Bonsal v. Camp
Decision Date | 12 January 1911 |
Citation | 111 Va. 595,69 S.E. 978 |
Parties | BONSAL v. CAMP. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Cancellation or Instruments (§ 23*)— Rescission—Restoration or Former Status.
In an action to annul a contract, there must be a sufficient averment and proof of facts to justify the interposition of the court, which must be able to substantially restore the parties to the position which they occupied before they entered into the contract.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Cancellation of Instruments, Cent. Dig. § 32; Dec. Dig. § 23.*]
2. Cancellation of Instruments (§ 35*)— Parties.
On a bill to rescind a contract, all those substantially interested in the contract should be parties, unless the interests are severable, and, if the case can be completely decided as between the parties, that an interest exists in another whom the court cannot reach by process will not prevent a decree.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Cancellation of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 55-65; Dec. Dig. §35.*]
3. Cancellation of Instruments (§ 35*)— Parties.
In an action to rescind a deed by defendant on the ground that plaintiff was induced to make the purchase through the fraudulent representations of one C, who assumed to act as plaintiff's agent and who was to be interested to the extent of one-twentieth of the land, the purchase price whereof was $40,000, but who was alleged to be acting in defendant vendor's interest, such C. was a necessary party.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Cancellation of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 55-65; Dec. Dig. § 35.*]
Appeal to Circuit Court of City of Norfolk.
Bill by W. N. Camp against W. R. Bonsai. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Thos. H. Willcox and N. T. Green, for appellant.
W. L. Williams and Peatross & Savage, for appellee.
KEITH, P. Camp, the appellee, filed his bill in the circuit court of the city of Norfolk against Bonsai, in which he prays the court to rescind a deed made by Bonsai to him for a tract of land in the state of North Carolina, upon the ground that he was deceived into making the purchase by fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of Bonsai and his agent, one R. F. Brewer. Bonsai, the sole defendant, demurred to the bill because Brewer was not made a party defendant. He also answered, and such proceedings were had as resulted in a decree, which directed that upon the repayment by Bonsai of the purchase money which he had received from Camp the deed made by Bonsai to Camp should be rescinded upon certain terms and conditions.
The particular fraud relied upon consists in the fact that Brewer, who had been in the employment of Camp, who negotiated the the purchase of the real estate from Bonsai, and in the course of the transaction represented himself as acting for Camp, and who was to be interested in the purchase to the extent of one-twentieth of the value of the land, and whom Camp expected ultimately would become the purchaser of one-eighth thereof, was in reality during the whole negotiation acting in the interest of Bonsai, from whom he was to receive the sum of $5,000 for procuring a sale of the land for the sum of $40,000, had never paid a dollar for the twentieth interest which he actually had in the land under the contract as it was finally agreed upon, but was credited by the sum of $2,000, his ratable proportion of one-twentieth of the price of the land, as a part of the compensation which he was to receive from Bdnsal. It was represented, too, that upon the land there was from 40, 000, 000 to 00, 000, 000 feet of timber, which constituted its chief value; but, when Camp undertook to sell it, it was ascertained by timber experts that there were less than 20, 000, 000 feet.
This is a sufficient statement of the facts to enable us properly to pass upon the demurrer, which is the only assignment of error with which we shall deal.
It may be conceded for the sake of the argument, that the hill so states the fraud in the transaction as to entitle the plaintiff to a decree for a rescission of the deed; and this brings us to the consideration of the only ground of demurrer stated, viz., that Brewer was known by Camp to be the equitable owner of one-twentieth of the land purchased, and was therefore a necessary and indispensable party to this suit.
Camp was a resident of Florida, Brewer a resident of Tennessee, Bonsai a resident of Virginia, and the subject-matter of the contract was situated in the state of North Carolina.
In Barney v. Baltimore City, 6 Wall. 284 (18 L. Ed. 825), Mr. Justice Miller said:
The question for determination is whether this case falls within the second class— that of persons whose relations to the suit are such that, if their interest and their absence are formally brought to the attention of the court, it will require them to be made parties, if within its jurisdiction,...
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Young-Allen v. Bank of Am., N.A.
...solemn contracts of parties." Schmidt v. Household Fin. Corp., II , 276 Va. 108, 115, 661 S.E.2d 834 (2008) (quoting Bonsal v. Camp , 111 Va. 595, 599, 69 S.E. 978 (1911) ). "If rescission is granted, the contract is terminated for all purposes, and the parties are restored to the status qu......
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Watkins v. Fairfax County
...as parties to the proceeding is an absolute necessity, without which the court cannot proceed.....'" Id. quoting Bonsai v. Camp, 111 Va. 595, 597-98, 69 S.E. 978, 979 (1911) (quoting Barney v. Baltimore City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280, 284, 18 L.Ed. 825 Thus, the question to be answered in the ......
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Schmidt v. Household Finance Corp., II
...substantially to restore the parties to the position which they occupied before they entered into the contract. Bonsal v. Camp, 111 Va. 595, 599, 69 S.E. 978, 979 (1911); see also McLeskey v. Ocean Park Investors, Ltd., 242 Va. 51, 54, 405 S.E.2d 846, 847 (1991) ("If rescission is granted, ......
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Wilkins v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
...drastic exercise of the power of a court of chancery—to annul and set at naught the solemn contracts of parties." Bonsal v. Camp, 111 Va. 595, 595, 69 S.E. 978, 979 (1911).9 "If rescission is granted, the contract is terminated for all purposes, and theparties are restored to the status quo......