Booker v. State

Decision Date23 March 1979
Docket NumberNo. 578S80,578S80
Citation386 N.E.2d 1198,270 Ind. 498
PartiesWilliam Mane BOOKER and Dickie Durrad Bridges, Appellants (Defendants below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

John F. Surbeck, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, Thomas L. Ryan, Fort Wayne, for appellants.

Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

William Mane Booker and Dickie Durrad Bridges, defendants, were each found guilty, in a trial to the court, without the intervention of a jury, of robbery and felony murder. They jointly appeal their convictions and present three issues for determination:

1. Did the trial court err in overruling the defendants' motion to suppress evidence resulting from the defendants' in-custodial interrogation?

2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding and judgment of guilt?

3. Did the trial court err in overruling the defendants' objection to a hypothetical question?

Investigating a house burglary in which a stolen car had been used, Officer John Phenicie, of the Fort Wayne Police Department, spotted the car parked at the rear of 1210 Oak Street. Phenicie and his partner began checking houses nearby to see if anyone had seen the person who had left the automobile there. Phenicie saw Booker (whom he recognized) leaving a house several houses away; he called to Booker; Booker ran. Booker was apprehended and was arrested under outstanding warrants for No Operator's License and Driving While Suspended; he was also arrested for Fleeing a Police Officer. After Phenicie read Booker his rights, he asked Booker if he would like to go to the scene of the burglary; Booker said that he would go because he had not done anything wrong. Booker was identified by the complainant at the scene. Phenicie added the preliminary charge of burglary, and Booker was taken to the City-County Building where he was again advised of his rights and signed a written waiver. He then implicated Bridges in the burglary.

Within the course of the interrogation, Booker admitted his involvement in the house burglary. Upon prompting by the officers, Booker also indicated that he and Bridges had been involved in other burglaries. The officers advised him that since he was under arrest for first-degree burglary that it would be possible that he would not be charged wih any other first-degree burglary and that it would "be better for him to get it off of any other crime that he had committed." Booker elaborated upon several burglaries, and then the officers asked if there was anything else. Booker said two or three purse snatchings but not the one where the old man died. The officer testified, "At this time we again advised him that possible (Sic ) it would be better for him to get it off his chest, in other words, and tell us details." Booker then related that he was involved, with Bridges, in stealing a purse and wallet from an elderly couple after which crime the man died.

Bridges was picked up for questioning. After he was informed of his rights, in the presence of his mother, he described his involvement in the house burglary. The officers then informed him that Booker had implicated him in purse snatchings. Bridges's mother was told that "her son was involved where a man died." Bridges's mother cautioned her son not to lie, that "One lie will lead to another." Bridges described his participation in the purse snatching which resulted in the old man's death.

On a later date, Booker was re-interviewed, and he stated that a third person, Leroy McGraw, had stayed in the car while the purse snatching occurred. McGraw testified at trial that he had seen Booker and Bridges robbing the elderly couple. After the crime, Booker and Bridges had returned to the car and McGraw drove them away; McGraw threw the purse and the wallet that were taken from the man and woman out of the car.

I.

A detailed hearing on the defendants' motion to suppress was held; the trial court denied the motion. Upon appeal, the defendants urge that such denial was erroneous because their confessions were the result of an improper arrest. This contention is meritless. Booker was arrested initially on two outstanding traffic warrants and for fleeing a police officer. Booker had been informed of his rights when he agreed to go to the scene of the house burglary and was identified. Once identification had been made, Phenicie was justified in adding the preliminary charge of burglary. Therefore, the arrest of Booker was completely proper.

Bridges was picked up because Booker had implicated him in the house burglary and in the purse snatching. The arrest of Bridges was based upon probable cause.

Booker argues that the police induced him to confess to the purse snatching, which resulted in his conviction for felony murder, by promising that he would not be charged because he was already charged with first-degree burglary on the house burglary. The record reveals no such promise. Booker was told that it was possible that he would not be charged with any other first-degree burglary. When Booker mentioned the purse snatching "where the old man died," the police simply stated that it would be better for him to get it off his chest by telling the details. Any supposed inducements fall far short of the direct promise of immunity extant in Ashby v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 316, 354 N.E.2d 192.

Bridges's confession was not induced by the police. The evidence most favorable to the state discloses that Bridges and his mother were informed of Bridges's rights and signed written waivers. Bridges admitted his involvement in the purse snatching after his mother told him not to lie. Even after Bridges confessed, Booker augmented his confession by implicating McGraw. Booker had been advised once again of his constitutional rights, and he had stated that he understood them before the second interview had commenced. No promises or inducements were made to Booker before the second interview was made.

None of the confessions was offered at trial anyway. The defendants argue, however, that since McGraw testified at trial, his testimony should have been suppressed since his testimony was a "fruit" of the induced confessions. As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate that the police improperly induced any confession. The trial court correctly denied the defendants' motion to suppress, and McGraw's testimony was properly admitted.

II.

The defendants posit that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction. The record is clear. Ralph and Neva Hill, husband and wife, were returning from a prayer meeting on the evening of November 3, 1976. Mr. Hill, seventy-four years of age, unlocked the rear door of the couple's home and held the door open for Mrs. Hill, seventy years of age, to enter. The defendants attacked the Hills; Bridges pulled Mrs. Hill's purse and watch off her arm; Booker wrestled Mr. Hill off the step, causing him to fall to his hands and knees, removed his billfold from his hip pocket, and mauled him. Mrs. Hill stood there screaming. The defendants then fled from the yard, got into McGraw's car, and McGraw drove away.

After the attack, Mr. and Mrs. Hill went inside. Mrs. Hill called the police and the minister of their church. Mr. Hill spoke briefly to the minister telling him, "No, I'm not hurt. My shoulder hurts a little, but that's all. It's not important for you to come." The minister testified that Mr. Hill was breathing "quite hard." Mrs. Hill then called her niece. While she was talking, she heard a crash in the...

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  • Baraka v. Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • June 15, 2006
    ...was whether mother intentionally smothered child or accidentally rolled over on top of child while sleeping); Booker v. State, 270 Ind. 498, 386 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (1979) (once trial court made preliminary finding that purse-snatching incident would have been a stressful event for the elderl......
  • Com. v. Rhoades
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    ...v. Stamp, 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 82 Cal.Rptr. 598 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819, 91 S.Ct. 36, 27 L.Ed.2d 46 (1970); Booker v. State, Ind., 386 N.E.2d 1198 (1979); Mason v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.2d 532 (Ky.1968); State v. Luther, 285 N.C. 570, 206 S.E.2d 238 (1974). Thus, the defendant did n......
  • Vaughan v. State
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    • Indiana Appellate Court
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    ...might have merit in other contexts, the instruction, as given, is a correct statement of law in Indiana. Booker v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 498, 502, 386 N.E.2d 1198, 1201; LaMar v. State, (1953) 231 Ind. 508, 511, 109 N.E.2d 614, 615. VII. State's Closing Argument Finally, Vaughan contends t......
  • Chubb v. State
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    ...proscribed in the criminal statute, only one of the acts need be proven in order to support a conviction. See Booker v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 498, 503, 386 N.E.2d 1198, 1201; Davis v. State (1985), Ind.App., 476 N.E.2d 127, 132.3 In the present case, the defendant was not charged with fond......
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