Booth v. State of Md.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-7597,96-7597
• Citation: 112 F.3d 139
• Parties: John Marvin BOOTH; Wesley Eugene Baker; Kenneth Lloyd Collins; Tyrone Delano Gilliam, Jr.; Steven Howard Oken, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE OF MARYLAND; Parris N. Glendening, Governor of Maryland; J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland; Eugene M. Nuth, Warden, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 139

112 F.3d 139

65 USLW 2718

John Marvin BOOTH; Wesley Eugene Baker; Kenneth Lloyd Collins; Tyrone Delano Gilliam, Jr.; Steven Howard Oken, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE OF MARYLAND; Parris N. Glendening, Governor of Maryland; J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland; Eugene M. Nuth, Warden Defendants-Appellants.

No. 96-7597.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 3, 1997.

Decided April 21, 1997.

ARGUED: Gwynn X. Kinsey, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Peter Edward Keith, Gallagher, Evelius & Jones, Baltimore, Maryland; Gary Wilmer Christopher, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Criminal Appeals Division, Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Nevett Steele, Jr., Michael J. Gentile, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee Booth; William B. Purpura, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee Baker; Fred Warren Bennett, Catholic University Law School, Washington, DC, for Appellee Oken; Charles G. Bernstein, Baltimore, Maryland; Neil Ian Jacobs, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee Collins; Jerome H. Nickerson, Bel Air, Maryland, for Appellee Gilliam.

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, HALL, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge HALL and Senior Judge BUTZNER joined.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Chief Judge:

Five death row prisoners sued the State of Maryland, its Governor, Attorney General, and a state prison warden under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The prisoners sought a declaratory judgment that Maryland was not entitled to the benefits of the new chapter 154 of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266, and an injunction prohibiting Maryland from raising chapter 154 as a defense in the inmates' prospective federal habeas corpus cases. After denying the defendants Eleventh Amendment immunity, the district court granted plaintiffs the requested relief. Booth v. Maryland, 940 F.Supp. 849 (D.Md.1996). Finding that relief in this civil action would abridge the basic principles of the Eleventh Amendment, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss.

I.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) brought a number of changes to the federal habeas corpus statute. The new chapter 154, entitled "Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases" creates incentives for state governments in capital cases. States that meet certain requirements for the appointment and compensation of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings are known as "opt-in" states and are entitled to prompter and more deferential review in federal habeas proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266. Specifically, prisoners filing federal habeas suits in "opt-in" states must file their petitions within 180 days after the final state court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a). In an opt-in state, the federal habeas court must, for example, consider the case before all noncapital matters, § 2266(a), and must enter a final judgment within 180 days from the filing date, § 2266(b)(1)(A). As a general matter, the court may not consider claims that were not raised and decided on the merits in state courts, § 2264, and it may not allow amendments to the habeas petition after an answer to the petition has been filed, § 2266(b)(3)(B).

All five plaintiffs in this case have previously filed state petitions for post-conviction review that have been reviewed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. One of the five inmates had filed a federal habeas petition at the time this action was brought, and the other four planned to do so after their state remedies were exhausted. The prisoners brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the State of Maryland had failed to comply with the requirements of chapter 154 and an injunction forbidding Maryland from invoking chapter 154 until the state did comply.

The district court agreed with the inmates. After finding that Maryland and its officials were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court ruled that Maryland had failed to comply with three of the requirements of chapter 154. Specifically, the court held that Maryland did not have codified "competency standards" for appointment of post-conviction counsel, 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b), that the compensation rates for these attorneys did not satisfy the statute, id., and that Maryland's policy of disallowing payment for computerized legal research and photocopying expenses violated chapter 154's requirement of reimbursement of "reasonable litigation expenses," id. The court therefore declared that Maryland was "not presently entitled to invoke the benefits of Chapter 154" and enjoined the state from attempting to invoke the new standards in any future federal habeas actions brought by the five inmates. Booth, 940 F.Supp. at 855.

Maryland now appeals and argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars this lawsuit.

II.

We begin with a brief reiteration of the basic history of the Eleventh Amendment. At the time the Constitution was drafted,

[t]he right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and to adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and active debate ... but the existence of any such right had been disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Government, and it was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the existence of such Federal power that the Constitution was finally adopted. 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 91 (rev. ed.1937) (quoted with approval in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660, 94 S.Ct. 1347 [1354], 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)).

In the first few years of its existence, the Supreme Court nonetheless heard numerous suits against states. In the most famous of these, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), the Court held that a state was susceptible to suit by a citizen of another state or of a foreign country. The ruling caused "such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325, 54 S.Ct. 745, 749, 78 L.Ed. 1282 (1934). The amendment retains a continuing vitality. The Supreme Court noted that "[f]or over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.' " Seminole Tribe v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 507, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)).

Unchanged since its passage in 1798, the Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction of federal courts over state defendants:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const. amend. XI.

Although the Amendment is silent as to suits brought against a state by it own citizens, the Supreme Court "has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63, 94 S.Ct. at 1355 (citing Hans, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504 33 L.Ed. 842 and numerous other cases). ¹ Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials when they are merely the nominal defendants and "the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945); see also McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1329 (4th Cir.1987) (judgment against state officials acting in official capacity contrary to Eleventh Amendment).

Under settled precedent, then, the Eleventh Amendment protects the sovereign rights of states from abridgement by the federal judiciary. Thus, the State of Maryland and the named officials are not subject to this suit unless the plaintiffs can demonstrate that this case falls within one of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

III.

The defendants assert the Eleventh Amendment as an absolute bar to this action. The plaintiff inmates, on the other hand, argue that the defendants' Eleventh Amendment defense fails on three grounds: (1) the case concerns a continuing violation of federal law and therefore falls under the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity invoked in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), (2) the action involves habeas corpus, a subject which is excepted from Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (3) Maryland has implicitly waived the immunity by affirmatively threatening to invoke chapter 154 in future habeas cases. We address each of these grounds in turn.

A.

The prisoners first argue that the doctrine of Ex Parte Young defeats the state defendants' claim of immunity. In Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking to enjoin state officials from committing continuing violations of federal law. 209 U.S. at 159-160, 28 S.Ct. at 453-54. The inmates contend that because their action is for injunctive and declaratory relief rather than monetary damages, it falls squarely within the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Ex Parte Young represents a limited exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, applicable only when plaintiffs allege an ongoing violation of federal law. The Supreme Court has not shown a propensity to relax this requirement; to the contrary, its cases analyzing the Ex Parte Young doctrine...