Boone County Utilities v. Boone County Board of Comm., IP 02-0538-C-B/S (S.D. Ind. 1/28/2003)
| Decision Date | 28 January 2003 |
| Docket Number | IP 02-0538-C-B/S. |
| Parties | BOONE COUNTY UTILITIES, LLC, Plaintiff, v. BOONE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Remand. Plaintiff Boone County Utilities, LLC ("BCU") contends that Counts I and II of this action should be remanded to the Boone County Superior Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) and 1367(c) and that this Court should abstain from considering Count III of the Amended Complaint pending disposition of Counts I and II, the state law claims. BCU asserts that remand is appropriate because Count II contains a novel question of state law and the state law claims in Count I and II substantially predominate over the federal question in Count III. For the reasons stated below, BCU's Motion for Remand is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BCU commenced this action in the Boone County Superior Court, alleging in a two-count complaint that Defendants, the Board of Commissioners of Boone County, and Commissioners Georgia Baldauf, Wendy Brant, and Byron Loveless, in their official capacities (collectively "Commissioners"), violated Indiana's Open Door Law (Ind. Code § 5-14-1.5 et. seq.) and the statutory record-keeping requirements imposed on local governments by state law (Ind. Code § 36-2-2-11). Specifically, BCU alleged that in November 2001 the Commissioners voted to authorize the filing of a petition before the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission ("IURC") seeking to revoke BCU's "Certificate of Territorial Authority" for its sewage disposal business. Count I of the Complaint alleged that the Board's decision to initiate the IURC proceeding was made in secret, in violation of the Indiana Open Door Law. Count II alleged that the Boone County Auditor's failure to keep minutes of certain Board meetings leading up to the filing of the revocation petition before the IURC violated the record-keeping requirements under Indiana Code § 36-2-2-11. Both Counts I and II related exclusively to state law. As for remedies, Count I sought injunctive relief, asking the Court to declare void the Defendants' action to commence the Petition, to require Defendants to withdraw the Petition, and to order Defendants to comply with the Open Door Law in the future. Count II requested an order prohibiting Defendants from failing to enlist the Auditor to keep minutes of their meetings rather than keeping their own minutes, and mandating that Defendants instruct the Boone County Auditor to record all such meetings.
In March 2002, BCU amended its Complaint to add Count III, a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count III relied on the same factual allegations as Count I, but requested, in addition to the injunctive relief sought in Count I, compensatory damages based on the alleged deprivation of federally protected rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand at 6; Am. Compl. ¶ 34). BCU maintains that one of the bases for the § 1983 claim is the deprivation of a property right, which is determined by state law. (Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand at 6). In addition, BCU alleges that it "has been denied its right under the First Amendment to freely petition and be heard," as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 6 n. 3, citing Medina v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 184 F. Supp.2d 805, 825 (N.D.Ind. 2001)).
Following BCU's filing of the Amended Complaint, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal to this Court, citing federal jurisdiction over Count III based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The entire case was subsequently removed to the Southern District of Indiana. BCU filed this Motion to Remand on May 24, 2002.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a case may only be removed from state to federal court if the case might have been brought originally in federal court. Section 1441(a) states that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States. . . ." Federal subject matter jurisdiction may be based on either diversity of citizenship or a federal question. Brewer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Co., 101 F. Supp.2d 737, 739 (S.D.Ind. 2000). A defect in the removal procedure or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction requires remand of the action to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Furthermore, the removal statutes must be strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of remand. Brewer, 101 F. Supp.2d at 739; see also Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993); People of State of Ill. v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1982).
Because the parties to the present action are not of diverse citizenship, our jurisdiction over this action depends entirely on whether a federal question exists. Federal "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Speciale v. Seybold, 147 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 1998). The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the "well-pleaded complaint rule," which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). "This rule makes the plaintiff the master of the complaint, allowing the plaintiff to avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading only state law claims." Kittle v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 102 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1032 (S.D.Ind. 2000).
The parties do not dispute that Count III, stating a claim under § 1983, presents a federal question. However, BCU contends that Counts I and II of this action should be severed and remanded to the Boone County Superior Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and 1441(c), and that the Court should abstain from further consideration of Count III until disposition of the state court claims.
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) provides, in relevant part:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion may remand all matters in which State law predominates.
Section 1441(c) gives this Court discretion to remand the state law claims found in Counts I and II to state court, if Count III, the federal claim, is "separate and independent" from Counts I and II.
However, if "there is a single wrong to the plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under [] 1441(c)." American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951) (); see also Lewis v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 758 F.2d 219, 221 (7th Cir. 1985). A cause of action is not comprised of facts, but "of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show." Id., 341 U.S. at 13. "The use of different counts to plead different legal theories or multiple theories of recovery does not automatically make those counts separate and independent." Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 786 (3rd Cir. 1995).
To determine whether multiple counts actually relate to a single wrong, the court must look to the plaintiff's pleading, which controls. Finn, 341 U.S. at 14 (citing Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 538 (1939). In Finn, the Court illustrated, in the context of a claim for copyright infringement, how multiple claims can arise from the violation of a single right:
The bill alleges the violation of a single right, namely, the right to protection of the copyrighted play. And it is this violation which constitutes the cause of action. Indeed, the claims of infringement and unfair competition so precisely rest upon identical facts as to be little more than the equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances. The primary relief sought is an injunction to put an end to an essentially single wrong, however differently characterized, not to enjoin distinct wrongs constituting the basis for independent causes of action.
Id. at 13 n. 11, (quoting Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933)).
Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint are based on the timing of and the circumstances surrounding the meeting at which the Commissioners authorized the filing of a petition before the IURC. Count III does not allege any additional fact not asserted in Count I. All three counts reference the violation of a single right, namely the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The alleged violation of this right underlies the entire cause of action. Indeed, the alleged violations of Indiana's Open Door Law and recording statute rest upon such similar facts to the federal claim as to be little more than the equivalent of "different epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances." Hurn, 289 U.S. at 246. The primary relief sought is designed "to put an end to an essentially single wrong, however differently characterized, not to remedy distinct wrongs constituting the basis for independent causes of action." Id.
Because Counts I and II are not separate and independent from Count III, the § 1983 claim over which this court has original jurisdiction, the state law claims in Counts I and II lie within the supplemental jurisdiction of this court and were...
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