receipt of mail. The result was immediate and comprehended receipt of all mailed matter including such inocuous items as utilities or tax bills. Since the order applied to all money orders and mail addressed to the plaintiffs, whether relating to the few cited films or otherwise, the plaintiffs were, in effect, completely put out of business by the order.
On commencement of this action, a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction issued against the defendant pending the outcome of this action in order to prevent the complete destruction of the plaintiffs' business before the matter was finally determined. The plaintiffs have represented by way of affidavits (which have not been rebutted) that since the original complaint was filed by the Post Office, all orders and money received for the specific films which the Postmaster has labeled obscene, lewd, and lascivious, have been returned.
Three separate issues are presented by this action: (1) the constitutionality of the section invoked; (2) the constitutionality of the specific application of this section; and (3) a review of the administrative action against the plaintiffs in other than its constitutional aspects. Pursuant to motion of the plaintiffs, a separate trial was ordered on the latter issue alone, with jurisdiction retained to dispose of the constitutional questions if necessary to an adequate adjudication of this case.
The scope of judicial review of administrative action such as that involved here, is set forth in the United States Code Annotated, Title 5, Section 1009(e), and includes the power to:
"* * * (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, finding, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; * * * (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; * * * (5) unsupported by substantial evidence * * *."
The Supreme Court has recently set forth the kind of scrutiny which a reviewing court must give the administrative record to satisfy itself that the agency action rests on adequate proof. In Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,5 the court said:
It appears that the only contraverted issue at the administrative level was whether or not the films were "obscene, lewd, or lascivious", and that the only evidence on this crucial question was the films themselves. Thus, the court is in a particularly advantageous position to evaluate the evidence.6
The words obscene, lewd, and lascivious have received extensive and varied judicial interpretations.7 The Ninth Circuit8 has recently approved an instruction and definition of the phrase in a criminal action for placing such material in the mail:
"
The court specifically emphasized that the test was the common sense of decency and modesty of the community and whether or not it was calculated to promote the general corruption of morals. This is in line with a general transition from the "standard...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder
...protected speech, or because the initial findings of obscenity are often reversed on review. Nor has that been done. Bonica v. Olesen, D.C.S.D.Cal.1954, 126 F.Supp. 398. While persuasive arguments have been made by the plaintiff for the proposition that the court must evaluate the accused w......
-
Fugiani v. Barber, 15162.
...Procedure Act (Title 5 Sec. 1009 (e)). Another case where a district judge substituted his own judgment on the facts was Bonica v. Olesen, D.C., 126 F. Supp. 398. Cf. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cogan, 9 Cir., 201 F.2d 78, 86: "We think it manifest that the district judge knew mor......
- GENERAL MOTORS OVERSEAS OP. DIV. v. The Lichtenstein