Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. C2745,C2745
• Citation: Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 633 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App. 1982)
• Parties: Mrs. Lynn W. BONNIWELL, et al., Appellants, v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, Appellee. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 553

633 S.W.2d 553

Mrs. Lynn W. BONNIWELL, et al., Appellants, v.BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. C2745.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

March 4, 1982.

W. James Kronzer, Kronzer, Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Ballard & Friend, John E.

Williams, Jr., Fulbright & Jaworski, L. S. Carsey, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, for appellants.

Stanley B. Binion, James L. Reed, Jr., Reynolds, Allen, Cook, Pannill & Hooper, Houston, for appellee.

Before PAUL PRESSLER, MILLER and MORSE, JJ.

PAUL PRESSLER, Justice.

The principal question presented by this appeal is whether a prior judgment, denying a defendant indemnity over and against a co-defendant on a cross-action, is res judicata of an identical cross-action in a suit brought by a different plaintiff, involving the same defendants, so as to support a summary judgment granting the first defendant indemnity over and against the co-defendant.We find the doctrine of res judicata applicable and accordingly affirm.

This litigation stems from a fatal airplane crash occurring shortly after takeoff at an air field in Galveston County, Texas on April 30, 1974.The aircraft was manufactured by appellee, Beech Aircraft Corporation(hereafter Beech), and operated by the commuter carrier, Metroflight, Inc.(hereafter Metro), one of the appellants.Metro had purchased the craft from Shawnee Airlines, Inc.(hereafter Shawnee).Although a named defendant in the two suits significant to this appeal, Shawnee is not a party to this appeal.

Of five lawsuits which resulted from this accident, the two which are here relevant are styled Wilcox, et al. v. Metroflight, Inc., et al., (hereafter referred to as the Wilcox case) and Bonniwell, et al., v. Metroflight, Inc., et al. (hereafter referred to as the Bonniwell case.)This appeal is from a summary judgment entered in favor of Beech and against Metro in the Bonniwell case.Although the summary judgment adjudicates rights only as between Metro, Beech, and Shawnee on their respective cross-actions, the Bonniwells are parties to this appeal because, by virtue of a stipulation entered into by them, the summary judgment substantially affects their rights.This stipulation recognizes the validity of a settlement agreement entered into by the Bonniwells with Metro and also provides that the Bonniwells will be bound by the summary judgment if affirmed on appeal.

In both the Wilcox and Bonniwell casesthe defendants and the causes of action against those defendants were identical.Metro and Shawnee were sued under the theory of negligence and Beech was sued under the theories of strict liability and negligence.The first case to proceed to trial was the Wilcox case tried in the 56th District Court of Galveston County, Texas.Prior to trial, the Wilcox plaintiffs settled with Metro nonsuiting the carrier on the negligence claims.Metro remained a party because Beech had cross-acted against Metro and Shawnee for indemnity or contribution.Metro had filed a similar cross-action against Beech, but it likewise nonsuited as to Beech prior to jury selection.

Of the sixteen fact findings made in Wilcox, the following are relevant here:

(1) Did not find that at the time the aircraft in question was manufactured by Beech Aircraft Corporation, the control lock system in question was defectively designed.

(2) Did not find that Beech Aircraft Corporation was negligent in failing to convey a design change relating to control lock pin position in the control column to the users of the Beech 99 airplane prior to the occasion in question.

(6)That Metroflight, Inc., was, on or about April 30, 1974, acting by and through its pilots, agents or employees, negligent in failing to remove the control lock pin in the Beech 99 aircraft prior to takeoff.

(7) That the negligence of Metroflight, Inc., in failing to remove the control lock pin was a proximate cause of the crash of the Beech 99 aircraft on April 30, 1974.

(8)That Metroflight, Inc., was negligent in permitting the aircraft to be operated with the single control lock pin.

(9) That such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Maxine B. Wilcox, Georgia Whale and David Goldstein.

(10)That Metroflight, Inc., on or about April 30, 1974, acting by and through its pilots, agents or employees, was grossly negligent in failing to remove the control lock pin in the Beech 99 aircraft prior to takeoff.

(11) That 25% of the negligence causing the occurrence was attributable to DefendantShawnee Airlines, Inc.

