Booth v. McManaman

• Decision Date: 16 November 2011
• Docket Number: CV. No. 10–00680 DAE–RLP.
• Citation: 830 F.Supp.2d 1037
• Parties: Lehua BOOTH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Patricia McMANAMAN, in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Services, State of Hawaii, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

830 F.Supp.2d 1037

Lehua BOOTH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.Patricia McMANAMAN, in her official capacity as Director of the Department of Human Services, State of Hawaii, Defendant.

CV. No. 10–00680 DAE–RLP.

United States District Court, D. Hawai‘i.

Nov. 16, 2011.

James B. Rogers, Paul Alston, Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing, Victor M. Geminiani, Lawyers For Equal Justice, Honolulu, HI, Marc Cohan, Mary R. Mannix, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Rebecca Estrada Quinn, Candace J. Park, Office of the Attorney General, Honolulu, HI, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

DAVID ALAN EZRA, District Judge.

On November 16, 2011, the Court heard Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs were J. Blaine Rogers, Esq., Victor Geminiani, Esq., Deja Ostrowski, Esq., and, by telephone, Mary R. Mannix, Esq. Appearing on behalf of Defendant was Deputy Attorney General Rebecca E. Quinn. After reviewing the motion and the supporting and opposing memoranda, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. # 30.)

BACKGROUND

I. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

The federal Food Stamp Program, now known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), was initiated in 1964 pursuant to the Food Stamp Act (“the Act”).¹ 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. The express purpose of SNAP is to “safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households.” Id. § 2011. SNAP provides federally-funded benefits to eligible low-income households to help them purchase food. Id. § 2011 et seq. The program is administered nationally by the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), which is responsible for issuing regulations consistent with the Act. Id. § 2013(a), (c). States that participate in the program designate a state agency to administer the program at the state level. Id. § 2012(t). State agencies must administer the program in compliance with the Act and its implementing regulations. Id. § 2020(e).

Hawaii, of course, has chosen to participate in the program. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) is the designated state agency responsible for administering the program. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 346–51. Pursuant to federal law, DHS is required to process food stamp applications within thirty days after application and provide ongoing SNAP benefits to eligible applicants no later than thirty days after application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3); 7 C.F.R. 273.2(a), (g)(1), (3). Additionally, expedited SNAP benefits must be provided to eligible households no later than seven days following the date of application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9); 7 C.F.R. 273.2(i)(3)(i).

On November 10, 2010, USDA sent DHS a letter indicating that individual states are required to have a 90 to 95 percent application timeliness rate and that data showed that DHS had an “application timeliness rate of 78.7 percent with the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval at 84.87 percent.” (Doc. # 38–2.) The letter directed DHS to submit a written Timeliness Corrective Action Plan outlining the steps that DHS would take to improve overall timeliness. ( Id.)

On March 7, 2011, DHS submitted its Timeliness Corrective Action Plan and detailed DHS' efforts to implement a new system of processing cases called the Business Process Re–Engineering (“BPR”) model. (Doc. # 38–3.) Statistics indicate that States that have implemented the BPR method have reported improved timeliness rates. (Doc. # 38–1 ¶ 12; Doc. # 38–5.) In March 2011, DHS obtained federal funds to hire a consultant to help DHS establish BPR. (Doc. # 38–1 ¶ 18.) DHS is currently still in the process of implementing BPR in its SNAP offices. ( Id. ¶¶ 18–27.) DHS hopes to have the BPR system in place in all its offices by October 2012. ( Id. ¶¶ 24.) There will be an adjustment period associated with BPR but DHS expects to see noticeable changes in the State wide timeliness rate by April 2012. ( Id. ¶¶ 25, 28.)

II. The Instant Action

On November 17, 2010, this action was initiated on behalf of a purported class of Hawaiian residents who (1) applied for SNAP benefits in Hawaii after November 2008 and did not receive benefits in a timely manner, or (2) are seeking, or will in the future seek, SNAP benefits in Hawaii. (Doc. # 1.) The gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is that DHS is not determining food stamp eligibility and issuing food stamps within the time limits set forth under federal law. ( Id.)

Named Plaintiff Lehua Booth is 53 years old and lives in Kihei, Maui with her husband. (Doc. # 30–2 ¶ 2.) She is disabled and her husband is unemployed. ( Id. ¶ 3.) Their only income is the $677 she receives monthly for her Social Security Income. ( Id. ¶ 3.) Booth and her husband previously qualified for SNAP benefits and used those benefits to buy food. ( Id. ¶ 5.) On August 4, 2011, Booth discovered that her SNAP benefits had been cut. ( Id. ¶ 6.) The next day she went to the Maui DHS office and filled out a SNAP application. ( Id. ¶ 6–8.) After almost one month had passed without any response regarding her application, Booth went to the Maui DHS office and was informed that her file was among the backlogged files from the Maui office that had been transferred to the Oahu office. ( Id. ¶ 10.) Booth has tried to contact DHS multiple times to inquire as to the status of her application to no avail. ( Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 12, 15.) As of the time of filing the instant Motion, Booth had not yet been informed about whether she qualifies for SNAP benefits.² (Doc. # 30 at 3.)

Booth, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, brings this action to enjoin Defendant from failing to process applications for SNAP benefits and provide benefits to eligible households within the time frame mandated by federal law. (Doc. # 36 ¶ 3.)

III. Procedural History

On February 7, 2011, the Court issued a Stipulated Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification (“Stipulated Order”). (Doc. # 14.) In the Stipulated Order, the Court ordered: (1) certification of the requested class; (2) appointment of former Named Plaintiff David Bohn as class representative; and (3) appointment of Lawyers for Equal Justice, National Center for Law and Economic Justice, and the law firm of Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing as class counsel. ( Id. at 3–4.)

After the Court issued the Stipulated Order, David Bohn's SNAP application was finally processed. Plaintiff Lehua Booth subsequently filed a Motion (1) to Intervene; (2) for Appointment as Class Representative; and for Leave to file an Amended Complaint. (Doc. # 29.) On October 28, 2011, 2011 WL 5170303, this Court issued an Order Adopting the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation to grant that Motion. (Doc. # 40.)

Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Preliminary Injunction on September 12, 2011. (“Mot.,” Doc. # 30.) In its Motion, Plaintiffs request that this Court order Defendant to (1) process all applications for food stamps within the time frames required by federal law; and (2) provide food stamps and expedited food stamps to eligible individuals on a timely basis. ( Id.) On October 25, 2011, Defendant filed an Opposition to the instant Motion. (“Opp'n.,” Doc. # 38.) On November 2, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Reply in support of their Motion. (“Reply,” Doc. # 43.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[I]njunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 376, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 365 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218–19, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982)); see also Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1126–27 (9th Cir.2009) (applying heightened standard mandated by Winter ). “ ‘[S]erious questions going to the merits' and a hardship balance that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can [also] support issuance of an injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir.2010). A district court has great discretion in determining whether to grant or to deny a preliminary injunction. See Wildwest Inst. v. Bull, 472 F.3d 587, 589–90 (9th Cir.2006); see also Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.1983) ( “At one end of the continuum, the moving party is required to show both a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury. At the other end of the continuum, the moving party must demonstrate that serious legal questions are raised and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.”) (internal citations omitted). However, a mandatory preliminary injunction “is subject to heightened scrutiny and should not be issued unless the facts and the law clearly favor the moving party.” Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir.1993).

Plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375 (emphasis in original). The mere possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient. Id. (finding the Ninth Circuit's standard of a “possibility” of harm too lenient). “To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is...