Bonner v. CHEVRON USA INC.
| Decision Date | 06 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. E80-0111(N). |
| Citation | 512 F. Supp. 1313 |
| Parties | Homer BONNER, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Stephen B. Murray, New Orleans, La., Stanford Young, Waynesboro, Miss., for plaintiff.
Watkins & Eager, John L. Low, IV, Jackson, Miss., for defendant.
This is a personal injury action filed under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (hereinafter "Lands Act"). In his complaint, plaintiff, Homer Bonner, Jr., alleges he sustained personal injuries on a fixed drilling platform located on the outer continental shelf "offshore of the coast of Louisiana." Bonner further alleges that the defendant, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., owned the platform on which his injuries occurred. The accident in question occurred, according to the allegations of the complaint, on April 2, 1976. Suit was filed in this Court on December 1, 1980.
To complete the factual scenario, it should be noted that the suit has no connection with the State of Mississippi other than the fact that it was filed here. Bonner is a resident of the State of Alabama; Chevron is a California corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco. As aforesaid, the complaint itself alleges the accident occurred off the coast of Louisiana. Chevron contended, and Bonner did not deny, that plaintiff's single purpose in filing suit in Mississippi was to take advantage of Mississippi's six-year limitations period.
Chevron moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the suit is time barred. According to Chevron, the one-year Louisiana limitations period, § 3536, La.Civ.Code Ann., operates, by virtue of § 1333(a)(2) of the Lands Act, so as to displace the otherwise applicable six-year limitations period prescribed by Mississippi law, § 15-1-49, Miss.Code Ann. (1972).
After studying the briefs and supplemental briefs submitted by the parties, and following oral argument, the Court has concluded Chevron's motion is well taken and should be sustained. The result is harsh; however, the legislative intent is clear. As will be seen hereafter, the Court is of the opinion that, under the facts in this case, the Congress has specified application of the Louisiana limitations period. If it is to be otherwise, it remains within the legislative prerogative of Congress to effectuate a change by way of amendment to the Lands Act.
Because this is a Lands Act case, the Act itself furnishes our point of departure. It provides in pertinent part as follows:
Since the complaint itself alleges that the "adjacent state" is Louisiana, it is obvious that Louisiana law governs Bonner's rights against Chevron. However, Louisiana law applies not of its own force and effect, but by virtue of its incorporation and application as "the law of the United States." This Court agrees with Chevron's assertion that Louisiana law thereby becomes federal law, mandating application of the Louisiana prescriptive period rather than the Mississippi limitations period.
The United States Supreme Court considered the question of what limitations period is to be applied in a Lands Act case in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). As in the case at bar, the plaintiff in Huson had been injured on the outer continental shelf in waters adjacent to Louisiana. As here, suit in Huson was not filed until after the expiration of the one-year Louisiana prescriptive period, but the district court and court of appeals permitted the maintenance of suit on the theory that the admiralty doctrine of laches, rather than the Louisiana prescriptive statute, applied. The Supreme Court reversed on this point, reasoning as follows:
Under § 1333(a)(2) of the Act, "state law becomes federal law federally enforced." Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 365, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 1842, 23 L.Ed.2d 360, 370. It was the intent of Congress, expressed in the Senate Committee Report, in the Conference Report, and on the floor of the Senate, that state laws be "adopted" or "enacted" as federal law. See Id., at 357-58, 89 S.Ct. at 1837-38, 23 L.Ed.2d at 365. Thus a federal court applying Louisiana law under § 1333(a)(2) of the Lands Act is applying it as federal law — as the law of the federal forum. Since the federal court is not, then, applying the law of another forum in the usual sense, ordinary conflict of laws principles have no relevance. 404 U.S. at 102-03, 92 S.Ct. at 353, 30 L.Ed.2d at 303. emphasis in original
There is a footnote appended to the above passage from the Court's opinion in Huson, which this Court finds quite instructive. That footnote reads in applicable part as follows:
This is not to imply that a federal court adjudicating a claim under state law as absorbed in the Lands Act must function as it would in a diversity case. 404 U.S. at 102 n. 5, 92 S.Ct. at 353 n.5, 30 L.Ed.2d at 303 n. 5.
From Huson, this Court gleans "ordinary conflict of laws principles have no relevance." 404 U.S. at 103, 92 S.Ct. at 353, 30 L.Ed.2d at 303. Accordingly, such cases as Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969), are inapplicable. And because the Louisiana prescriptive period is "absorbed" so as to become a "federal law federally enforced," the substantive/procedural dichotomy generally relied upon in resolving conflicts questions is also not applicable. Rather, reference is to the Supremacy Clause by virtue of which the now federal one-year limitation period bars maintenance of the present action, notwithstanding the Mississippi six-year limitations period. As is stated in Am.Jur.:
The authority of the United States Government is supreme in its congnizance of all subjects which the Constitution has committed to it. Consequently, there can be no conflict of authority, in the sense here given to the term, between a state and the United States in respect to such a matter, the former always subordinated and the latter paramount. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws § 15 at 36.
While admittedly not directly in point, and, to some extent, dicta, the foregoing comments of the Supreme Court in Huson are, in the absence of more pertinent authorities, persuasive. Insofar as the Court and counsel have been able to ascertain, the limitations issue here presented is a question of first impression. The Court, therefore, accords the foregoing language from Huson somewhat greater weight than would normally be the case.
The Court's disposition of the motion sub judice is supported by the legislative history of the Lands Act as set forth...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bonner v. Chevron U.S.A., 81-4271
... ... Before BROWN, POLITZ and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges ... POLITZ, Circuit Judge: ... On April 2, 1976, Homer Bonner, Jr., was injured while working on a fixed drilling platform, owned by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., located off the coast of Louisiana. On December 1, 1980, Bonner filed suit against Chevron invoking the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Lands Act), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56. Chevron moved for dismissal on the ground that the suit was not timely filed because Louisiana's one year statute of ... ...