Boone v. Pierce, 2832.
| Decision Date | 17 February 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 2832.,2832. |
| Citation | 218 S.W.2d 347 |
| Parties | BOONE et al. v. PIERCE et ux. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Coryell County; R. B. Cross, Judge.
Suit by Minnie A. Boone and others against E. J. Pierce, and wife to recover on promissory notes and to foreclose liens on land securing the payment of the notes, wherein defendants by way of cross-action sought a cancellation of the notes and liens. From an adverse judgment, plaintiffs appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
Fitzpatrick & Dunnam, of Waco, and J. D. Brown, Jr., of Gatesville, for appellants.
L. M. Stinnett, of Gatesville, for appellees.
Appellants, as owners of the corporate stock of a bank in liquidation, sought by this suit to recover on five promissory notes in the principal aggregate sum of $1500 and to foreclose their asserted liens on certain land securing the payment thereof. Appellees denied liability on the notes and by way of cross action sought a cancellation of the notes and liens asserted upon the, ground, among others, that such instruments were void, invalid and unenforceable because the agreement evidenced thereby was in violation of the Federal Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933.
The case was tried in the court below without a jury and resulted in judgment for appellees. By the two points upon which their appeal is predicated, appellants say the trial court erred (1) in refusing to render judgment for them as prayed for and (2) in rendering judgment for appellees on their cross action. Under these points they contend, among other things, that the evidence fails to show the notes and liens declared upon to be violative of any Federal Statute or that appellants are estopped from asserting the validity thereof in this suit.
The record before us does not contain any findings of fact and conclusions of law or any request therefor. Hence, in passing upon the contentions here presented it is the duty of this court to view the evidence as a whole in the most favorable light from the standpoint of appellees and to assume that the trial court found all issuable facts raised by the evidence in such manner as to sustain the judgment.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933, U.S.C.A. Title 12, Chap. 7, Sec. 1016 et seq., was originally enacted at a time of national crisis resulting from an economic depression. The general purpose and intent of the Congress in the enactment thereof was to extend relief to harassed farmers struggling under debts and thereby enable such farmers to have their debts voluntarily scaled down and refinanced so as to save their farms and rehabilitate themselves financially. To that end the Act provided in part that the amount of the mortgage given by any farmer, together with all prior mortgages or other evidences of indebtedness secured by such farm property of the farmer, should not exceed seventy-five per centum of the normal value thereof, nor should a loan in excess of $7500 be made to any one farmer; that no loan should be made thereunder unless the holder of any prior mortgage or instrument of indebtedness secured by such farm property should arrange to the satisfaction of the Land Bank Commissioner to limit his right to proceed against the farmer and such farm property for default in payment of the principal; and that any person who should knowingly make any material false representation for the purpose of obtaining any loan thereunder, or in assisting in obtaining any such loan, should, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
The record in this case discloses that Messrs. Boone, Foote and Humes, as the then owners of the land in controversy, placed a mortgage lien against the same during the year 1923 for the purpose of securing the payment of their note in the principal sum of $7500. In 1924 they conveyed the land to J. R. Pancake who assumed the payment of the $7500 note. In 1930 Pancake conveyed the land to appellee, E. J. Pierce, who assumed the payment of the $7500 note and in addition thereto executed four promissory notes, each being in the principal sum of $750, each being payable to Boone and Foote in their representative capacity as Liquidating Agents of the First State Bank of Turnersville, Texas, the payment thereof being secured by a vendor's lien and a separate deed of trust lien on the land so conveyed.
In December of 1933 Pierce was...
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