De Bont v. de Bont

• Decision Date: 27 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2882-593-Appeal.,2882-593-Appeal.
• Citation: 826 A.2d 968
• Parties: Bartholomeus T. de BONT v. Darlene P. de BONT.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

826 A.2d 968

Bartholomeus T. de BONT v. Darlene P. de BONT.

No. 2882-593-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 27, 2003.

Bartholomeus deBont, pro se.

Sandra Terry Dobson, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case came before the Supreme Court on May 6, 2003, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda of the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the appeal at this time.

The plaintiff, Bartholomeus T. de Bont (de Bont or plaintiff), appeals pro se from a Family Court decision pending entry of final judgment in this divorce action. The plaintiff and the defendant, Darlene P. de Bont (Darlene or defendant), were married on November 14, 1987, and had one biological child, Ashley, born on August 31, 1989. The couple separated in February 1998, after plaintiff was convicted for the crime of embezzlement.¹ Subsequently, on August 19, 1998, defendant, with plaintiffs knowledge and consent, adopted a child, Matthew, who was born on June 8, 1993.² Although Darlene remained in Rhode Island for a substantial period after plaintiff was incarcerated, she eventually moved to Florida in January 2001. On June 4, 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce.

On January 3, 2002, after a four-day hearing in which de Bont appeared pro se, the trial justice rendered a written decision granting plaintiff an absolute divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences leading to an irremediable breakdown of the marriage. The trial justice found that Matthew was adopted by Darlene and was her child and not plaintiff's. He also denied plaintiffs claim that he was a de facto/psychological father to Matthew. The trial justice awarded Darlene sole custody of Ashley and temporarily denied plaintiff visitation rights until a court review demonstrated that Ashley would not be psychologically harmed by visiting plaintiff at the Adult Correctional Institutions. A decision pending entry of final judgment was entered on January 31, 2002, and plaintiff appealed.

After a final judgment entered on April 24, 2002, plaintiff filed numerous motions and pleadings, including, on May 13, 2002, an "Amended Motion for Specific Relief." A hearing was held on plaintiffs motion on June 24, 2002, and the trial justice, finding that there had been no substantial change in circumstances since the final judgment, denied several requests, including de Bont's motion for a stay pending appeal, a demand for further discovery, and a request for psychological evaluations of the parties and the children. However, notwithstanding his findings, the motion justice granted plaintiffs request to be provided with current information about Ashley's schooling and medical and mental health care records, and that defendant notify him if Ashley suffers a serious injury or contracts a serious illness. Further, the trial justice directed defendant to provide plaintiff with Ashley's address, and furnish photographs of the child every six months. Finally, he ordered that defendant refrain from making disparaging remarks about plaintiff in Ashley's presence. The plaintiff filed an appeal from that order.

Before addressing the substantive issues on appeal, we first must consider the time-liness of plaintiffs appeal from the decision pending entry of final judgment. Although, as noted, the decision was entered on January 31, 2002, and on March 1, 2002, plaintiff filed a motion to extend the appeal period with an affidavit alleging that, despite his good faith efforts to file his appeal on time, he did not receive notice of the decision pending entry of final judgment until after the appeal period had lapsed. Although plaintiffs motion to extend the appeal period was granted, the order failed to specify the date by which the appeal should be filed. Further, plaintiff contends that he mailed a notice of appeal on February 22nd, the same day he received a copy of the decision pending entry of final judgment, but this filing was returned to him by the clerk of the Family Court. Pursuant to Article I, Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appeal deadline was February 20, twenty days after the decision pending entry of final judgment was entered. However, Rule 4(a) further states that a trial justice may allow for an additional thirty days to appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect. This Court has held that the "additional thirty days begins running at the expiration of the original twenty-day period, and not from the date the motion to extend is granted." Millman v. Millman, 723 A.2d 1118, 1119 (R.I.1999) (per curiam). (Emphasis added.) Thus, the time for plaintiff to file an appeal was extended until March 22, 2002. We note that plaintiffs notice of appeal bears a date stamp of March 2002, but the specific date is illegible. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs notice of appeal is not clearly date-stamped, we are inclined to accept plaintiffs representation that his notice of appeal initially was filed on February 22 and again filed before March 22, 2002.

The plaintiff has raised numerous issues for our consideration, many of which are without merit. Accordingly, we shall address only those issues that warrant our review and were properly preserved in the trial court. Initially, plaintiff alleges that the trial justice erred in many of his evidentiary rulings on the admission and exclusion of evidence, as well as his refusal to hear the testimony of three witnesses supporting plaintiffs post-judgment motion. This Court will not disturb a trial justice's ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence, absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Neri, 593 A.2d 953, 956 (R.I.1991). Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied that plaintiffs evidentiary charges are without merit. We note that de Bont has failed to identify the witnesses he sought to present nor has he indicated the substance of their expected testimony. Without these specifics, we decline to address plaintiffs claim of error. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that, as a result, the trial justice abused his discretion or otherwise was wrong in any evidentiary rulings.

Additionally, plaintiff argues that he should be considered a de facto/psychological parent to Matthew and also that he was wrongfully denied custody and visitation rights to Ashley. In finding that plaintiff was not an equitable parent to Matthew, the trial justice concluded that plaintiffs contact with Matthew, because of the parties' separation and plaintiffs incarceration, had been intermittent and quite insignificant. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff was not a de...