Bonner v. State

• Decision Date: 13 February 1998
• Citation: 740 So.2d 439
• Parties: Barbara BONNER v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

740 So.2d 439

Barbara BONNER v. STATE.

CR-95-0917.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

February 13, 1998.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1998.

Certiorari Denied July 16, 1999.

Max Cassady, Evergreen, for appellant. Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Stephen N. Dodd, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

Alabama Supreme Court 1971452.

McMILLAN, Judge.

The appellant, Barbara Bonner, appeals from her conviction for manslaughter, a violation of § 13A-6-3, Code of Alabama 1975. She was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. That sentence was split, and she was ordered to serve 2 years, followed by five years' probation.

The appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to allow her to introduce expert testimony concerning the "battered women syndrome." The trial court found that the relevance and materiality of the proffered testimony failed to outweigh its prejudicial effect on the jury.

"Battered spouse" syndrome has increasingly gained recognition in Alabama and in courts throughout the country. See Ex parte Haney, 603 So.2d 412 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 925, 113 S.Ct. 1297, 122 L.Ed.2d 687 (1993), and the cases cited therein. See Sarah C. Madison, Comment, A Critique and Proposed Solution to the Adverse Examination Problem Raised by Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in State v. Hennum, 74 Minn. L.Rev. 1023 (1990), for a list of jurisdictions that have considered battered-spouse-syndrome evidence. See also State v. Hickson, 630 So.2d 172, 175 (Fla.1993), quoting Rogers v. State, 616 So.2d 1098 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993) (wherein the district court stated: "Because the scientific principles underlying expert testimony relative to the battered woman's syndrome are now firmly established and widely accepted in the psychological community, we conclude that the syndrome has now gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community as a matter of law.") The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, found an expert's testimony on the subject of battered spouse syndrome "essential to rebut the general misconceptions regarding battered women" because this testimony "is aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge." State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 206, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (1984). The Alabama Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion in Ex parte Haney, 603 So.2d at 414:

"`Expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admitted to help the jury not only to understand the battered woman syndrome but also to determine whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger when considering the issue of self-defense.

"`"Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any time. The expert evidence would counter any `common sense' conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really that bad the woman would have left her husband much earlier. Popular misconceptions about battered woman syndrome would be put to rest, including the beliefs that the women are masochistic and enjoy the beatings and that they intentionally provoke their husbands into fits of rage. See Walker, The Battered Woman, 19-31 (1979)."'

"[State v.] Koss, 551 N.E.2d [970 (1990)] at 973 (quoting State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 68-69, 716 P.2d 563, 567 (1986))."

In this case, the trial court engaged in a relatively extensive colloquy with defense counsel regarding the relevancy and materiality of the expert's proffered testimony. Defense counsel informed the trial court that the expert was a social worker who had a master's degree and who regularly counsels battered women. Defense counsel further stated, in an offer of proof, that although the expert had never counseled the appellant, he was not offering the expert's testimony to show that the appellant suffered from any syndrome but rather to show the "psychological coping mechanisms of battered women and why they don't leave home and how they try to protect themselves." The trial court sustained the State's objection to the offer of proof because: (1) the proper factual predicate had not been laid to justify the testimony; and (2) the testimony would tend to confuse the jury because the homicide in this case occurred during a period of confrontation and the appellant was arguing self defense. In so ruling, the trial court stated, "I'm not going to allow [the testimony] until such time as the facts of the relationship are placed into evidence and we haven't had that yet." The trial court further found that "the confusion from allowing the proffered testimony into evidence outweighed the probative value of [the] testimony ... in light of the facts of the case, which is a self-defense case, where the victim is alleged to [have been] actively beating on the defendant at the time he was stabbed."

After examining the record, we hold that the trial court erred in disallowing the appellant's offer of expert testimony. First, the record reveals that a proper factual predicate was established to justify the introduction of the expert testimony. Before the appellant's offer of proof, evidence was presented during the State's case-in-chief and by defense witnesses who testified that the appellant's husband, Curtis Bonner, subjected her and her children to mental and physical abuse before and during their marriage. During direct examination by the State, Officer Robert Jackson of the Frisco City Police Department testified that on several occasions he responded to "911" emergency calls made by the appellant as a result of physical beatings by the victim. Evidence was presented that the physical violence escalated during the couple's marriage. Defense witnesses, including the appellant's 10-year-old son and 9-year-old niece, testified that at least three times a month the victim would beat the appellant with his fists and push her into the wall. They also testified that the victim had fired a gun at the appellant and had beaten her with the gun barrel. Both children testified that there were times when the appellant fought back, and that she had, on two occasions, stabbed the victim. The appellant's son testified that on the night of the killing, the victim had been drinking and was beating the appellant. He testified that she "started blocking" his assault and then grabbed a knife and stabbed the victim. Evidence was presented that throughout their marriage the appellant requested the Department of Human Resources to provide legal aid to enable her to divorce the victim. However, the victim would apologize for his behavior and persuade her not to divorce him. The record indicates that the State countered the appellant's claim of self-defense by arguing that she continued in the allegedly abusive relationship with the victim, thereby creating an inference that she was not afraid of the victim.

However, generally, a battered woman "is or has been in an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected her to forceful physical and/or psychological abuse." Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 203 (1984).

"The violence associated with this type of relationship is neither constant nor random. Instead, it follows a pattern. Dr. [Lenore] Walker identified a three-stage cycle of violence. The first stage is the `tension building' phase, during which small abusive episodes occur. These episodes gradually escalate over a period of time. The tension continues to build until the second stage—the acute battering phase—erupts. During this phase, in which most injuries occur, the battering is out of control. Psychological abuse in the form of threats of future harm is also prevalent. The third phase is a calm, loving period during which the batterer is contrite, seeks forgiveness, and promises to refrain from future violence. This phase provides a positive reinforcement for the woman to continue the relationship in the hope that the

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