Booth v. Quantum Chemical Corp., Civil Action No. CV495-258.

• Decision Date: 03 October 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. CV495-258.
• Citation: 942 F.Supp. 580
• Parties: Brenda S. BOOTH, Plaintiff, v. QUANTUM CHEMICAL CORP. d/b/a Suburban Propane, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

942 F.Supp. 580

Brenda S. BOOTH, Plaintiff, v. QUANTUM CHEMICAL CORP. d/b/a Suburban Propane, Defendant.

Civil Action No. CV495-258.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division.

October 3, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Fletcher Farrington, Savannah, GA, for plaintiff.

Charles W. Brannon, Jr., of Kennedy, Lewis, Smart & Brannon, Savannah, GA, Allen Sherrod Willingham and Michael J. Hannan, III, of Love & Willingham, Atlanta, GA, for defendant.

ORDER

MOORE, District Judge.

Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of res judicata (Doc. 15). For the reasons stated below, this Court GRANTS the motion. Any and all outstanding motions are hereby rendered MOOT.

I. Background.

Except where specifically indicated, the following facts are not contested.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Regional Coordinator until November 1994 when she was terminated. On October 20, 1994, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Robert E. Lee in the State Court of Chatham County. Mr. Lee worked as a manager for Defendant. On November 23, 1994, Mr. Lee, a resident of North Carolina, properly removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia where it was given the civil action number CV494-286 and assigned to Judge Anthony A. Alaimo. On April 10, 1995, Plaintiff amended the complaint to add Defendant to the action. The amended complaint alleged that Mr. Lee, as Plaintiff's superior, asked and authorized her to conduct an investigation for the company pertaining to employee thefts and other malfeasances. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for her reporting violations of company policies discovered during her employment and the requested investigation. She also alleged fraud on the part of Mr. Lee and breach of implied contract on the part of both Mr. Lee and Defendant.

During this time, several events occurred. First, it must be mentioned that Plaintiff filed the complaint in state court pro se. On January 20, 1995, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC. On March 8, 1995, Attorney Fletcher Farrington entered an appearance on behalf of Plaintiff and on April 10, 1995, he filed the Amended Complaint in CV494-286. On June 30, 1995, the EEOC issued the right-to-sue letter to Plaintiff who then received it one or two days later. The original scheduling notice issued by the Clerk of Court set the amendment of pleadings deadline at January 29, 1995. Despite this deadline, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint on March 17, 1995, which Magistrate Judge James E. Graham granted on April 10, 1995. Discovery was originally set to expire on April 4, 1995, but Judge Alaimo extended it through July 15, 1995.

On September 25, 1995, Plaintiff, through her attorney, filed another claim against Defendant, this time in the Superior Court for Chatham County.¹ This lawsuit alleged that the termination of her employment amounted to a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On October 27, 1995, Defendant removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, where it was given the civil action number CV495-258 and assigned to the undersigned judge.

Meanwhile, in the world of CV494-286, Judge Alaimo issued an order on January 24, 1996, granting the summary judgment motion of Defendant and Mr. Lee on all claims except the claim for expenses and quantum meruit recovery. On April 2, 1996, Defendant and Mr. Lee made an unconditional tender of $5,000 in full payment for the expenses and quantum meruit claims. At some point in May 1996, the parties submitted a consent order for Judge Alaimo to sign which would have granted Defendant and Mr. Lee's summary judgment motion on the basis of accord and satisfaction. Soon thereafter, Attorney Farrington must have become aware of the viability of Defendant's res judicata defense in CV495-258 as, on May 24, 1996, he filed a motion to stay CV494-286 or to consolidate it with CV495-258. On June 13, 1996, Judge Alaimo granted the consolidation and did not sign the consent order. CV494-286 and CV495-258 were consolidated and assigned to the undersigned judge.

When these cases came to this Court's attention, the Court was extremely curious as to their status. On July 25, 1996, the parties attended a pretrial conference with the Court at which counsel for Plaintiff responded that he could offer no reason why the consent order in CV494-286 should not be signed and that case severed from CV495-258 and closed. The next day, this Court severed CV494-286 from CV495-258, signed the consent order granting Defendant and Mr. Lee's summary judgment motion, and closed CV494-286.

Currently before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of res judicata. This Court now considers the motion.

II. Analysis.

A. When Summary Judgment is Appropriate.

The "purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue as to facts material to the nonmovant's case. Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1583 n. 16 (11th Cir.1991). A dispute of material fact "is `genuine' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, [then] there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.

In assessing whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor, the district court must review the evidence and reasonable factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir.1992). This Court must avoid weighing conflicting evidence during this endeavor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. Where a reasonable fact finder may "draw more than one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment." Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933-34 (11th Cir.1989) (citation omitted). However, if the evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id.

B. Res Judicata Bars Plaintiff's Title VII Claim.

Defendant asserts that the prior adjudication of the state law claims in CV494-286 constitutes res judicata as to the Title VII claim asserted by Plaintiff in this action. This Court agrees with Defendant and finds that Plaintiff is precluded from pursuing her claim in the instant case.

"[A] judgment upon the merits in one suit is res judicata in another where the parties and subject-matter are the same, not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted, but also as respects any other available matter which might have been presented to that end." Grubb v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 479, 50 S.Ct. 374, 378, 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930). The doctrine of res judicata actually incorporates two separate doctrines pertaining to the preclusive effect given to a prior judicial determination. Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir.1978).² The first doctrine is "`claim preclusion,' or true res judicata." Id. The second doctrine is that of issue preclusion. Id. This Court is not concerned with any issue preclusion application here. Claim preclusion "treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the parties on the same `claim' or `cause of action.'" Id. When a court enters a judgment for a defendant, the "effect of [the] judgment extends to the litigation of all issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or not raised at trial." Id. The preclusive effect "extends not only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same `operative nucleus of fact.'" Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 725 F.2d 627, 632 (11th Cir.1984) (citation omitted).

Under federal law, as well as the law of Georgia, res judicata will bar a subsequent judicial proceeding if the court finds that three essential requirements are met: (1) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered a prior decision; (2) the prior decision was a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the same cause of action and the same parties (or their privies) were involved in both cases.³ Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-30, 103 S.Ct. 2906, 2917-18, 77 L.Ed.2d 509 (1983); Akin v. PAFEC, Ltd., 991 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1993).

Plaintiff asserts that the first and third requirements have not been satisfied and that, therefore, the defense of res judicata is inapplicable to this case. As Plaintiff's response pertains to the first requirement, this Court will summarily dispose of that contention because it is meritless. It is true that res judicata will not apply if the prior judgment was entered by a court without competent jurisdiction or if the requirements of due process were ignored. Jones v. Texas Tech. Univ., 656 F.2d 1137,...