Booze v. State

Decision Date01 September 1995
Docket NumberNos. 1274,1503,s. 1274
Citation111 Md.App. 208,681 A.2d 534
PartiesDonald E. BOOZE, v. STATE of Maryland. Alan Shelton SNEAD, v. STATE of Maryland. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Kreg Paul Greer, Assigned Public Defender, Towson, for appellant Booze.

Michael R. Braudes, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant Snead.

Gwynn X. Kinsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. and Patricia Jessamy, State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.

Submitted before WENNER, SALMON and EYLER, JJ.

WENNER, Judge.

Appellants, Donald E. Booze and Alan Shelton Snead, were each convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of two counts of first degree murder and illegal use of a handgun, 1 for which each was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment, plus ten years, all of which were to be served consecutively. In this consolidated appeal, appellants seek redress for what they perceive to be a plethora of errors by the judge who presided at trial. For clarity, we have rephrased and reordered appellants' questions:

Both Appellants

I. Did the trial court err in overruling defense counsels' Batson 2 challenges to the prosecutor's exercise of certain peremptory strikes?
II. Did the trial court err in denying appellants' motions for a mistrial after a witness testified to the "drug reputation" of the defendants?
III. Did the trial court err in overruling defense objections to certain remarks made by the prosecutor in opening statement and closing argument?

Snead only

IV. Did the trial court err in restricting the cross-examination of a key State's witness?

Booze only

V. Did the trial court err in allowing the prosecutor to present photographs of the murder victims to a State's witness?
VI. Did the trial court err in denying appellant Booze his right properly to exercise his peremptory challenges?

For reasons we shall explain, we shall affirm the judgments as to Booze, vacate them as to Snead, and remand Snead's case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

Antonio Henderson and Isaac Durant were shot to death in the 3100 block of Woodland Avenue in Baltimore City. Henderson was a drug dealer, and Durant may have been in the wrong place at the wrong time.

At trial, the State first presented Durant's fiancee, Rishardean Bennett 3. Bennett testified that she and Durant were traversing along Woodland Avenue when Durant stopped to speak with Henderson. At some point, Bennett saw Booze 4 and Snead 5 approaching with drawn weapons. Someone told Bennett to run and she ran. After hearing shots, Bennett learned that Durant was dead.

Bennett's credibility was challenged when she acknowledged being "on the lam" for a "parole" violation from a felony drug conviction, and that she had been convicted for aggravated assault and theft. Moreover, Bennett had not informed the police of her version of events, or testified at appellants' first trial.

Michael Brooks was an eleven-year old cocaine dealer working for Henderson on the day of the shootings. Brooks testified that he observed Booze running up a path shooting, and Snead standing at an alley shooting. Brooks had initially given various inconsistent versions of the incident, which he attributed to being "scared." Brooks acknowledged that he was facing three counts of attempted murder, and would be tried by the same person prosecuting the case at hand. The prosecutor purportedly warned Brooks that if he changed his story, he might also face charges of perjury and contempt.

Henderson's nephew, Perry Knight, who had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and unauthorized use, testified that he saw Booze fire at his uncle. Before firing, Booze signalled to a person standing some distance away, who also fired at Henderson. Knight subsequently returned fire at Booze "five times." Although Knight testified he had seen Snead in the vicinity earlier, Knight could not identify him as the second shooter. Knight acknowledged that he had not initially approached the police with his version of events because he too was scared.

Jacquetta Jones had known both Booze and Snead for some time. She testified that she observed both appellants brandish handguns, and that Snead had fired his weapon. According to Jones, Snead began running and calling after Booze, who displayed his weapon while crossing the street.

