Booth-El v. Nuth
| Decision Date | 25 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-8.,No. 01-10.,01-8.,01-10. |
| Citation | 288 F.3d 571 |
| Parties | John BOOTH-EL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Eugene M. NUTH, Warden; J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Respondents-Appellants. John Booth-El, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Eugene M. Nuth, Warden; J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Annabelle Louise Lisic, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Respondents-Appellants. David John Walsh-Little, Baltimore, Maryland; Michael Alan Millemann, Baltimore, Maryland, for Respondents-Appellees. ON BRIEF: J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Ann N. Bosse, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Respondents-Appellants.
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WILKINS and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILKINS and Judge GREGORY joined.
After his third death sentence for the murder of Irvin and Rose Bronstein was affirmed by the Maryland courts, John Booth-El filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The district court granted in part his petition on the ground that the removal of intoxication as a statutory mitigating factor at his 1990 re-sentencing violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. But the court rejected his claims concerning a potentially coercive Allen charge, the failure to bifurcate the sentencing hearing, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The State of Maryland appeals and Booth-El cross-appeals. Because federal law provides no grounds for granting Booth-El's habeas petition, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions to dismiss the petition.
On May 20, 1983, Irvin and Rose Bronstein were found dead in their Baltimore home. Both had been bound and gagged, and each had been stabbed twelve times. Their residence had been ransacked and some of their property was missing. Petitioner John Booth-El and William "Sweetsie" Reid were charged with the murders. Booth-El's first trial ended in a mistrial because the prosecution had failed to turn over certain information before trial. See Booth v. State, 301 Md. 1, 481 A.2d 505, 505-06 (Md.1984) ("Booth I"). In the second trial, Booth-El was convicted of first degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. He was sentenced to death for the murder of Mr. Bronstein.1
Booth-El appealed the sentence, and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098, 1103 (Md.1986) ("Booth II"). The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the introduction of victim impact statements at a capital sentencing proceeding violated the Eighth Amendment. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). A new sentencing proceeding was held, and Booth-El was again sentenced to death. But the Maryland Court of Appeals vacated the sentence because the trial judge had refused to admit evidence relating to parole eligibility. Booth v. State, 316 Md. 363, 558 A.2d 1205 (Md.1989) ("Booth III").
A third sentencing hearing was held in the summer of 1990, and Booth-El was once again sentenced to death. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence on direct appeal. Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 608 A.2d 162 (Md.1992) ("Booth IV"). He was then denied post-conviction relief. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, except with respect to an alleged Brady violation. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The court remanded for consideration of the claim. Booth v. State, 346 Md. 246, 696 A.2d 440 (Md.1997). After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Booth-El was denied leave to appeal. Booth v. State, 349 Md. 421, 708 A.2d 681 (Md.1998).
In March 1997, Booth-El filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, raising twenty-four claims. He asserted, inter alia, that the 1983 change to the Maryland death penalty statute, which removed intoxication from the list of statutory mitigating factors, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 10 of the Constitution. Further, he argued that the trial judge erred in giving an Allen-type charge to the sentencing jury after it indicated that it was split on whether he was a first degree principal. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). Moreover, he claimed that he was denied due process when the trial judge refused to bifurcate the 1990 sentencing proceedings. In his view, the jury should have first determined whether he was a first degree principal before any evidence regarding aggravating and mitigating factors was presented. Finally, he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during his 1984 guilt/innocence trial.
The district court granted in part Booth-El's petition for writ of habeas corpus based on his ex post facto claim. It further concluded that his other claims either were procedurally defaulted or did not provide a basis for relief. See Booth-El v. Nuth, 140 F.Supp.2d 495, 500 (D.Md.2001).
The State appeals, and Booth-El cross-appeals the rejection of his claims regarding the Allen charge, the failure to bifurcate the sentencing hearing, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
We review de novo the district court's decision to grant or deny habeas relief to a state prisoner. Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 555 (4th Cir.1999). In addition, because the state court adjudicated the merits of Booth-El's ex post facto claim, our review of its decision is "limited by the deferential standard ... set forth in [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)." Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 157 (4th Cir.2000) (en banc), cert. denied, Bell v. Beck, 534 U.S. 830, 122 S.Ct. 74, 151 L.Ed.2d 39 (2001).2 Thus, federal habeas relief may not be granted unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." § 2254(d)(1).
Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Further, a state-court decision is contrary to the Court's clearly established precedent if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court's] cases," or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent." Id. at 405, 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Finally, a state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of the Court's precedent if the court "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case," id. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495, or "was unreasonable in refusing to extend the governing legal principle to a context in which the principle should have controlled." Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). The Court has stressed that [i]n § 2254(d)(1), Congress specifically used the word "unreasonable," and not a term like "erroneous" or "incorrect." Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. See also Bell, 236 F.3d at 160; Vick v. Williams, 233 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 952, 121 S.Ct. 2596, 150 L.Ed.2d 754 (2001).
At the time the Bronsteins were murdered, Maryland's death penalty statute listed several mitigating circumstances, including intoxication. Md. Ann.Code art. 27, § 413(g)(4) (1957). Effective July 1, 1983, intoxication was removed from that section. Both before and after the 1983 change, the statute contained a catch-all provision which allowed the jury to consider "[a]ny other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case." § 413(g)(8) (1957, 2001). The Maryland Court of Appeals described the effect of the change:
[Previously] the burden was on the murderer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence diminished capacity as a result of intoxication. If the jury found that fact, then the statute determined that [it] was mitigating and that it was to be considered in weighing whether the aggravating circumstance outweighed intoxication and any other mitigating circumstances. After the change, the murderer has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both the fact of diminished capacity due to intoxication and that [it] is a mitigating circumstance.
Booth IV, 608 A.2d at 175 (citations omitted).
During the 1990 sentencing proceedings, Booth-El asked that the verdict form contain the pre-amendment language, but his request was denied. On direct appeal, he argued that the refusal to include that language on the verdict sheet violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it required him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that intoxication was a mitigating circumstance.
The Maryland Court of Appeals found no constitutional violation because the change did not fit into one of...
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