Bonilla Romero v. US, Civil No. 89-0304 (PG)
| Citation | 749 F. Supp. 31 |
| Decision Date | 23 October 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 89-0304 (PG),Crim. No. 89-0083 (PG). |
| Parties | Felipe BONILLA ROMERO, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
A.J. Amadeo Murga, Santurce, Puerto Rico, for petitioner.
Juan A. Pedrosa, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, for respondent.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has remanded the instant case to this court with instructions to consider the effect that its decision in United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210 (1st Cir.1990) may have with regard to the proceedings which led to petitioner Felipe Bonilla Romero's convictions in 1986. Finding fundamental compliance with the Lyons doctrine, we allow the convictions to stand.
On February 19, 1986 petitioner Felipe Bonilla Romero was indicted by a federal Grand Jury on two counts of narcotics violations and three counts of receiving or carrying firearms. In related proceedings in the local courts the defendant had filed a motion for the suppression of evidence, the local trial court had granted the motion, and that jurisdiction's highest tribunal had upheld the lower judge's decision. A similar motion filed before this court, however, did not encounter similar fate. This fact notwithstanding, petitioner relied on the same strategy he utilized in the local courts and on the trial date of December 16, 1986 he waived his right to a jury trial, agreed to a stipulation as to what the government's witnesses would say were they to be called to testify, and reserved his right to appeal this court's denial of his motion for suppression. In the words of the Circuit Court, however, "although immediately prior to accepting the stipulation this district court made a comprehensive inquiry into the knowing and voluntary character of defendant's waiver of jury trial, it did not address the defendant personally regarding his assent to the stipulation." Bonilla Romero v. United States, 907 F.2d 143 (1st Cir.1990) (per curiam). After evaluating the evidence, this court found the defendant guilty of counts one, two, three and five of the indictment. Defendant's subsequent exercise of his reserved right proved to be unsuccessful, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in United States v. Bonilla Romero, 836 F.2d 39 (1st Cir.1987).
On March 9, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to vacate the sentence under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. Citing United States v. Lyons, supra, he claimed that the stipulation was tantamount to a guilty plea and that, consequently, the Court was required to make Rule 11 inquiries of defendant before accepting the stipulation. Rule 11, of course, requires the trial court, before accepting a plea of guilty, to specifically advise the defendant of his rights, the nature of the charges against him, and the consequences of his act. Fed.R.Cr.P. 11(c). Lyons, on the other hand, while not mandating Rule 11 inquiries when a stipulation of facts upon which a guilty finding could be made is submitted, does require that the Court satisfy itself that the defendant has accepted the stipulation freely and with knowledge of the consequences of what he is doing. Additionally, defendant alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel given the facts that he did not consent to the stipulation and that he did not understand the constitutional rights he waived through it. Relying on the U.S. magistrate's report and recommendation, however, on December 8, 1989 we dismissed the motion without the need for a hearing. Petitioner, displeased with our treatment of the matter, appealed.
In its per curiam opinion of June 29, 1990, the Appellate Court found that Lyons required that defendant's Rule 11 argument and, consequently, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, should be the subject of further probe. Specifically, the Court directed us to consider, first, what effect, if any, is to be given to the distinction drawn by some courts between stipulations that go to what the government's witnesses would say if they testified and stipulations that go to the truth of that testimony. Secondly, we must consider just what sort of inquiry is required under Lyons given the nature of the stipulations in this case. Thirdly, we had to examine whether the extensive colloquy we maintained with the defendant concerning his related waiver of a jury trial was adequate, under all the circumstances, to satisfy the court that the defendant had also consented to the stipulations freely and voluntarily. As an afterthought, the Court additionally instructed us that reliance could not be placed solely on counsel's undertaking that defendant accepted the stipulation, or on defendant's failure to object, to satisfy ourselves that defendant in fact consented to the stipulation knowingly and voluntarily.
Pursuant to First Circuit instructions, on August 30, 1990 the Court held an evidentiary hearing in which both the defendant and his trial attorney testified and the following facts were established. Defendant conceded that, having faced similar charges in the local courts, he had been fully familiar with the charges against him and with the circumstances and consequences of a trial by jury. He had discussed with his attorney the pros and cons of waiving his jury trial and the advantages and disadvantages of being tried by the Court, had been personally addressed by the Court regarding this matter, and was therefore not contesting that he had intelligently waived that right. Perhaps most importantly, however, defendant candidly admitted that waiving his right to a jury trial and agreeing to be tried by the Court on the basis of stipulations, while at the same time reserving his right to appeal from our previous denial of his motion to suppress, was precisely the legal strategy that he and his trial attorney had discussed and agreed to as the most advisable course to be followed in his defense.
Defendant's trial counsel, on the other hand, testified that he had explained to his client the nature, consequences, and differences between a conditional guilty plea, a trial by stipulation and a full-blown jury trial, as well as the possibilities of appeals from each one.1 He added that on two occasions he had been close to signing plea agreements which would have preserved his client's right to appeal from this Court's denial of his motion to suppress but on both occasions the agreements were not approved, hence their decision to proceed with a trial by stipulation. He further stated that he had explained to the defendant that a proffer of the evidence by the government did not constitute an admission of the truth but only a summary of what their witnesses would say if called to the stand, that he had summarized to the defendant the content of their testimony, and that he had explained to the defendant that since it contained all the elements of the offense the Court could possibly find him guilty on the basis of the stipulated testimony alone. The defendant, of course, was also familiar with the government witnesses' testimony as it had been the same one which had been offered before the local courts. Both he and his client were of the opinion that their chances on appeal were strong given the facts the Puerto Rico Supreme Court had handed down an opinion upholding the lower local judge's grant of their motion to dismiss and that they had reason to believe that some of the government's witnesses were perjured. Finally, he testified that he had discussed their trial strategy with his client and his client's previous counsel on several occasions and that it had been his client who, after listening to his professional opinion, had taken the final decision to proceed by trial by stipulation. His client's main concern, he concluded, had been with preserving his right to appeal from this Court's denial of his motion to suppress.
We must begin, of course, with a closer look at precisely what it is that United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210 (1st Cir.1990) stands for. There, appellant had signed a stipulation of facts and expressly waived his right to a trial by jury before the district court. The trial judge did inquire into defendant's understanding of the effects of the stipulation and his jury waiver, specifically asking him whether he understood that the Court could decide the case and find him guilty of all charges of the indictment on the basis of the stipulations. After the Court found him guilty on all counts, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that "a full blown inquiry under Fed.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(3) was required as a matter of law to determine whether his waiver was voluntary and knowing because his trial by stipulation was equivalent to a guilty plea." 898 F.2d at 214.
The Court of Appeals did not agree. Noting that trial stipulations can "run the gamut from modest accommodations designed to avoid unnecessary consumption of time ... to agreements which are the functional equivalent of a guilty plea" and that other circuits had been reluctant to mandate a complete Rule 11 inquiry even when faced with pretrial stipulations containing all the facts necessary for a guilty finding, the First Circuit also declined to extend the proscriptions of Rule 11 to cover trials by stipulations. 898 F.2d at 214-215. Our Appellate Court found the position adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397 (D.C.Cir.1978), to be particularly persuasive and, like the Strother Court, set out to determine whether the trial "judge took special pains to satisfy himself that the waiver was knowing and voluntary to impress upon the defendant the significance of" his choice and whether the defendant "satisfied the judge that he understood the nature and scope of his stipulation." 898 F.2d 215. While suggesting that Rule 11 inquiries are recommendable...
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