Bonner v. Circuit Court of City of St. Louis, Mo., 75-1056.

Citation526 F.2d 1331
Decision Date28 November 1975
Docket NumberNo. 75-1056.,75-1056.
PartiesHorace W. BONNER, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. CIRCUIT COURT OF the CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, et al., Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Samuel H. Liberman, St. Louis, Mo., made argument for appellants.

Amicus curiae brief for State of Missouri was filed by John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., William F. Arnet, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., and Charles B. Blackmar, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Louis, Mo.

Separate brief for appellee and Missouri Bar, amicus curiae, was filed by R. H. McRoberts, St. Louis, Mo., for Missouri Bar.

James J. Gallagher, Associate City Counselor, St. Louis Mo., for appellees Judges Tillman, Bloom, Walsh, Scott and Corcoran.

John F. Gillespie and Michael G. Ravetta, Asst. Circuit Attys., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee Brendan Ryan.

Cornelius T. Lane, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee Charles D. Kitchen.

Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, and LAY, HEANEY, BRIGHT, ROSS, STEPHENSON, WEBSTER and HENLEY, Circuit Judges, en banc.

Certiorari Denied March 1, 1976. See 96 S.Ct. 1418.

The case was argued and submitted before the Court en banc.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Twenty black prisoners, each convicted for various crimes in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, Missouri, appeal from the dismissal of their complaint alleging civil rights violations on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The defendants include five St. Louis Circuit Court Judges, the Circuit Attorney and the Public Defender for the City of St. Louis. Jurisdiction is allegedly based upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000a on the ground that the state court is a place of public accommodation. Plaintiffs' basic allegation is that the defendants have joined in a systematic racially discriminatory conspiracy to harass, intimidate, coerce, discriminate, and deny equal protection to black citizens by coercing pleas of guilty to criminal charges.1

Plaintiffs seek both declaratory and injunctive relief. They ask the court to declare the policies and practices of the defendants unconstitutional and to enjoin the denial to "black persons, namely plaintiffs" of due process and equal protection of the law. Specifically plaintiffs seek to enjoin Judges Tillman, Bloom, Scott, Walsh and Corcoran from acting in violation of the Federal Constitution, and defendant Kitchen, as Public Defender, from accepting federal funds so long as his office provides representation below "adequate standards" due to too heavy a caseload.

The district court, the Honorable H. Kenneth Wangelin presiding, dismissed the complaint without a hearing, holding that the state court is not a place of public accommodation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a and that judicial immunity barred relief as to all defendants.2

We find it unnecessary to decide whether jurisdiction can be based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a and 2000b since we view the pro se complaint as asserting jurisdiction based on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq. We have observed before:

A complaint should not be dismissed merely because a plaintiff's allegations do not support the particular legal theory he advances, for the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.

Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974).

The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that each of the defendants enjoyed judicial or quasi-judicial immunity which barred declaratory and injunctive relief. This circuit has never decided whether those enjoying judicial immunity from damage suits are similarly immune from suits seeking equitable and injunctive relief. In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) the Supreme Court observed:

Judges who would willfully discriminate on the ground of race or otherwise would willfully deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights, as this complaint alleges, must take account of 18 U.S.C. § 242.... That section provides:
"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined ... or imprisoned ...."
Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, see Pierson v. Ray 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), or civil liability for willful corruption, see Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 110-111 34 S.Ct. 27, 28-29, 58 L.Ed. 142 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335, 347, 350, 354 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872), we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. Cf. Ex parte Virginia 10 Otto 339, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880). On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach "so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress ...." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972).

414 U.S. at 503, 94 S.Ct. at 679.

We need not reach that question here. We affirm the dismissal on the grounds that first, plaintiffs have failed to allege irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law, indispensable pre-requisites to the equitable relief requested, and second, that the doctrine of federal non-intervention into state court proceedings is applicable here.

The Supreme Court has often reaffirmed the basic principle that equity will not act to restrain state criminal proceedings "when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 750, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Neither the requisite irreparable harm nor the lack of an adequate remedy at law exists here. Plaintiffs do not challenge their present incarceration or the legality of their sentences, they challenge only possible future recurrences of the alleged illegal acts. The reason for this is clear. If plaintiffs sought relief from the fact or duration of present custody on the basis of an illegal conviction, they would have to begin by filing under the state post-conviction act, thereby exhausting their state remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-89, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).3

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the past denial of their rights is unconstitutional and an injunction precluding the circuit court judges, the prosecutor and the public defender from conspiring to deny and actually denying them due process and equal protection of the law. The irreparable injury is alleged to be certain specific acts which might take place in some future state criminal prosecution. However, this speculative allegation fails to satisfy the requirement of irreparable injury which must be both great and immediate if injunctive relief were not forthcoming. See O'Shea v. Littleton, supra 414 U.S. at 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669.

Furthermore, Missouri law, and federal law as well provide adequate legal remedies of which plaintiffs may avail themselves. Whether the relief is directed to the past or to the future, criminal defendants in the City of St. Louis may (1) seek disqualification of the judge if it can be demonstrated that the judge has a personal interest or prejudice which would deny the defendant a fair and impartial trial, Mo.S.Ct.R. 30.12-30.16; cf. Tyler v. Swenson, 427 F.2d 412, 415-17 (8th Cir. 1970); (2) seek review of a conviction on direct appeal to the appropriate appellate court in Missouri, Mo.Ann.Stat. §§ 479.250, 547.070 (1953); (3) pursue post-conviction proceedings in the Missouri state courts under Mo.S.Ct.R. 27.26; and (4) upon exhaustion of state remedies seek federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.4

In mentioning these procedures, we in no way do violence to the doctrine that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to relief under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). This doctrine, however, was never intended to modify the rule that where a plaintiff seeks equitable relief he must demonstrate that he lacks an adequate remedy at law and that absent injunctive relief he will suffer irreparable harm. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974); Potwara v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74, 77 (2nd Cir. 1967).

There exists a more fundamental reason why federal equitable relief is not available under the allegations of the complaint. Under our system of dual sovereignties state court judges are of course bound by the Federal Constitution. While some federal judicial review is required to assure uniformity in the application of the Bill of Rights,5 Congress and the federal judiciary have consistently recognized that federal courts should permit state courts to try state cases, and that where constitutional issues arise, state court judges are fully competent to handle them subject to Supreme Court review. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975), Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 419 U.S. 1043, 95 S.Ct. 615, 42 L.Ed.2d 637 (1975).

The principle of comity is "an even more vital consideration" reinforcing the doctrine of restraining federal intervention on the principle of an inadequate equitable basis for relief. Younger v. Harris,...

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