Bonner v. Chicago Transit Authority
Decision Date | 28 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 1-92-1890,1-92-1890 |
Citation | 249 Ill.App.3d 210,618 N.E.2d 871 |
Parties | , 188 Ill.Dec. 301 James BONNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a municipal corporation, and Gigi Lee, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Robert D. Shearer, of counsel, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.
Anthony J. Rivtrovato, of counsel, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff James Bonner appeals from a final order of the circuit court of Cook County which granted defendant Chicago Transit Authority's (the CTA) motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The validity of the circuit court's order turns on whether plaintiff's notice of suit to the CTA, mandated by section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (the Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111 2/3, par. 341), satisfied the requirements of that section. We find that it did not and, accordingly, affirm the dismissal.
Plaintiff's complaint, filed September 25, 1991, alleges that he was injured in an automobile accident on November 4, 1990, when a CTA bus driven by Gigi Lee collided with his vehicle. Plaintiff's complaint, inter alia, alleged negligence and asserted vicarious liability against the CTA.
On October 30, 1991, the CTA filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The motion alleged that, contrary to the specific notice requirements of section 41 of the Act, plaintiff's notice of suit incorrectly listed the date of the accident as November 3, 1990, and omitted entirely the approximate time of the accident.
On May 1, 1992, the circuit court granted the CTA's motion. Gigi Lee would remain a named defendant. Plaintiff pursues this appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a).
This case requires that we construe section 41 of the Act, which provides in relevant part:
(Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111 2/3, par. 341.
In Patinkin v. Regional Transportation Authority (1991), 214 Ill.App.3d 973, 158 Ill.Dec. 630, 574 N.E.2d 743, we recently addressed the notice requirements of section 41. In Patinkin, plaintiff was a passenger on an elevated train when one of the train's windows fell on her finger. Plaintiff sent the Regional Transit Authority (RTA) notice of her intention to sue, thereafter instituting her suit against the RTA. Plaintiff later amended her complaint to add the CTA as a defendant. Plaintiff asserted that the notice she sent to the RTA constituted sufficient notice to the CTA.
The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's action against the CTA on the ground that plaintiff's notice to the RTA did not satisfy the required statutory notice under section 41 of the Act. We affirmed the dismissal. In so doing, we expressly stated as follows:
(Patinkin, 214 Ill.App.3d at 976, 158 Ill.Dec. 630, 574 N.E.2d 743.)
We reiterated later that, "in determining whether the requirements of section 41 have been complied with, the section's terms must be strictly construed." Patinkin, 214 Ill.App.3d at 976, 158 Ill.Dec. 630, 574 N.E.2d 743.
While Patinkin 's factual setting differs from the present case, the principle of law for which it stands is directly applicable. In short, claimants against the CTA must strictly comply with section 41. Absent such compliance, dismissal is required.
Patinkin is dispositive of the instant appeal. (See also Sanders v. Chicago Transit Authority (1991), 220 Ill.App.3d 505, 163 Ill.Dec. 260, 581 N.E.2d 211 ( ); Murphy v. Chicago Transit Authority (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 918, 139 Ill.Dec. 18, 548 N.E.2d 403 ( ); Margolis v. Chicago Transit Authority (1979), 69 Ill.App.3d 1028, 26 Ill.Dec. 566, 388 N.E.2d 190 ( ); Thomas v. Chicago Transit Authority (1975), 29 Ill.App.3d 952, 331 N.E.2d 216 (same); Frowner v. Chicago Transit Authority (1960), 25 Ill.App.2d 312, 167 N.E.2d 26 ( ); Hayes v. Chicago Transit Authority (1950), 340 Ill.App. 375, 92 N.E.2d 174 ( ).) Here, it is uncontested that plaintiff's notice failed to correctly state the date of the accident and omitted entirely the approximate hour of the accident. The notice, therefore, did...
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