Bonnet v. Seekins

• Decision Date: 17 April 1952
• Docket Number: No. 9044,9044
• Citation: 243 P.2d 317,126 Mont. 24
• Parties: BONNET v. SEEKINS.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 317

243 P.2d 317

126 Mont. 24

BONNET v. SEEKINS.

No. 9044.

Supreme Court of Montana.

April 17, 1952.

Paul T. Keller, Melvin E. Magnuson, Helena, for appellant.

Doyle & Francisco, Conrad, for respondent.

ANGSTMAN, Justice.

Plaintiff, a member of the Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, brought this action to recover the sum of $1,500 as rental alleged to be due under the terms of a written lease, and the further sum of $1,965 as damages alleged to have been sustained because of damage to the property covered by the lease.

The complaint consisted of two causes of action. The first was to recover the rental and the second the damages. The court instructed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff for $1,500 on the first cause of action. The jury found for plaintiff on the second cause in the sum of $125 and as instructed returned a verdict for $1,500 on the first cause of action. Judgment was entered on the verdict. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and he appealed from the judgment.

The lease in question covered a fortyacre tract of land held by plaintiff under an allotment. The lease was written on October 11, 1946, and signed on October 25th. It was approved by the superintendent of the Indian agency on December 6th. It was for a five-year term beginning on January 1, 1947, with the payment of $1,500 rental upon approval of the lease and $1,500 on December 1, 1947, and a like amount on December 1st of each succeeding year to and including 1950.

Defendant by his answer admitted the execution of the lease and its terms and by way of cross-complaint alleged that on October 12, 1946, a sublease was executed by plaintiff and her husband to defendant covering a tract of 1500 acres for the period of five years commencing on January 1, 1947; that the rental was $1,500 per year payable yearly in advance; that the $1,500 was the same $1,500 rental referred to in plaintiff's complaint as the consideration for the 40 acres and that the one consideration of $1,500 was to cover both leases; that the 40 acres and the 1500 acres constituted a farm and grazing unit which defendant desired to use in the operation of a dairy; that in April 1947 defendant was notified by the superintendent of the Blackfeet. Indian agency at Browning that the 1500 acre sublease was void and of no effect because plaintiff and her husband had no authority to execute the sublease; that in consequence defendant was compelled to dispose of his dairy business and livestock.

He alleged damages by reason of the forced sale in the sum of $2,463.58. The reply or answer to the cross-complaint admitted the execution of the sublease referred to in the cross-complaint and that defendant commenced the operation of a dairy on the premises and procured cows and equipment therefor and denies each and every other allegation in the cross-complaint.

There was no evidence offered in support of the cross-complaint and at the conclusion of defendant's case the following proceedings took place: 'Mr. Doyle: At the close of the defendant's case the plaintiff requests the Court to withdraw from the consideration of the jury the counter claim contained in the answer and cross-complaint of the defendant. The Court: Any Objection? Mr. Werner: No objection. The Court: The motion is granted and the counter claim is withdrawn.'

Defendant's first contention is that since plaintiff is a ward of the United States and since the 40 acres involved in the lease is trust patented land, the state court had no jurisdiction. The question was raised by defendant by objecting to the introduction of any evidence on that ground.

In 27 Am.Jur., Indians, p. 554, Sec. 21, it is said: 'It has, furthermore, been almost uniformly held that Indians may sue or be sued in state courts, since the latter are generally open to all persons irrespective of race, color, or citizenship.'

A leading case announcing this view is that of Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 12 S.Ct. 862, 36 L.Ed. 719. Our Constitution, Article III, Sec. 6, commands that, 'Courts of justice shall be open to every person'. Certainly Indians are persons and as such are entitled to maintain actions to redress wrongs.

Such is the holding of courts generally.

In Bem-Way-Bin-Ness v. Eshelby, 87 Minn. 108, 91 N.W. 291, 293, the same contention was made as here. The action was by Tribal Indians to recover possession of land. The court in speaking of the question said: 'This brings us to the question whether the plaintiffs may maintain their original action in the state court, although they are tribal Indians, and not citizens. This is an interesting and important question, and at the outset it is well to note that no officer or agent having charge of the Indians is here making any objection to the plaintiffs' maintaining their action, but that white men, citizens of this state, who are, as the plaintiffs allege, in possession of their land, over which the state and its courts have plenary jurisdiction, are the only parties questioning the jurisdiction of the court; and, further, that the federal courts have no jurisdiction of the action, and that, if the state court has not, then the plaintiffs have no adequate or practical remedy to redress the alleged wrong. Our state constitution (article 1, Sec. 8) provides that: 'Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character; he ought to obtain justice freely and without purchase; completely and without denial; promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.' This opens the door of our courts to all persons, irrespective of race, color, creed, citizenship, or condition. Why, then, should that door be closed on the sole demand of the defendants against the plaintiffs, who only seek a fair opportunity to establish their alleged property rights?' The court concluded that the state court had jurisdiction.

It has been held that the state courts have jurisdiction of an action by an Indian ward of the government to recover the reasonable value of the use of lands as mesne profits against one holding a lease on allotted land which was void for want of approval by the superintendent of the Indian agency or the proper United States official. Holden v. Lynn, 30 Okl. 663, 120 P. 246, 38 L.R.A.,N.S., 239; Phillips v. Reynolds, 79 Neb. 626, 113 N.W. 234.

In recognition of the rule that the courts of a state are open to all persons irrespective of race, color or citizenship, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has held that the state courts have jurisdiction to appoint an administrator for a deceased reservation Indian to enforce the right of action for wrongful death. Trujillo v. Prince, 42 N.M. 337, 78 P.2d 145. See also Martinez v. Martinez, 49 N.M. 83, 157 P.2d 484, involving water rights; Kohlmeyer v. Wolverine Oil Co., 37 Okl. 477, 132 P. 497, involving possession and ownership of lands for oil and gas purposes. And compare Brown v. Anderson, 61 Okl. 136, 160 P. 724; and Red Hawk v. Joines, 129 Or. 620, 278 P. 572.

In Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cullers, 81 Tex. 382, 17 S.W. 19, 21, 13 L.R.A. 542, plaintiff was the assignee of Black, an Indian. The question was whether Black had any right to sue and if not whether he could transfer the right to plaintiff. The court said: 'If, however, it were necessary for us to decide the question, we think we would have little difficulty in holding that an Indian, like Black, is a 'person' within the meaning of our state constitution and laws, and is thereby guarantied the right of redress for injuries done to him 'in his person, property, or reputation.' If he is not a person, then what is he?'

In 42 C.J.S. Indians, p. 652, Sec. 8, it is said: 'Indians generally may sue in the federal and state courts on causes of action otherwise within the jurisdiction of the particular court. * * * Actions which have been held maintainable by Indians include such actions as ejectment, replevin, an action for the diversion of water on the public domain, an action for breach of contract, an action to redress any wrong committed outside the limits of his reservation against his person or property, or an action to recover an allotment...