Bonnell v. Smith

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GLAZE; DUDLEY
• Citation: Bonnell v. Smith, 908 S.W.2d 74, 322 Ark. 141 (Ark. 1995)
• Decision Date: 16 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 95-147,95-147
• Parties: Mark BONNELL, Petitioner, v. Hon. Kim M. SMITH, Judge, Second Division Circuit Court of Washington County, Arkansas, Respondent.

Page 74

908 S.W.2d 74

322 Ark. 141

Mark BONNELL, Petitioner, v. Hon. Kim M. SMITH, Judge, Second Division Circuit Court of Washington County, Arkansas, Respondent.

No. 95-147.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Oct. 16, 1995.

Donald C. Donner, Fayetteville, for appellant.

Mima C. Kilgore, Fayetteville, for appellee.

GLAZE, Justice.

This case involves a petition for writ of prohibition. On March 21, 1994, petitioner Mark Bonnell's former wife, Brenda Bonnell, filed a complaint for replevin against Bonnell in municipal court for possession of a 1984 Toyota, valued at $3,900.00. Mrs. Bonnell claimed right of possession through title to the vehicle and through the couple's December 20, 1992 decree of divorce. On March 21, Mr. Bonnell was served with a summons and notice of petition for order of delivery, but he failed to object within five days pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 18-60-808(b) (1987). On April 5, the municipal court issued an order of delivery and the vehicle was seized.

Two days later, Mr. Bonnell filed a motion to dismiss his ex-wife's complaint. In his motion he challenged the municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction, requested vacation of the order of delivery, and requested Rule 11 sanctions. Mrs. Bonnell responded, claiming her ex-husband had waived his challenge by not responding within the required five day period.

The municipal court later found it did not have jurisdiction because the value of the vehicle in dispute exceeded the $3,000.00 original jurisdictional amount required by Ark.Code Ann. § 16-17-704(a)(4) (Repl.1994). Upon Mrs. Bonnell's request, the municipal court ordered the case transferred to circuit court. Mr. Bonnell then refiled his motions to dismiss and for sanctions in circuit court. He claimed that the municipal court correctly determined it had no jurisdiction of Mrs. Bonnell's action and that the court in so holding should have dismissed rather than have transferred the case to circuit court. Mrs. Bonnell amended her complaint in circuit court to include an additional claim for $14,000.00 that she asserted was due her under the parties' divorce decree. Mr. Bonnell renewed his motions, and later argued to the circuit court that the chancery judge had already decided the $14,000.00 claim.

The circuit court conducted a hearing on October 27, 1994, and denied Mr. Bonnell's motions, ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the replevin action. The circuit court recessed without deciding whether Mrs. Bonnell was precluded from pursuing her $14,000.00 claim. Bonnell subsequently petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition.

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ, which is only granted when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction, there are no disputed facts, there is no adequate remedy otherwise, and the writ is clearly warranted. West Memphis Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Circuit Court, 316 Ark. 290, 871 S.W.2d 368 (1994). When considering a petition for writ of prohibition, jurisdiction is tested on the pleadings, not the proof. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co. v. Circuit Court, 317 Ark. 493, 878 S.W.2d 745 (1994). Prohibition is only proper when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends on a legal rather than a factual question. Id.

First, we point out that both municipal and circuit court may have jurisdiction of a replevin action. Ark.Code Ann. § 18-60-804 (1987). Section 18-60-804 provides as follows:

(a) In all cases ... wherein a party claims a right of possession of property in the possession of another, the party may apply to the circuit court or the municipal court for issuance of an order of delivery of the property.

* * * * * *

(c) The petition may be brought in the municipal court at the election of the party so filing, and the municipal court shall have authority to give notice and hear the petition in the same manner as the circuit court. (Emphasis added.)

Generally speaking, a replevin action can be maintained only by one who has a general or special property interest in a thing taken or detained at the commencement of the action. Anderson v. Sharp County, Arkansas, 295 Ark. 366, 749 S.W.2d 306 (1988) (citation omitted). And such right of possession or ownership must be by a title recognized in law. Id.

