Bonner v. Chevron U.S.A., 81-4271
| Decision Date | 22 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-4271,81-4271 |
| Parties | Homer BONNER, Jr., (Tony Bonner, Executor of the Estate of Homer Bonner, substituted in place and stead of Homer Bonner, Jr.) Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHEVRON U.S.A., Defendant-Appellee. Summary Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Camilo K. Salas, III, New Orleans, La., Maurice Dantin, Columbia, Miss., for amicus curiae Jack B. McIntosh.
John L. Low, IV, Jackson, Miss., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before BROWN, POLITZ and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
On April 2, 1976, Homer Bonner, Jr., was injured while working on a fixed drilling platform, owned by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., located off the coast of Louisiana. On December 1, 1980, Bonner filed suit against Chevron invoking the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56. Chevron moved for dismissal on the ground that the suit was not timely filed because Louisiana's one year statute of limitations was applicable to Bonner's ex delicto suit. The district court agreed and granted the dismissal, 512 F.Supp. 1313. We affirm.
There is no question that the accident causing Bonner's injuries occurred on a fixed drilling platform located on the outer continental shelf off the coast of Louisiana. Consequently, Louisiana is the "adjacent state" within the intendment of the Lands Act, and pertinent Louisiana law becomes surrogate federal law applicable to Bonner's claim. Congress ordained this policy in 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a), which reads:
(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are hereby extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom ... to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State: ...
(2)(A) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this Act or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State now in effect or hereafter adopted, amended, or repealed are hereby declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf ....
Prior to passage of the Lands Act, the question of what law was applicable to "artificial islands," such as Chevron's drilling platform, was problematic. In Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355-57, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 1837, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969), the Supreme Court traced the history of the Lands Act and discussed how Congress addressed the matter:
The purpose of the Lands Act was to define a body of law applicable to the seabed, the sub-soil, and the fixed structures such as those in question here on the Outer Continental Shelf. That this law was to be Federal law of the United States, applying state law only as Federal law and then only when not inconsistent with applicable Federal law, is made clear by the language of the Act. Section 3 makes it the "policy of the United States" that the affected areas "appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control and power of disposition." Section 4 makes the "Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States" apply "to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State." Since federal law, because of its limited function in a federal system, might be inadequate to cope with the full range of potential legal problems, the Act supplemented gaps in the federal law with state law through the "adoption of state law as the law of the United...
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