Bonnafant v. Chico's Fas, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 April 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:13–cv–893–FtM–29CM.
• Citation: 17 F.Supp.3d 1196
• Parties: Paula BONNAFANT, Plaintiff, v. CHICO'S FAS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

17 F.Supp.3d 1196

Paula BONNAFANT, Plaintiff

v.CHICO'S FAS, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 2:13–cv–893–FtM–29CM.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division.

Signed April 25, 2014.

Benjamin H. Yormak, Yormak Disability Law Group, Bonita Springs, FL, for Plaintiff.

Kelly Lyon Davis, Otto W. Immel, Jr., Quarles & Brady, LLP, Naples, FL, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN E. STEELE, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. # 6) filed on January 6, 2014. Defendant filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. # 11) on January 21, 2014.

Paula Bonnafant (plaintiff or Bonnafant) filed a Complaint (Doc. # 3) against Chico's FAS, Inc. (defendant or Chico's) in state court alleging that Chico's violated the Florida (Private) Whistle–Blower Act (FWA), Fla. Stat. §§ 448.101 –105. Chico's filed a timely Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1) asserting that the federal court has federal question jurisdiction over the action because the state law claim “arises under” federal patent and trademark laws pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). Asserting that the action does not arise under federal law, Bonnafant now seeks a remand to state court. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion and remands the case to state court.

I.

In summary, the Complaint (Doc. # 3) alleges the following: In August 2009, plaintiff was hired as a contractor to design women's handbags for defendant. Plaintiff's job duties included designing original handbags to be sold by defendant. Plaintiff became a full-time employee in January, 2011.

Plaintiff alleges that her supervisor frequently rejected her original designs and directed her to copy the styles and characteristics of designer handbags already being marketed, with the only difference being the Chico's logo. In May 2011, plaintiff voiced her concerns to the supervisor, stating that she did not feel comfortable copying designs and was concerned that she and the company could get into serious legal trouble for doing so. Plaintiff states that the discussion became heated, and she was told not to use the term “knock-off” but to instead say she was “inspired by” other designer labels. Shortly thereafter plaintiff was reprimanded. Subsequently, plaintiff again used the term “knock-off,” and was admonished by the supervisor to never use the term again. The Complaint describes several examples of where other vendor's products were copied and used over plaintiff's objections. Plaintiff discussed her concerns with the production manager and the production director, and plaintiff's work environment thereafter became hostile. Plaintiff received her first write-up within a month of speaking with the production manager and production designer.

Plaintiff then met with the Human Resources Director to express her concerns that her supervisor was retaliating against her. Plaintiff explained that most of the bags she designed never made the line because her supervisor would give plaintiff samples of other designers that she wanted plaintiff to duplicate. Plaintiff received a second write-up after a meeting was scheduled to discuss plaintiff's concerns about being required to copy handbags. Plaintiff alleges that two weeks after she discussed her concerns in detail with Human Resources, she was terminated because she refused to violate corporate policy and applicable “trademark/patent” laws by copying exactly a designer handbag.

Plaintiff filed a one count Complaint in state court alleging a violation of the Florida Whistle–Blower Act. Plaintiff alleges that she was an employee of Chico's; that she was acting within the scope of the protection provided by Fla. Stat. § 448.102(3) ; that she had engaged in statutorily protected activity; that Chico's conduct in copying the handbag designs violated federal and state law; and that she suffered a negative employment action and damages as a result of her statutorily protected activity.

Defendant filed a timely Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1) asserting that the case was properly removed because “[t]he claim asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint requires the interpretation of federal law....” (Doc. # 1, ¶ 4.) Although the Complaint only asserts a state law claim, defendant argues that the claim “arises under” federal law and thus federal subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Plaintiff disagrees, and seeks a remand to state court.

II.

Federal removal jurisdiction is construed narrowly and “all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir.1999). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the removing defendant. Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir.2002) (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir.2001) ). “[T]o meet their burden, the defendants must show that the plaintiffs' complaint, as it existed at the time of removal, provides an adequate basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir.2008).

A.

The defendant removed this action “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338.” (Doc. # 1, p. 1.) Section 1441 provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Section 1441(a) does not apply to this case because Congress has indeed “otherwise expressly provided.” Title 28 U.S.C. § 1454 provides that “[a] civil action in which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents ... or copyrights may be removed to [federal court]....” 28 U.S.C. § 1454(a). Removal is therefore authorized by § 1454(a), not § 1441(a).

The case is removable if it “arises under” patent or copyright law, a phrase which appears in § 1454(a) as well 28 U.S.C. § 1331¹ and § 1338² . The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “arising under” in 1331 and in § 1338(a) identically, and applied their precedents interchangeably. Gunn v. Minton, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013) (state claim alleging legal malpractice in handling patent case does not “arise under” § 1338(a) ). Similarly, the Court gives the phrase “arising under” in § 1454(a) the same meaning as in § 1331 and § 1338.

B.

The assertion in the Notice of Removal that the state law claim is removable simply because it “requires the interpretation of federal law” (Doc. # 1, ¶ 4) is clearly incorrect. While a state law claim may be removable as “arising under” federal law, it is not removable simply because the case involves the interpretation of federal law. “[T]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction”, Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986), “even where the interpretation of federal law may constitute an element of the state cause of action.” Madzimoyo v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A., 440 Fed.Appx. 728, 730 (11th Cir.2011). Rather, a state law claim “arises under” federal law if it is one of a “special and small category” of cases in which a federal issue is “(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1065. As discussed below, this is not one of those cases.

C.

The Florida Whistle–Blower Act (FWA) are remedial statutes which created a new cause of action designed “to protect private employees who report or refuse to assist employers who violate laws enacted to protect the public.” Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla.1994). The Act provides employees with a cause of action against private-sector employers who take certain types of retaliatory personnel action. Id. As such, it “is an exception to Florida's at-will employment doctrine.” Aery v. Wallace Lincoln–Mercury, LLC, 118 So.3d 904, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

The Complaint alleges that defendant violated Fla. Stat. § 448.102(3), which provides: “An employer may not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because the employee has: ... (3) Objected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the employer which is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.” The phrase “law, rule, or regulation” is defined to include “any statute or ordinance or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant to any federal, state, or local statute or ordinance applicable to the employer and pertaining to the business.” Fla. Stat. 448.101(4). In order to establish a prima facie case under the FWA, plaintiff must establish “1) that she objected to or refused to participate in any illegal activity, policy or practice of Defendant; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and 3) the adverse employment action was causally linked to her objection or refusal.” Aery, 118 So.3d at 916 (citing Gleason v. Roche Labs., Inc., 745 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1270 (M.D.Fla.2010) ). To meet the first element, “all that is required is that the ‘employee have a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that her activity is protected by the statute.’ ” Aery, 118 So.3d at 916 (quoting Luna v. Walgreen Co., 575 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1343 (S.D.Fla.2008) ).

Applying the four-part test in Gunn establishes that plaintiff's FWA claim does not “arise under” federal law:

(1) Necessary Federal Issue

The Court finds that a federal patent or trademark issue is “necessary” to plaintiff's case. The Complaint alleges that copying the designer handbags violated state and...