The only limitation on a municipal court's authority to act on a claim in replevin is found at Ark. Const. amend. 64 and Ark.Code Ann. § 16-17-704(a)(4), wherein the municipal court is given original jurisdiction, coextensive with the county where it is situated, and concurrent with the circuit court in matters of contract where the amount in controversy does not exceed $3,000.00, excluding interest. A circuit court, on the other hand, has jurisdiction over a claim in replevin for personal property valued above $3,000.00. See Ark. Const. art. 7 § 11; Ark.Code Ann. § 16-13-201 (Repl.1994) and § 18-60-804. In the present case, Mrs. Bonnell's complaint alleged that she possessed title to a 1984 Toyota vehicle valued at $3,900.00 which she obtained under the Bonnells' divorce decree and which was being unlawfully detained by Mr. Bonnell. Clearly, Mrs. Bonnell's replevin action was properly within the jurisdiction of the Washington County Circuit Court, and, as a consequence, a writ of prohibition does not lie in these circumstances.

Mr. Bonnell argues further, however, that the municipal court had no authority to transfer Mrs. Bonnell's replevin action to circuit court in the first place, and instead the municipal court was obliged to dismiss, not transfer Mrs. Bonnell's case. We disagree.

Both Arkansas statutory law and our Rules of Civil Procedure provide authority permitting the municipal court to transfer Mrs. Bonnell's action as it did here. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-17-702 (1987) provides that all civil cases filed in municipal court (not subject to the Small Claims Procedure Act) shall be subject to the Inferior Court Rules, the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Section 16-17-702 reflects the General Assembly's efforts to implement Amendment 64 to the Arkansas Constitution which enlarged the jurisdiction of municipal courts. ¹ This same statutory principle is embodied in Inferior Ct.R. 10, as well. Inferior Ct.R. 10 states that, unless otherwise allowed, "the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and the rules of evidence shall apply to and govern matters of procedure and evidence in the inferior courts." And finally, this court's Ark.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) provides the following:

Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action or direct that the case be transferred to the proper court. (Emphasis added.)

As is clearly provided by Arkansas's statutory law and court rules, the municipal court had authority to transfer this cause to the Washington County Circuit Court after concluding Mrs. Bonnell's replevin action exceeded the jurisdictional amount. Mr. Bonnell defended Mrs. Bonnell's initial action by asking that it be dismissed, but acting under Rule 12(h)(3), the municipal court appropriately transferred the action instead. Mr. Bonnell does not challenge the constitutionality of these court rules or statute, and we are unaware of any such grounds that would limit the municipal court's discretion in transferring a replevin action to circuit court in circumstances such as those presented here. ²

Again, Mrs. Bonnell in her complaint claimed rightful possession of the vehicle through "title showing her as owner." While she also claimed possession through the couple's divorce decree, it is the claim by way of title that places jurisdiction properly in circuit rather than chancery court. ³ See Johnson v. Swanson, 209 Ark. 144, 189 S.W.2d 803 (1945). Had Mrs. Bonnell claimed right to possession from the divorce decree alone, jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the decree would have been properly in chancery court through exercise of its contempt powers. See Nooner v. Nooner, 278 Ark. 360, 645 S.W.2d 671 (1983).

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition.

DUDLEY, NEWBERN and ROAF, JJ., dissent.

DUDLEY, Justice, dissenting.

The writ of prohibition should be issued because suit has never been commenced, and the circuit court is without jurisdiction over petitioner and is about to proceed against petitioner.

I.

Brenda Bonnell filed suit in municipal court and obtained service on her former husband, petitioner, who now seeks a writ of prohibition. She sought replevin of a car valued at $3,900.00, which is in excess of the municipal court jurisdictional amount. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss because the municipal court lacked jurisdiction.

A municipal court is a court of limited and restricted jurisdiction. Bynum v. Patty, 207 Ark. 1084, 184 S.W.2d 254 (1944); see Ark.Code Ann. § 16-17-704 (Repl.1994). Courts of limited and restricted jurisdiction have only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly conferred by statute, or the constitution, or are necessarily incident thereto. Hilburn v. First State Bank, 259 Ark. 569, 535 S.W.2d 810 (1976). Neither the constitution nor the applicable statutes give municipal court jurisdiction over a replevin claim in the amount of $3,900.00. Ark. Const. art. 7, § 40; Ark. Const. amendment 64 § 1; Ark.Code Ann. § 16-17-704. Jurisdiction is never presumed in a court of limited jurisdiction. Morris v. Dooley, 59 Ark. 483, 28 S.W. 30 (1894). It has long been established that, when a replevin action is filed in a court of limited and restricted jurisdiction, the value must be shown in order for the court of limited jurisdiction to "acquire jurisdiction," otherwise the act of the judge is a "nullity." McClure v. Hill, 36 Ark. 268, 272 (1880). The municipal court was without subject-matter jurisdiction in this replevin action.

The municipal court recognized it was without jurisdiction and transferred the case to circuit court even though it had no subject-matter...