Bonin v. Vasquez, No. CV 91-0693-ER.

• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
• Writing for the Court: RAFEEDIE
• Citation: 807 F. Supp. 589
• Parties: William BONIN, Petitioner, v. Daniel VASQUEZ, et al., Respondents.
• Docket Number: No. CV 91-0693-ER.
• Decision Date: 09 November 1992

807 F. Supp. 589

William BONIN, Petitioner,
v.
Daniel VASQUEZ, et al., Respondents.

No. CV 91-0693-ER.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

November 9, 1992.

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Fern M. Laetham, State Public Defender, Barry Helft, William D. Freeman, Michael

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H. Roquemore, Deputy State Public Defenders, San Francisco, CA, for petitioner

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary Schons, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Steven Zeigan, Esteban Hernandez, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Diego, CA, for respondents.

OPINION AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

RAFEEDIE, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, William George Bonin, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1982 convictions in Los Angeles of ten counts of first degree murder and his subsequent death sentence.¹ After his Los Angeles trial, petitioner stood trial in Orange County where he was convicted of four additional counts of first degree murder and received another death sentence. This order and opinion concerns only the Los Angeles case.²

Petitioner has set forth 24 constitutional violations which he believes require the Court to reverse either his convictions, his sentence, or both.

In reviewing this petition, the Court read the entire 5,561 pages of trial transcripts, the clerk's transcripts, the briefs in petitioner's automatic appeal and state habeas, and all of the pleadings and responsive documents filed by both parties. In addition, the Court conducted a three day evidentiary hearing encompassing several of the issues raised in the petition.

The Court has closely examined each issue raised by petitioner. As discussed in detail below, the Court finds that petitioner has not raised any claim which mandates the granting of a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Bonin's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

II. FACTS

Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles of the murder of ten young males: Marcus Grabs (age 17), Donald Hyden (age 15), David Murillo, Charles Miranda (age 15), James Macabe (age 12), Ronald Gatlin (age 19), Harry Turner (age 14), Steven Wood (age 16), Darin Kendrick (age 19), and Steven Wells (age 18). The string of murders began in August 1979 and continued until June 1980.

All of the victims died from ligature strangulation with the exception of Grabs, who died from multiple stab wounds. Each victim had ligature marks around his neck and either his wrist or ankles, or both. Each victim showed signs of having been beaten around the face and other areas of the body. The evidence disclosed that seven of the victims had engaged in sexual activity prior to their death. With two exceptions, the victims were found nude with no clothing or other identifying evidence in the vicinity.³

The prosecution presented three types of evidence. First, the jury heard the testimony of Greg Miley and James Munro, petitioner's former co-defendants.⁴ Miley testified that he assisted Bonin in murdering Miranda and Macabe. Munro told the jury that he was present when Bonin murdered Wells. Second, a number of witnesses (a television newscaster, two of petitioner's friends, and two fellow inmates) testified that Bonin admitted killing one or more of the victims. Third, forensic experts linked petitioner to the murders through carpet fibers, hair, semen, and blood.

The defense consisted primarily of discrediting Munro and the inmate witnesses.

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At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence that Bonin sexually assaulted five young males in the late 1960's and mid-1970's and that he killed four young men in Orange County. The defense presented the testimony of Bonin's mother and two brothers about Bonin's troubled childhood; the testimony of Bonin's friend that Bonin was non-violent; and the testimony of a prison psychologist who discussed Bonin's prison progress. The jury returned a death sentence after less than one day of deliberation.