(12) That 75% of the negligence causing the occurrence was attributable to DefendantMetroflight, Inc.

(13) That on April 30, 1974, the pilot, Charles Sweeney knew, or should have known, that the aircraft in question could not be safely operated with the elevator and aileron controls locked.

In its judgment the Wilcox court denied Beech indemnity from Metro "because no liability or damages ... (were) assessed against Beech Aircraft Corporation...."

The summary judgment from which this appeal is taken involves the Bonniwell case.Beech moved for a summary judgment on Metro's cross-action against Beech and Beech's cross-action against Metro and Shawnee.The cross-plaintiffs in all of the cross-actions sought indemnity, or in the alternative, contribution over and against the cross-defendant(s).Beech's motion was grounded on the doctrine of res judicata.Beech asserted that the prior adjudication in the Wilcox case decided the issues in dispute in the Bonniwell case and, therefore, constituted a bar to the relitigation of those issues.Beech's motions were granted resulting in a take-nothing judgment against Metro and Shawnee on their cross-actions against Beech and a judgment in favor of Beech for complete indemnity over and against Metro.

The Bonniwells' standing to appeal this judgment arises from their stipulation that if the summary judgment is affirmed on appeal, they are bound by the settlement agreement they entered into with Metro.That settlement agreement provides that as part of the consideration for the payment of the sum of $450,000, the wife and children of Charles E. Bonniwell, III, deceased, "... do hereby indemnify and hold harmless Metroflight, Inc., from any and all claims, demands, actions and causes of action of whatsoever nature or character, which have been or hereafter may be asserted by any person, firm or corporation who is or shall be named as a defendant by us in any lawsuit arising out of the above described accident...."

The effect of affirming the summary judgment in question is to virtually eliminate the Bonniwells' cause of action against Beech.This is because, even if Beech were found liable to the Bonniwell's in a trial of their case against Beech, the summary judgment granting Beech complete indemnity over and against Metro would require Metro to pay those damages to the Bonniwells.They in turn have indemnified Metro pursuant to their settlement agreement.The Bonniwells' cause of action is thus destroyed because they would end up only where they started.However, the effect of affirmance on the Bonniwells is not the issue before this court and should not determine our decision.The Bonniwells entered into the agreement for a valuable consideration and their decision to so do was in no way influenced by any actions of Beech.Therefore, Beech's rights against Metro should not be compromised because of this settlement.What is at issue here is whether, as respects the horizonal relationship between Metro and Beech (as opposed to the vertical relationship between the Bonniwells and Beech), the Wilcox judgment adjudicating the rights of Beech on its cross-claim is res judicata of Beech and Metro's cross-claims in the Bonniwell case.

Appellants assert four main areas of complaint in their seven points of error.The first area (points of error one through four) concerns the trial court's alleged error in granting Beech's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata.The second area (point of error five) concerns the trial court's alleged error in holding that Metro could not assert its claims for affirmative relief because they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.Since Beech has conceded that the statute of limitations was not a bar to Metro's claims, while at the same time insisting that the claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we will not directly address the statute of limitations point in our discussion.In their third complaint (point of error six), appellants assert that the trial court erred in not granting Metro affirmative relief for its losses because they were only economic and, therefore, could not be claimed under strict liability.Finally, in their seventh point of error, appellants complain of the trial court's alleged error in entering a judgment granting Beech indemnity over and against Metro.Because the indemnity question is interwoven with the res judicata question, we will consider appellants' points one through four and point seven together concluding with appellants' point of error six.

RES JUDICATA

Appellants argue that res judicata is not applicable because in Beech's prayer for relief in Wilcox, it asked only to have judgment for indemnity or contribution if it were required by judgment to pay damages to plaintiffs.They argue that because the judgment denied Beech indemnity, there was no adjudication of Beech's right to indemnity or contribution.We disagree.Beech's prayer simply made a correct assessment of the law.Beech prayed for this relief because the law will allow a cross-plaintiff indemnity or contribution from a co-defendant only if the cross-plaintiff is found liable to the plaintiff.The wording of a prayer should not foreclose a judgment in favor of the party making the prayer as long as the judgment is proper under the law and resolves the issues presented by the parties.

Appellants argue that because the result of...