Booth v. Galveston Cnty.

• Citation: 352 F.Supp.3d 718
• Decision Date: 10 January 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:18–CV–00104
• Parties: Aaron BOOTH, Plaintiff. v. GALVESTON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

352 F.Supp.3d 718

Aaron BOOTH, Plaintiff.

v.GALVESTON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:18–CV–00104

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

Signed January 10, 2019

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

George C. Hanks Jr., United States District Judge

Pending before the Court is the Memorandum and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison. Dkt. 151. The case was referred to Judge Edison pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Dkt. 102. Pending before Judge Edison was Galveston County's First Amended Motion to Dismiss All Claims Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 45); Magistrates' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and Brief in Support (Dkt. 46); District Court Judges' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. 47); Defendant Hon. Jack Roady's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 48); District Court Judge Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (Dkt. 94); and Galveston County's First Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (Dkt. 127).

On December 20, 2018, Galveston County filed its Objections (Dkt. 154). The next day, on December 21, 2018, all the other defendants filed their Objections (Dkts. 155–157). Booth filed responses to the defendants' Objections (Dkts. 159–160). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court is required to "make a de novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge's] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection [has been] made." After conducting this de novo review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id. ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

Based on the pleadings, the record and the applicable law, the Court ACCEPTS Judge Edison's Memorandum and Recommendation and ADOPTS it as the opinion of the Court. It is therefore ORDERED that:

(1) Judge Edison's Memorandum and Recommendation (Dkt. 151) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED in its entirety as the holding of the Court;

(2) Galveston County's First Amended Motion to Dismiss All Claims Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 45) is DENIED ;

(3) Magistrates' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and Brief in Support (Dkt. 46) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part . Specifically, the claims asserted against the Magistrates in their official capacities are DISMISSED . The motion is denied in all other respects;

(4) District Court Judges' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. 47) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part . Specifically, the claims asserted against the District Court Judges in their individual capacities are DISMISSED . The motion is denied in all other respects;

(5) Defendant Hon. Jack Roady's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 48) is DENIED ;

(6) District Court Judge Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (Dkt. 94) is DENIED ; and

(7) Galveston County's First Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (Dkt. 127) is DENIED .

It is so ORDERED .

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

ANDREW M. EDISON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This lawsuit concerns Galveston County's pretrial detention system. Plaintiff Aaron Booth ("Booth") alleges that arrestees in Galveston County ("the County") are routinely detained before trial solely due to their inability to pay bail in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. Booth brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County, six District Court Judges, three County Magistrates, and County District Attorney Jack Roady, asking for declaratory and injunctive relief.

The case was referred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Dkt. 102. Pending before the Court are Galveston County's First Amended Motion to Dismiss All Claims Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 45); Magistrates' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and Brief in Support (Dkt. 46); District Court Judges' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. 47); Defendant Hon. Jack Roady's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 48); District Court Judge Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (Dkt. 94); and Galveston County's First Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (Dkt. 127) (collectively "Defendants' Motions to Dismiss").

Having considered the parties' briefing, the applicable legal authorities, and oral argument, the Court recommends that: (i) all claims brought against the District Court Judges in their individual capacities be dismissed; (ii) all claims brought against the Magistrates in their official capacities be dismissed; and (iii) in all other respects, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss be denied.

BACKGROUND¹

Booth was arrested and charged with felony drug possession in the County on April 8, 2018. In consultation with a County prosecutor, the arresting officer set Booth's "bail at $20,000, the minimum amount permitted under [the] County's felony bail schedule." Dkt. 31 ¶ 16. Thereafter, the arresting officer booked Booth "into Galveston County Jail in the early morning hours of April 8." Id. Later that morning, Booth "saw a magistrate who automatically adopted [the $20,000] bail amount" without inquiring "about his ability to pay ... [or] whether [Booth] is a flight risk or a danger to the community." Id. ¶ 17. During his appearance before the magistrate, Booth alleges that he "asked ... for a court-appointed attorney and completed a ‘pauper's oath’ form to demonstrate that he is too poor to hire his own attorney." Id. ¶ 18. Booth also alleges that he "did not have the benefit of counsel at the time his bond was set, and so he did not have the opportunity to request, through counsel, an individualized bond determination based on his particular circumstances."Id. Because Booth did not have the ability to satisfy the $20,000 bail at the time of magistration, he was held in the County Jail.

The same day as his incarceration, Booth filed this suit asserting that the County's pretrial detention "practices ... violate [his] substantive and procedural due process rights, infringe Equal Protection guarantees, and undermine the constitutional right to counsel." Dkt. 1 ¶ 4. Almost one month later, on May 4, 2018, Booth filed a First Amended Complaint asserting three counts: (1) "Wealth-Based Imprisonment Fourteenth Amendment Due Process & Equal Protection Clauses Against All Defendants"; (2) "Procedural Due Process Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause Against Galveston County, Felony Judges, [County Court at Law] Judges, and Magistrates"; and (3) "Right to Counsel Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Clause Against the [County Court at Law] and [District Court] Judges."² Dkt. 31 ¶¶ 127–137. The First Amended Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, not monetary damages. See id.¶ 6. The lawsuit names the District Court Judges and Magistrates in their individual and official capacities; the District Attorney is sued solely in his official capacity. See id. ¶¶ 11, 13–14.

In support of his constitutional claims, Booth alleges that the County has an unconstitutional standard operating procedure for ordering pretrial detention without first taking into consideration an arrestee's eligibility for release on nonfinancial conditions or inability to pay bail.³ Booth refers to this standard operating procedure as Galveston County's Bail Schedule Policy. See id. ¶ 69 (explaining that the "County's pretrial detention practices" as described in the First Amended Complaint "constitute the Bail Schedule Policy").

The Bail Schedule Policy, as alleged, is multipronged. After an arrestee is taken into custody, but before being booked into the County Jail, the arresting officer must prepare a preprinted bail order form identifying the charges levied against the arrestee, as well as a bail amount for each charge. See Dkt. 31 ¶ 29. In setting the bail amounts, for misdemeanor charges, the arresting officer utilizes bail amounts contained on a misdemeanor bail schedule promogulated by the District Attorney. See id. ¶ 31. For felony charges, the arresting officer calls the County prosecutor, who then relays the appropriate bail amount based solely on a felony bail schedule, which is also promulgated by the District Attorney. See id. ¶ 30. After completing the preprinted bail order form, an arrestee can be booked into the jail. See id. ¶ 32. An arrestee is then taken before a Magistrate, usually within 24 hours of incarceration. See id. ¶ 33. This proceeding is referred to as a "magistration."

At the magistration, the Magistrate conducts a brief hearing—Booth alleges the hearing lasts no more than one minute—where the arrestee is: (1) instructed not to ask questions; (2) unrepresented by counsel; and (3) only permitted to answer a few questions that are all unrelated to the issue of bail. See id. ¶¶ 38–42, 44. Sometime before the end of the hearing, the Magistrate, who is empowered to make individual bail determinations, rubber stamps the preprinted bail amounts promulgated by the District Attorney without ever inquiring about the arrestee's ability or inability to pay bail. See id. ¶¶ 43, 48. Arrestees that can afford to pay the specified bail amounts can make a payment and go free. Arrestees who cannot afford to purchase their freedom remain imprisoned at the County Jail. See id. ¶ 50.

Booth alleges that, within a week or so after magistration, an arrestee will have an opportunity to appear before a County Court at Law Judge. See id. ¶¶ 51, 54. The County Court at Law Judge only considers guilty pleas, so if an arrestee does not intend to plead guilty, the arrestee will remain imprisoned for approximately another week before...