III. THE ISSUES

A. CLAIMS INVOLVING THE ACTIONS OF PETITIONER'S TRIAL COUNSEL

The Court first addresses the common subparts of petitioner's issues two, four, and five.⁵ In those three issues, petitioner delineates a host of errors and omissions for which he holds his trial attorney, William Charvet, responsible. In issue two, petitioner argues that Charvet made errors and omissions because of a conflict of interest due to a literary rights agreement. Similarly, in issue four, petitioner attributes the errors and omissions to Charvet's use of drugs during the trial. Finally, in issue five, petitioner suggests that the errors and omissions were a result of Charvet's general ineffective assistance of counsel. Because these errors and omissions constitute the "adverse effect" component of each of the broader issues, the court will discuss each error or admission before discussing the issues of the literary rights agreement, drug usage, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

1) Charvet Failed to Investigate and Obtain a Carpet Fiber Expert to Counter the Testimony of the State's Experts

PETITIONER'S CLAIM

Petitioner argues that Charvet should have hired a carpet fiber expert to testify that there were an insufficient number of fibers collected from the bodies to be compared with any degree of accuracy with the carpet fibers from petitioner's van.

DISCUSSION

The Court does not consider Charvet's failure to call a carpet fiber expert to be below the standard of competence expected of an attorney. Given the imprecise nature of fiber analysis, the additional testimony of a carpet fiber expert would add very little. Indeed, each prosecution witness testifying about the carpet fibers acknowledged that the fiber comparisons showed only that there were no dissimilarities between the fibers found on the bodies and the fibers taken from the carpeting in petitioner's van. The witnesses further admitted that they could never prove conclusively the source of the fibers found on the bodies.

Even assuming that Charvet was incompetent for failing to call a carpet fiber expert, the Court finds no prejudice. There is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had a carpet fiber expert been called to testify that the fiber sample size was too small for a reliable comparison.⁶

2) Charvet Failed to Investigate Mitigating Factors in Petitioner's Childhood As Well As Mitigating Psychiatric Evidence

PETITIONER'S CLAIM

Petitioner alleges that Charvet failed to investigating two relevant mitigating factors: petitioner's childhood and petitioner's psychiatric problems. Petitioner maintains that if Charvet had conducted a proper investigation, he would have learned that petitioner was physically abused as a child, was sexually assaulted by a number of adult males, and suffered from a bipolar

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mental disorder. Petitioner speculates that the presentation of this information would have humanized him in the eyes of the jury and would have made it reasonably probable that the jury would have opted for a life sentence rather than death

DISCUSSION

Childhood Mitigation

The Court finds that Charvet presented a constitutionally adequate portrayal of Bonin's childhood. During the penalty phase, Charvet presented evidence that petitioner's father had a history of abusing alcohol, gambling, and physically assaulting his wife and children. Charvet also presented evidence that petitioner was sexually molested while at a detention center when he was only ten years old. Moreover, after focusing primarily on Bonin's ability to function productively in prison, Charvet stated in his penalty phase closing argument, "I'm not going to go into trying to blame — about the beating of the mother or losing the home — because that's not really part of it. We are talking about what happens. If Mr. Bonin lives, what happens? And why should he die?" LART 18/5523.

Thus, not only did Charvet present the very evidence that Bonin is complaining Charvet failed to investigate, but Charvet also explained on the record and to the jury that his intent was not to elicit sympathy for petitioner, but rather to show that petitioner could be a functioning member of society if his life was spared.

The Court previously denied petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing on this issue, but granted the request for an evidentiary hearing on a similar issue in the Orange County case. The Court takes judicial notice of the testimony heard at the evidentiary hearing. The evidence presented at the hearing would have added very little to that which Charvet presented at trial. Through declarations, petitioner presented evidence that several of his classmates from fifth and sixth grade recalled that he was always dirty, he related poorly to other children, and he had no friends. A neighbor from childhood remembered that petitioner's parents were rarely around and they never spent time with petitioner and his brothers. Several people who were at the orphanage when Bonin was there vividly described the abusive practices of the orphanage. Of note however, not one declaration named petitioner as either a victim of or a witness to the abuse. In sum, further investigation by Charvet would have revealed little more than that which Charvet did present.

Moreover, Charvet articulated for the jury his tactical reasons for not pursuing childhood mitigation with any more vigor. Charvet decided that his best hope for sparing petitioner's life was to demonstrate that petitioner functioned well in an institutional setting. In hindsight, maybe that was not the best approach. But this Court's role is to examine Charvet's performance at the time it was given. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (19...