Bonnett v. State

• Decision Date: 09 January 1974
• Citation: 313 A.2d 808,126 N.J.Super. 239
• Parties: Harry BONNETT et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. STATE of New Jersey et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 239

126 N.J.Super. 239

313 A.2d 808

Harry BONNETT et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. STATE of New Jersey et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Dec. 11, 1973.

Decided Jan. 9, 1974.

Richard M. Conley, Deputy Atty. Gen. for defendants-appellants (George F. Kugler, Jr., Atty. Gen., attorney; Morton I. Greenberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).

William L. Brach, East Orange, for plaintiffs-respondents (Brach, Eichler, Rosenberg & Silver, East Orange, attorneys; William H. Eaton, Jersey City, on the brief).

David G. Lubell, New York City of the New York Bar, for intervenor-respondent League of Women Voters of N.J., (William J. Bender, Newark, attorney).

Before Judges CARTON, SEIDMAN and DEMOS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SEIDMAN, J.A.D.

Pursuant to leave granted, defendants appeal from the denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint.

Plaintiffs, who are residents and taxpayers of Essex County, filed a class action under R. 4:32--1 et seq. as representative parties of (1) owners of real property in the county, (2) black residents, (3) low-income residents, and (4) property owners 'with lost or jeopardized equities.' The none-count complaint challenged the allegedly inequitable tax system in New Jersey insofar as it related to (1) categorical public assistance, (2) the courts, and (3) supporting agencies in the administration of justice.

The thrust of the complaint is that the individual plaintiffs, as well as the county and the municipalities within it, are unconstitutionally discriminated against by reason of a system whereby certain expenses are allocated for payment by real estate taxes assessed with the county, rather than allocated on an equal statewide basis with a resultant disproportionate and inequitable burden on the residents of the county.

Subsequently, the League of Women Voters of New Jersey was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff.

Defendants moved for a dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court below denied the motion. holding that an issue was raised whether there was 'a reasonable or rational justification for the New Jersey system of providing welfare assistance and the judiciary, as required by the equal protection clause.'

It is thoroughly established that in dealing with the legal sufficiency of a complaint 'the plaintiff is entitled to a liberal interpretation of its contents and to the benefits of all its allegations and the most favorable inferences which may be reasonably drawn from them.' Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 193, 156 A.2d 1, 4 (1959); Di Christofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J.Super. 244, 252, 128 A.2d 281 (App.Div.1957); Winkler v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 66 N.J.Super. 22, 25, 168 A.2d 418 (App.Div.1961). See also P & A Const. Inc. v. Hackensack Water Co., 115 N.J.Super. 550, 551, 280 A.2d 497 (Law Div.1971); Young v. Gilbert, 121 N.J.Super. 78, 82, 296 A.2d 87 (Law Div.1972).

While defendants do not question this rule, they argue that the recent cases of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), and Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), decided after the disposition of the motion below, are controlling and mandate a reversal and a dismissal of the complaint. We do not agree.

We recognize from Rodriguez that in determining the validity under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of a state's statutory scheme for the local financing of public services which results in substantial disparities in per capita expenditures because of variations in the amount of local taxable properties, the standard of review is not that of strict judicial scrutiny requiring a showing of compelling state interest, unless fundamental constitutional rights are involved. 411 U.S. at 16, 93 S.Ct. at 1287, 36 L.Ed.2d at 33. Rather, the standard is that the system be shown to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 411 U.S. at 40, 93 S.Ct. at 1300 36 L.Ed.2d at 47; and, if it does, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantage. 411 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 1291, 36 L.Ed.2d at 37, U.S.Const., Amend. 14.

To this extent, Robinson v. Cahill, Supra, is in accord; but as our Supreme Court observed, Rodriguez does not say that there could never be a successful equal protection attack where a State has called upon local government to participate in the rendition of a public service. 62 N.J. at 488, 303 A.2d 273. The court in Robinson v. Cahill chose not to rest its decision on the equal protection concept of either the Federal or the State Constitution, but relied, instead, on the public education provision of the State Constitution. N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1. It pointed out, however, that even though there might not be a federal constitutional flaw, it was for the State to decide whether 'the equal protection demand of our State Constitution is offended.' 62 N.J. at 490, 303 A.2d 273.

The court made the following significant comments, even though as Obiter dictum: 62 N.J. at 499--500, 303 A.2d at 286:

* * * It is undeniable that local expenditures per pupil do vary, and generally because other essential services must also be met out of the same tax base and the total demands exceed what the local taxpayers are willing or able to endure. But for that same reason similar discrepancies, both as to benefits and burdens, can be found with respect to the other vital services which the State provides through its local subdivisions. The equal protection proposition potentially...