Boone v. U.S.
Decision Date | 23 September 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-15661,90-15661 |
Parties | 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,113 John H. BOONE, Esq., Trustee of the Maud Van Cortland Hill Schroll Trust, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, and Department of the Army; United States Corps of Engineers; John O. Marsh, Jr., Sec. of Army, Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, Brigadier General Arthur E. Williams, and Colonel F.W. Wanner, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Apphia T. Schley, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellants.
Diane D. Hastert, Damon, Key, Bocken, Leong, Kupchak, Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.
Before CHAMBERS, BRUNETTI and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
Appellee John Boone, as trustee for the Maud Van Cortland Hill Schroll Trust ("the Trust"), brought an action against the United States to secure the Trust's right to deny public access to Puko'o Lagoon on the Island of Molokai, Hawaii. In a counter-suit, the United States sought a declaration that Puko'o Lagoon is subject to the federal navigational servitude. The district court found in favor of the Trust. See Boone v. United States, 725 F.Supp. 1509 (D.Haw.1989), Boone v. United States, 743 F.Supp. 1367 (D.Haw.1990). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Around 1829, native Hawaiians created Puko'o Fishpond, a littoral Hawaiian fishpond, by constructing a stone wall across an inlet to the sea. 1 The record contains no evidence of the size, condition, use, or water depth of the inlet prior to the construction of the wall. The fishpond wall was approximately 2000 feet long, ten feet wide and five feet high. The wall contained two Makaha, or openings to the sea, in which sluice grates were placed to allow fish to enter and exit the fishpond. Puko'o Fishpond covered about twenty-five acres; the depth of the pond ranged from one to three feet and was subject to the ebb and flow of the tides.
At the time the fishpond wall was constructed, Hawaiian fishponds were an integral part of the Hawaiian feudal system.
Chiefs gave land, including its fishponds, to sub-chiefs, or took it away at will. Any fishponds in conquered chiefdoms became the personal property of the conquering high chief and were treated in the same manner the high chief treated all newly subjugated lands and appurtenances. The commoner had no absolute right to fish in the ponds, nor in the sector of ocean adjacent to the chief's land--all of such rights were vested in the chiefs and ultimately in the King, alone.
United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F.Supp. 42, 46-47 (D.Haw.1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 584 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S.Ct. 383, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). In 1848, King Kamehameha III pronounced the Great Mahele, or land distribution. In 1852, as part of the Great Mahele, title to Puko'o Fishpond was vested in 'Ilae Napohaku, the first tax assessor on Molokai. The parties agree that Puko'o Fishpond, like all Hawaiian fishponds, had always been considered private property by landowners and by the Hawaiian government. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 166-67, 100 S.Ct. 383, 385-86, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979) ( ).
In 1946, a tsunami, or tidal wave, struck and damaged the fishpond wall. The extent of the damage is in dispute. At trial, the government presented testimony of witnesses who claimed they could navigate their flat bottomed boats through holes in the wall at high tide. The Trust presented evidence that the wall was intact prior to its destruction in the early 1970s and could not be breached by boats.
Around 1960, Pukoo Properties, Inc., purchased the property surrounding and including Puko'o Fishpond. Pukoo Properties, Inc., subsequently entered into a joint venture, "Canadian-Hawaiian Developers" ("Canadian-Hawaiian"), which planned to develop the property into a resort complex. Canadian-Hawaiian obtained zoning changes and permits from the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps") and various state agencies to dredge the waters contiguous to Puko'o Fishpond. Dredging was necessary to create an approach channel to the planned Puko'o Lagoon, a boat anchorage basin, and public beaches on submerged public lands. Because the fishpond was considered private property, no permits from the County or State were required or sought for dredging inside the fishpond. Boone, 725 F.Supp. at 1515. 2 Canadian-Hawaiian constructed the Lagoon, which involved the destruction of the fishpond wall, between 1971 and 1973.
In 1980 Canadian-Hawaiian abandoned its development plans and sold the property and the related development rights to the Trust for $5,750,000. The Trust's representatives believed the lagoon and its waters were private property and would not have purchased the property had they known there was a question about its private nature. Id. at 1519. The Trust subsequently invested an additional $340,000 to $500,000 in the property. The Trust seeks "to keep the property as clean and tranquil as possible by limiting access to the area to a limited number of organizations who share the Trust's expressed goal of promoting native Hawaiian culture." Id. at 1510. Public and commercial uses are excluded "so as to avoid spoilage of the property." Id. at 1519.
In 1982, a local charter boat operator complained to the Corps that the Trust had denied him access to Puko'o Lagoon. The Corps expressed its view that the denial of public access violated a condition in its dredging permit and the public's rights under the federal navigational servitude. In 1988, the Trust filed a declaratory judgment action to secure a right to deny public access to the lagoon. After cross-motions for summary judgment were denied, the Corps filed a counter-suit seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the Lagoon is subject to the federal navigational servitude. After a bench trial, the district court found that although Puko'o Lagoon is presently navigable, the lagoon was not subject to the navigational servitude and the Corps could not require public access without payment of compensation under the fifth amendment. Id. at 1525. The Corps filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment which was denied in the part pertinent to this appeal. 743 F.Supp. 1367, 1371-73, 1374-77 (D.Haw.1990). The Corps then brought this appeal.
The Corps makes two arguments on appeal. First, it contends that the district court erred in finding that the area presently comprising Puko'o Lagoon was not navigable in fact within the meaning of the federal navigational servitude at the time the fishpond wall was destroyed in the early 1970s. Second, the Corps argues, regardless of the navigability of the fishpond in 1970, the Lagoon is subject to the navigational servitude because the area was a navigable inlet of the Pacific Ocean in its natural state.
Whether Puko'o Lagoon is subject to the navigational servitude is a mixed question of fact and law. The application of a rule of law to established facts is reviewed de novo when the question requires consideration of legal concepts in mix of facts and law. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). Essentially factual inquiries or the establishment of historical facts, however, are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 1202-04. We give special deference to the district court's credibility findings. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).
The commerce clause 3 supports two distinct but often overlapping phenomena relevant to this appeal: the congressional authority to regulate the nation's interstate waterways and the federal navigational servitude. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173, 177, 100 S.Ct. 383, 389, 391, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). Clarification of this distinction is useful for the resolution of this case.
"Commerce," the Supreme Court explained, Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25, 18 L.Ed. 96 (1866). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (). Since Gibbons v. Ogden, the authority to regulate waterways under the commerce clause has been extended beyond control over waters navigable in fact 4 to nonnavigable tributaries, 5 waters which were once navigable in fact but are no longer so, 6 and water neither formerly nor presently navigable but which may be made navigable by reasonable improvements. 7 This expansion of the power to regulate navigable waters parallels, and is coextensive with, the expansion of the power to regulate commerce generally.
In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1940), the respondent power company argued that the government may regulate water rights "only in so far as necessary to protect navigation or navigable capacity." Id. at 393, 61 S.Ct. at 291. The Court rejected such a limited view and found that Congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to the construction of dams even where the river was not, nor ever had been, navigable but could become navigable through reasonable congressionally authorized improvements.
[I]t cannot properly be said that the constitutional power...
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