Bonman v. State
Decision Date | 30 October 1979 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 836 |
Citation | 376 So.2d 831 |
Parties | Lawrence BONMAN, Jr. v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
No brief for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and George Hardesty, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee, the State.
Lawrence Bonman, Jr., was indicted in January, 1978, for the offense of robbery. Trial was had on a plea of not guilty on March 9, 1978, and on this day the jury found appellant guilty as charged and fixed his punishment at twenty years imprisonment. Appellant's motion for new trial was denied on May 15, 1978, and this appeal followed.
At approximately 7:00 o'clock on the evening of December 6, 1977, Max Nichols was attacked, beaten and robbed outside his gas station-grocery store by appellant and two others. Mr. Nichols' had known appellant for two years and recognized him during this robbery. After beating the victim with a shovel, the appellant and the two other perpetrators made off with the victim's money box which contained several thousand dollars in cash.
In response to the victim's call, the sheriff, Richard Varnon, arrived soon thereafter and searched the area. The sheriff found the money box and three toboggans.
The following day a car, in which the appellant and two males were riding, was stopped for a traffic offense by Sheriff Varnon. The sheriff stated that he questioned them about their whereabouts the preceding night, and they offered to go to Mr. Nichols' store and let him see them. At the store, Mr. Nichols asked appellant why he had done it, and appellant denied committing the robbery.
Three days later, on December 10, 1977, Mr. Nichols signed an arrest warrant for appellant. Appellant was arrested the same day and informed of his constitutional rights. He refused to make a statement.
Deputy Charles Tate of the Lamar County Sheriff's Department testified at trial that, while he was taking appellant's fingerprints and after he had informed him of his Miranda rights, the appellant admitted that the toboggans found at the scene of the robbery were his, without any questioning by Deputy Tate.
A preliminary hearing was held on January 4, 1978, and the appellant was bound over to the grand jury.
At trial appellant testified himself and presented witnesses who testified that he was elsewhere at the time of the robbery.
Prior to trial, the appellant moved to suppress the evidence of the prosecution's chief witness, the victim of the robbery, Max Nichols, and to suppress any statements made by appellant to law enforcement officers.
Appellant first claimed that he was denied counsel at a preliminary hearing at which the victim testified, and, therefore, the victim should not be allowed to testify at trial. In support of this contention, appellant called Judge William Winston, District Judge of Lamar County, who presided at appellant's preliminary hearing. Judge Winston testified as follows (R. pp. 7-9):
The testimony of Judge Winston clearly shows that appellant was made aware of the disadvantages of not having counsel present at the preliminary hearing and that appointed counsel would be afforded him if he so desired. Since he voluntarily, understandingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel present, he cannot now claim to have been deprived of that right. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Clark v. City of Mobile, Ala.Cr.App., 357 So.2d 675, cert. denied, 357 So.2d 680 (1978); Cf. Mayola v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 337 So.2d 105, cert. denied, 337 So.2d 107 (1976).
The record also clearly shows that appellant was...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Robinson v. State
...The record reveals that the statement was voluntary and was not elicited. Thus, it was properly admitted. See e.g., Bonman v. State, 376 So.2d 831 (Ala.Crim.App.1979). Furthermore, the record indicates that the prosecutor informed the appellant's counsel of the statement as soon as she was ......