Booth v. State

• Decision Date: 28 January 1913
• Docket Number: No. 22,224.,22,224.
• Citation: 179 Ind. 405,100 N.E. 563
• Parties: BOOTH v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

179 Ind. 405

100 N.E. 563

BOOTH

v.STATE.

No. 22,224.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Jan. 28, 1913.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sullivan County; William H. Bridwell, Judge.

Harry C. Booth was convicted of failing to provide a washroom for the employés in a coal mine after demand, and he appeals. Affirmed.John T. & Will H. Hays, of Sullivan, and McNutt, Wallace & Sanders, of Terre Haute, for appellant. Thomas M. Honan, Atty. Gen., Thomas H. Branaman, of Indianapolis, Edwin Corr, of Bloomington, and James E. McCullough, of Indianapolis, for the State.

ERWIN, J.

This was a prosecution by the state of Indiana against Harry C. Booth upon an affidavit charging that appellant was a superintendent of a coal mine in the county of Sullivan, and that, after written demand of more than 20 employés of said mine, had failed to provide a washroom for the employés of said mine, in violation of an act of the General Assembly approved March 8, 1907. Acts 1907, p. 193.

The affidavit in said cause, omitting the caption, reads as follows: “Harry Ritchie, being duly sworn, says on his oath that on the 7th day of March, A. D. 1911, at and in the county of Sullivan and state of Indiana, Harry C. Booth did then and there unlawfully being then and there, and from the said day continuously up to the time of the filing of this affidavit, and being now superintendent of mine No. 25 in Sullivan county, Indiana, belonging to the Consolidated Indiana Coal Company, that at the time and place named mine No. 25 belonging to the Consolidated Indiana Coal Company was a coal mine then and there situated, in which persons were then and continuously since have been and now are employed, and that said Harry C. Booth was then and there superintendent and in charge of said mine; that twenty of the employés of said mine then and there in writing requested the said Harry C. Booth, while superintendent and in charge of said mine, to provide a washroom or washhouse for the use of persons employed in said mine; that said request was made to Harry C. Booth, and directed to him under and in the name of H. C. Booth as such superintendent, but that this defendant Harry C. Booth and H. C. Booth is one and the same person; that said Harry C. Booth, being superintendent and in charge of said mine, as aforesaid, and having been requested, as aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully fail and refuse to provide a suitable washroom or washhouse or any washroomor washhouse whatever for the use of persons employed in said mine, and that ever since said day up to the present time he has unlawfully refused, neglected, and wholly failed to provide any washroom or washhouse for the use of persons employed in said mine, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Indiana.” The appellant in due time moved to quash the affidavit. His motion was, in substance, that the law under which the prosecution was brought contravenes section 19 of article 4 of the Constitution of the state of Indiana, and is in violation of article 14 of the amendment to the Constitution of the United States, also is violative of section 1, art. 1, and section 21, art. 1, also section 23, art. 1, also section 25, art. 1, and section 26, art. 1, of the Constitution of the state of Indiana. The motion to quash the affidavit was, by the court, overruled, to which ruling of the court the defendant excepted. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and the cause was submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury, which said trial resulted in the finding of the defendant guilty as charged in the affidavit. A motion in arrest of judgment was seasonably made, which motion was, by the court, overruled, and judgment entered, fixing the penalty at a fine of $1 and costs of the prosecution, from which judgment the defendant appeals to this court. The assignment of errors in this court questions the constitutionality of the act under which the prosecution was brought.

[1] The contention of the appellant is that the title of the act limits the liability to owners and operators of coal mines, and does not include superintendents. The affidavit avers that the appellant is the superintendent of a coal mine. Section 19, art. 4, of the Constitution of this state, provides: “Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject must be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.” The title of the act in question reads as follows: “An act requiring the owners or operators of coal mines and other employers of labor to erect and maintain washhouses at certain places where laborers are employed for the protection of the health of the employés and providing a penalty for its violation.” The question is whether the title of the act is broad enough to include superintendents. Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense. Subdivision 1, § 240, Burns' R. S. 1908. The Standard Dictionary defines “operate” “to put in action and supervise the workings of; to conduct or manage the affairs of; superintend; as to operate a mining business or a railroad.” “Superintend” is defined by the same authority “to have the charge and direction of; especially some work or movement; regulate the conduct and progress of; responsible for; manage; supervise.”

[2] The words of a statute will be construed in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense, unless such construction will defeat the manifest intent of the Legislature. White v. Furgeson, 29 Ind. App. 144-154, 64 N. E. 49;Coffinberry v. Madden, 30 Ind. App. 360, 363, 66 N. E. 64, 96 Am. St. Rep. 349. It is contended by the appellant that the act in question, being a criminal statute, should be strictly construed. This contention is true to a limited extent. In Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction on page 962 the author uses the following language: “The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the Legislature. It is the Legislature, not the courts, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment. It is said that, notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the lawmakers must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true. But this is not a new independent rule which subverts the old. It is the modification of the ancient maxim, and amounts to this: That, though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be so strictly construed as to defeat the obvious intention of the Legislature. The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the Legislature had obviously used them would comprehend. The intention of the Legislature is to be collected from the words they employ.” The same author, on page 981, has this to say further on the same subject: “A penal statute should receive a reasonable and common sense construction, and its force should not be frittered away by niceties and refinements at war with the practical administration of justice.” To the same effect, see State v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 96 N. E. 340-342 and cases cited. The Legislature, while not using the word “superintendent,” evidently intended in the title of the act that it should apply to those having the supervision, the conduct or management of, the charge and direction, and be responsible for and regulate the conduct and progress of the same. We are of the opinion that the title of the act is comprehensive enough to include superintendents of mines.

[3] Appellant presents the further question that the act in question is in contravention of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that the act deniesto coal companies the equal protection of the law, and discriminates between coal mining and other classes of business; that it discriminates between the different classes of persons engaged in coal mining; deprives the defendant of his property without due process of law. The fourteenth amendment does not impair the police power of the state, nor does it prohibit one class of business being regulated by special provisions. State v. Richcreek, 167 Ind. 217, 224, 228, 77 N. E. 1085, 119 Am. St. Rep. 491, 10 Ann. Cas. 899, and cases cited; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923;Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703-709, 5 Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L. Ed. 1145.

[4] It is further insisted that the act in question is too indefinite and uncertain in its terms. It certainly cannot be said that this act is indefinite as to its terms and requirements. It could not be made more certain without setting out plans and specifications for each building required at...