Bonner v. Cagle

• Decision Date: 07 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. W2015-01609-COA-R3-CV,W2015-01609-COA-R3-CV
• Citation: Bonner v. Cagle, No. W2015-01609-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. Jan 07, 2016)
• Parties: GUYOKA BONNER v. SGT. CAGLE, ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

GUYOKA BONNER v. SGT. CAGLE, ET AL.

No. W2015-01609-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs December 22, 2015

January 7, 2016

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 14CV521

R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge

An inmate sought a writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the prison disciplinary board, alleging both a violation of his due process rights and a violation of the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures. The trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in Willis v. Tennessee Department of Correction, 113 S.W.3d 706 (Tenn. 2003). We affirm the dismissal of the inmate's due process claim but reverse the trial court's decision to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings of the inmate's claim related to the alleged failure to comply with the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

Guyoka Bonner, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se

Jennifer L. Brenner, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Correction.

OPINION

Background

Petitioner/Appellant Guyoka Bonner is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). On December 18, 2014, Mr. Bonner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari against Respondents/Appellees "Sgt. Cagle, et al."¹ ("Appellees") in the Lake County Circuit Court regarding prison disciplinary proceedings that were undertaken after a cell phone was found in his cell.

In his petition, Mr. Bonner alleged that his rights were violated when the disciplinary proceedings were held in his absence. The facts surrounding Mr. Bonner's allegations are taken from his petition and largely undisputed. On July 1, 2014, a search of Mr. Bonner's cell revealed a cellular phone hidden in a hole in the wall behind a mirror. Both Mr. Bonner and his cellmate were charged with possession of a cellular phone and destruction of property due to the hole in the cell wall. The disciplinary proceedings related to the possession of a cellular phone charge were continued several times, twice upon Mr. Bonner's request, and three times upon request of TDOC staff. Finally, the hearing was scheduled for August 6, 2014.

On that day, Mr. Bonner received a movement pass that allowed him to move about the prison in order to attend the disciplinary hearing and/or visit the law library. Mr. Bonner proceeded to the disciplinary hearing around 1:15, but after being informed by hearing officer Sergeant Cagle that the hearing would not commence until 2:00, Mr. Bonner left the part of the prison where the hearing was to take place to go the law library. After visiting the law library, Mr. Bonner returned to his cell to retrieve the documents needed for the hearing. According to Mr. Bonner, however, upon his arrival at his cell, an officer informed him that "movement had stopped" and that he would not be allowed to leave his cell without an escort. According to Mr. Bonner, no one was available to escort him to the disciplinary hearing, and he was not able to leave his cell until 2:30 when movement resumed. When he finally arrived at the hearing, it had already been conducted, and Mr. Bonner had been found guilty. Mr. Bonner received a punishment of segregation for ten days; cancellation of three months of visitation; package restriction for nine months; and a $4.00 fine. Mr. Bonner thereafter appealed to the warden and the TDOC Commissioner, but both appeals were denied.

On January 21, 2015, the Tennessee Attorney General, on behalf of Appellees, filed a notice that it would not oppose the petition for a writ of certiorari. Accordingly, on February 2, 2015, the trial court granted Mr. Bonner's petition for a writ of certiorari and ordered that the record regarding the disciplinary proceedings be filed with the court. The record was thereafter filed on February 25, 2015.

On April 23, 2015, Appellees filed a brief opposing Mr. Bonner's request for relief. In their brief, Appellees asserted that Mr. Bonner failed to show that there was any violation of the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures (discussed in detail, infra) or that there was any substantial prejudice resulting from any slight deviation from the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures, as required for relief. At the request of the trial court, Appellees subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the record, in reliance on their previously filed brief. Mr. Bonner did not respond to Appellees' motion.

On July 13, 2015, the trial court entered an order dismissing Mr. Bonner's petition. According to the trial court:

From a review of the TDOC file that was filed by certified record on February 25, 2015, it appears to the Court that the inmate's right to appear in person before the board or hearing officer may have been violated. The reason for failure of the inmate to be present for the hearing appears to be a question of fact. A certified record filed by TDOC seems to substantiate the claim of the petitioner that Policy No. 502.01 under Uniform Disciplinary Procedures may have been violated.

The petitioner claims that his failure to be present for the hearing constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process. He requests that this Court reverse his conviction for possession of a cell phone and to dismiss the charge due to a violation of his due process rights. He cites the case of Willis v. TDOC, 113 S.W.3d 706 (Tenn. 2003). He alleges in his petition that TDOC sentenced him to ten days in isolation; cancelled three months of visitation and nine months package restriction and a $4.00 fine. In reviewing the Willis case, cited above, it appears that Mr. Willis had certain tools which TDOC felt could be used for escape. He was punished by the disciplinary board with a thirty (30) day punitive segregation; involuntary administrative segregation and a $5.00 fine. He filed a petition for certiorari claiming violation of his due process rights. In Willis, the court found that thirty (30) days of punitive segregation was not a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of the prisoner[']s determinate sentence and, therefore, the prisoner was not entitled to due process protection. The court also found that the de minimis nature of the fine makes it immune from procedural due process requirements. Although under a Motion for Judgment on therecord,² the Court must accept the petitioner's version as being true, the petitioner still does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under a common-law Writ of Certiorari because the punishment alleged does not trigger due process rights as defined in the Willis case.

Mr. Bonner filed a timely notice of appeal.

Issues Presented

As we perceive it, Mr. Bonner raises two issues in his brief to this Court:

1. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing his claim based upon a violation of his due process rights?

2. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing his claim based upon a violation of the Uniform Disciplinary Procedures?³

3.

Standard of Review

Here, the trial court granted Appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings. When reviewing orders granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,⁴ we use the same standard of review we use toreview orders granting a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Waller v. Bryan, 16 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). Accordingly, we must review the trial court's decision de novo without a presumption of correctness, Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997), and we must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the non-moving party and take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Young, 130 S.W.3d at 63. We should uphold granting the motion only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim that will entitle him or her to relief. Id.

Analysis

As an initial matter, we note that Mr. Bonner is proceeding pro se in this appeal, as he did throughout the proceedings in the circuit court. "It is well settled that pro se litigants must comply with the same standards to which lawyers must adhere." Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). As explained by this Court:

Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant's adversary. Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.

Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011) (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). Accordingly, we keep these rules in mind in considering this appeal.

Due Process

Mr. Bonner first argues that his procedural due process rights were violated when he was deprived of an opportunity to be heard at the disciplinary proceeding, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974) (holding that inmates in prison disciplinary proceedings are entitled to advance written notice of the charges, written findings of fact, the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous); but see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2298, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995) (holding that while Wolff applies in prison...