Bookhart v. Greenlease-Lied Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1932
• Docket Number: No. 41511.,41511.
• Citation: Bookhart v. Greenlease-Lied Motor Co., 215 Iowa 8, 244 N.W. 721 (Iowa 1932)
• Parties: BOOKHART v. GREENLEASE-LIED MOTOR CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

215 Iowa 8

244 N.W. 721

BOOKHART

v.GREENLEASE-LIED MOTOR CO.

No. 41511.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 19, 1932.

Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; Ralph A. Oliver, Judge.

Action to recover damages for personal injury received as a result of an automobile accident.Trial to the court and a jury.Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Shull & Stilwill, of Sioux City, for appellant.

Marks, Marks & Eik and Fred H. Free, all of Sioux City, for appellee.

WAGNER, J.

The vital question in this case is as to whether or not the plaintiff at the time in question, within the meaning of the law, was a passenger or person riding in a motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not for hire.It may be conceded that the allegations of plaintiff's petition are sufficient to charge both negligence and recklessness on the part of the driver of the automobile.At the close of plaintiff's evidence, and again at the close of all of the evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, upon the ground that the testimony shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was in a car operated by defendant's agent, as a guest and upon invitation and not for hire, and that the evidence is wholly insufficient to establish, within the meaning of the law, recklessness on the part of the driver of the automobile.This motion was by the court overruled and the appellant now urges said ruling as error.The appellant necessarily relies upon what is familiarly called the guest statute, section 5026-b1,Code 1931, which reads as follows: “The owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for any damages to any passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not for hire, unless damage is caused as a result of the driver of said motor vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or because of the reckless operation by him of such motor vehicle.”

There is no evidence of intoxication upon the part of the driver of the automobile at the time in question.To fully set out the evidence would unduly extend the length of this opinion.It is sufficient to say that the evidence warrants the finding by the jury of negligence by the driver of the automobile at the time in question, that the same was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence.The pleadings put in issue the question as to whether or not the plaintiff at the time in question and within the meaning of the aforesaid statutory law was a passenger or person riding in the automobile as a guest or by invitation and not for hire.This court has made definite pronouncement as to what constitutes “reckless operation” within the purview of the aforesaid quoted statute.SeeSiesseger v. Puth (Iowa)239 N. W. 46;Neessen v. Armstrong (Iowa)239 N. W. 56;Kaplan v. Kaplan (Iowa)239 N. W. 682.It is sufficient to say that the evidence does not establish “reckless operation” by the driver of the automobile at the time in question.Therefore, if the plaintiff was a “passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not for hire”appellant's motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained.The evidence as to this question is uncontradicted.The defendant is a corporation engaged in business in Sioux City in the sale and exchange of automobiles.One Leap was a servant or salesman of the defendant corporation.On July 14, 1929, Leap called at the residence of the plaintiff and began negotiations with him relative to the exchange of a certain Oldsmobile owned by the defendant corporation for a car then owned by the plaintiff.The plaintiff testified: “We looked the car (Oldsmobile) over and he(Leap) asked me if I would consider it.I told him the car looked all right, if it was in as good shape as it appeared.I said if it was as good mechanically as it appeared, I would consider it.He said it was and asked what I would think of making a trade or deal.I told him I would want to trade my car in.We then had a conversation with reference to how much my car would be traded in for and in fact everything was practically arranged on condition of the car being suitable.He said he would show me it would do my work and do it satisfactorily.He said, ‘I will show you what the car will do.If you will get in the car we will take a little drive and see what the car works like.’I got in the car there at the corner in the seat beside the driver.The car was headed east and was standing right by the corner of the curb.We then drove east.”This testimony is substantially admitted by the testimony of Leap.It was during this journey taken for the purpose of demonstrating the Oldsmobile to the plaintiff that the accident occurred.No deal was finally consummated.

The question for our determination is, Under the aforesaid uncontradicted testimony, was the plaintiff within the meaning of section 5026-b1,Code 1931, a “passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not for hire?”This is a case of first impression in this state, upon the question presented.Indeed, there is a paucity of adjudicated cases in other jurisdictions relative to similar statutes.

[1] In order to arrive at the proper construction to be placed upon a statute, it is proper to look at the law as it previously stood, the matter sought to be remedied, and the nature and spirit of the statute.SeeLatta v. Utterback, 202 Iowa, 1116, 211 N. W. 503;Sinnott v. District Court in and for Clarke County, 201 Iowa, 292, 207 N. W. 129;State v. Claiborne, 185 Iowa, 170, 170 N. W. 417, 3 A. L. R. 392;Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 P. 841, 843.As is well stated in the case last cited: “It has been held that the terms of a statute should be construed with their intent and purpose in view.Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54, 222 P. 801, 31 A. L. R. 1121.The purpose and object that the Legislature had in mind sometimes throws light upon the meaning of the language used.The situation that this section[one similar to Section 5026-b1,Code 1931] was apparently designed to prevent is well known.As the use of automobiles became almost universal, the proverbial ingratitude of the dog that bites the hand that feeds him, found a counterpart in the many cases that arose, where generous drivers, having offered rides to guests, later found themselves defendants in cases that often turned upon close questions of negligence.Undoubtedly, the Legislature, in adopting this act, reflected a certain natural feeling as to the injustice of such a situation.Neither this feeling nor the reasons therefor apply to a situation arising out of an ordinary business transaction, such as the efforts of a dealer to sell an automobile to a customer.”(Writer's italics.)

In so far as material, the Connecticut statute provides: “No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others.”Pub. Acts 1927, c. 308.

In Kruy v. Smith, 108 Conn. 628, 144 A. 304, 305, the plaintiff was engaged in general housework, being employed by the day by various people.She had been engaged by the defendant to work for her as a laundress, and in the early morning the defendant drove an automobile to the plaintiff's home to get her, and the plaintiff entered defendant's car and was injured during the trip.The defendant contended that, under said facts, the plaintiff was a guest within the meaning of the statute hereinbefore quoted.The court held against the defendant's contention, saying: “The Legislature, when it used the word ‘guest,’ did not intend to include persons who are being transported for the mutual benefit of both the passenger and the operator or owner of the car, and, in determining whether the transportation was for the mutual benefit of both, not merely the act of transportation must be considered, but also any contract or relationship between the parties to which it was an incident.”

In so far as material, the California statute upon the subject reads as follows:

“Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving upon any of the public highways of the State of California, and while so riding as such guest receives or...