Bonsall Unified Sch. Dist. v. Richard C.
| Decision Date | 31 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 17-CV-1386 W (MDD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | BONSALL UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD C., et al., Defendants. |
Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss the Counterclaim/Cross-claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by the Bonsall Unified School District and Lori Cummins. [Doc. 9.] The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss.
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On July 7, 2017, the Bonsall Unified School District commenced this action against Richard C., Melissa C., and their minor child Mary C. (Compl. [Doc. 1].) The school district seeks review of an adverse administrative decision rendered by the office of administrative hearings on April 11, 2017. (Id. [Doc. 1] ¶ 1.) That decision ordered the district to reimburse Mary C.'s parents for non-public school expenses for the 2016-2017 year, in addition to travel costs. (ALJ Order
On October 16, 2017, Defendants filed a counterclaim and cross-claim against the school district and Lori Cummins. (Answer and Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4].) The Counterclaim/Cross-claim seeks review of the administrative decision, seeks to recover attorneys' fees from the underlying administrative matter, and it seeks redress for violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. ("Section 504"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("the ADA"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶¶ 59-96.)
On October 16, 2017, Defendants applied to the Court to use pseudonyms in place of their surname "with respect to all briefs, motions, oppositions to motions, replies, and other documents filed with the Court in this action." (Ex Parte App. for Use of Pseudonyms [Doc. 5] 2:1-7.) The application went unopposed. It requested that " 'Counter and Cross-claimant and Defendant be identified as 'Mary C.' and her parents be identified as 'Richard C.' and 'Melissa C.' " (Id.) On October 27, 2017, the Court granted this application, reasoning that the potential harm in the form of "disclosure of a child's private medical information" outweighed any public interest in Defendants' names. (Oct. 27, 2017 Order [Doc. 7].) Notwithstanding, some of the subsequent briefs filed by the school district and by Ms. Cummins contain Defendants' full surname. (Notice of Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. 9]; Cummins Reply [Doc. 17].) The district and Ms. Cummins are reminded to abbreviate Defendants' surname in accordance with the Court's order.
Defendants' Counterclaim/Cross-claim alleges the following facts.
Mary C. is a ten-year-old girl. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶ 15.) She "has been diagnosed with a Mood Disorder with Psychotic Features, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD"), Reading Disorder, and a Disorder of Written Language." (Id.) She has exhibited symptoms including defiance, impulsivity, shouting and screaming, anxiety, biting, hitting, scratching, and destroying property. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 16.) She "reportedly sees ghosts in her room, on the playground, and at school." (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 17.)
Mary C. attended Bonsall Elementary School from Kindergarten through the beginning of 4th grade. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶ 18.) She encountered a number of issues at school. In her kindergarten year, she threw a chair, head-butted a teacher, screamed, and threw tantrums. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶ 19.) Her first-grade teacher rated her "at risk" in several criteria and assessed her "behavioral severity" to be within the 92nd percentile. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 20.) Her teacher noted that she struggled to maintain a conversation, did not notice social cues, did not show interest in others' ideas, and got herself into trouble during unstructured times. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 21.) Defendants allege that the district knew of Mary C.'s diagnoses of ADHD, autism, and possible mood disorder when planning her placement for the second grade. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 22.) Nevertheless, they allege that the district "failed to offer her a placement designed to meet her unique needs." (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶¶ 22-24.)
A number of serious problems arose during Mary C.'s time in the second grade, at which time she was initially placed in 95% general education. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶¶ 23-33.) Between September 28, 2014 and December 1, 2014, Mary had nine "significant behavioral incidents at school." (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 29.) These "were moderate to extreme in severity and included stomping feet, pushing paper off of desk[s], kicking at furniture, yelling," slapping and kicking at staff, and throwing things. (Id.) On one occasion, Mary C. tried to stab someone with a screwdriver, then tried to stab someone else with a pencil, and finally and ended up stabbing herself and starting a fire. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 28.) Afterwards, she had to be hospitalized for two weeks as a danger to herself and others. (Id.) Two months later, on December 2, 2014, she had another behavioral incident that was so severe that the school called 911 and evacuated her second-grade classroom. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 30.)
Sometime between October of 2014 and January of 2015, Mary C. began attending a special day class. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶ 33.) By January 5, 2015, she was attending general education for about half of her day. (Id.) On January 7, 2015, "the team amended her [individualized education program] to change her placement to 50% of the time in special education." (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 34.) However, Defendants allege that Mary C. was not attending special education 50% of the time by April of 2015. Instead, depending on "her mood and unilateral decisions by school staff," she attended the general education classroom for up to "100% of her day." (See id.) The amount of each day she spent in general education changed on a daily basis. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 35.)
In February of 2015, Mary C. was admitted to a psychiatric hospital. Even so, and despite the difficulties she had in her second year, the district offered her a placement of 95% general education for third grade. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶¶ 31, 36.) Mary's behavioral problems continued. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶¶ 38-41.) The district frequently called Ms. C. to pick Mary up from school when these problems arose. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 41.) These incidents were not marked in Mary's record as disciplinary actions. (Id.) By the end of the third grade, Mary had regressed academically and behaviorally. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 42.)
Mary's parents removed her from Bonsall Elementary for her 4th grade year and placed her in Arch Academy ("Arch"), a certified non-public school. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶ 43.) Arch provided counseling, mental health services, and had a clinical social worker on campus to deal with behavioral issues. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 44.)
Defendants initiated administrative proceedings against the district on July 6, 2016. (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 23.) Defendants allege that the district retaliated against them by, inter alia, "revok[ing] funding for Independent Educational Evaluations for Mary C.'s little brother on September 21, 2016." (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶ 56.) According to the Counterclaim/Cross-claim, funding for these evaluations had previously been approved on May 23, 2016. (Id.)
An administrative hearing was held on this matter on January 24, 2017. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4] ¶ 50.) The ALJ ordered that the district reimburse Defendants for their tuition at Arch, and for associated transportation expenses. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶ 45; ALJ Order
The Counterclaim/Cross-claim asserts five claims for relief: (1) an appeal of the administrative decision; (2) for an award of attorneys' fees; (3) for violation of Section 504; (4) for violation of the ADA; and (5) for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Counterclaim/Cross-claim [Doc. 4].) The document does not distinguish between parties, referring to Defendants collectively as "Family" and not specifying against whom each cause of action is brought. (Id. [Doc. 4] ¶¶ 59-96.)
The school district and Ms. Cummins now move to dismiss the final three causes of action within the Counterclaim/Cross-claim.
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The Court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In ruling on the motion, a court must "accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to mean that "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The allegations in the complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Well-pled allegations in the complaint are assumed true, but a court is not...
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