Baltimore City Police officer Nicholas Constantine was in a marked cruiser patrolling the area when a young man ran up and directed him to the 3100 block of Woodland Avenue. As he approached the area, Constantine observed Snead and three or four other men running. According to Constantine, Snead stopped and said, "I didn't have anything to do with that." Just then, Constantine heard shots ring out. Snead then said, "you see, they're still shooting." Constantine then drove to the 3100 block of Woodland Avenue, where he found the bodies of Durant and Henderson. A fully-loaded .22 caliber revolver was found beside Henderson. Constantine also testified that Snead and his companions did not appear to be armed, but explained that he had seen them only briefly because he heard gunfire within a moment of Snead's first statement.

After being arrested, Snead said that although he was in the area and heard gunfire, he did not know from whence it came.

I.

Appellants first contend that the trial court erred in overruling their Batson challenges to the State's striking two African-Americans from the panel. The first was a female (the first juror), who was No. 14 on the initial panel, and provisionally seated as juror No. 2. She was struck by the State's fourth peremptory challenge. The second was a male (the second juror), who was No. 126 on the initial panel, and provisionally seated as juror No. 1. He was struck by the State's sixth peremptory challenge.

According to the State's brief, this issue has not been preserved for our review, as defense counsel declared the jury ultimately impaneled "acceptable." See Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 618, 667 A.2d 876 (1995) ("When a party complains about the exclusion of someone from or the inclusion of someone in a particular jury, and thereafter states without qualification that the same jury as ultimately chosen is satisfactory or acceptable, the party is clearly waiving or abandoning the earlier complaint about that jury").

The State is wrong. Just prior to opening statements, the following colloquy ensued:

COURT CLERK: Is the panel and alternates acceptable to the Defendant 1?

DEFENSE COUNSEL 1: Subject to previous reservations.

COURT CLERK: Is the panel and alternates acceptable to Defendant 2?

DEFENSE COUNSEL 2: Subject to my prior objections.

We nevertheless agree with the State that Booze has failed to preserve a Batson challenge to the first juror being stricken, as counsel for Booze did not join in Snead's objection to striking that juror. Md. Rule 8-131(a). Cf., Stockton v. State, 107 Md.App. 395, 396, 668 A.2d 936 (1995), cert. denied, 342 Md. 116, 673 A.2d 707 (1996) ("On the appellate shore, moreover, there is, with each passing year, noticeable erosion of the preservation requirement and the dike is in need of constant repair").

After Snead's counsel had presented a prima facie case, 6 the following ensued:

THE STATE: And the other black female--I don't remember which one that was. I'm not really sure--I'm not really sure who she was. But, anyway, the reason for [striking her]-- THE COURT: Well, I know she was young. If I recall correctly, that one and [sic] had on a pair of blue jeans, stone-washed jeans if I'm right on that. I can't remember the number.

At any rate, any response, [counsel for Snead]?

COUNSEL FOR SNEAD: Yes. I don't think pregnancy is a woman [sic]--a reason to keep a woman off of a jury, nor do I think chewing gum is. What they said after they were excused by [the State] has nothing to do with the reasons why they were excused.

THE COURT: Your motion is denied.

It is clear from the record that the trial court failed to afford the State an opportunity to "tender" 7 a race neutral reason for striking the first juror. Hence, we shall remand the Snead case for the limited purpose of permitting the State to explain why it had struck the first juror, provided it is able to do so. See, e.g., Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 541, 616 A.2d 356 (1992) ("... [S]hould it appear that there is no reasonable possibility that the circumstances surrounding the striking of [the disputed juror] can be reconstructed fairly, then a new trial may be required and the trial judge may order one").

As to the second juror, the following exchange occurred:

COUNSEL FOR BOOZE: Yes. Your Honor, this is also on a Batson challenge. I noticed that that juror was also somebody who had never been asked to come up here. No questions were asked of him. He didn't make any noises. He wasn't--

THE STATE: I didn't--

COUNSEL FOR BOOZE: --chewing gum. He was a black male.

THE COURT: State, wait a minute. Let him finish.

THE STATE: All right, Your Honor.

COUNSEL FOR BOOZE: I think that the pattern has become a little more clear, that it is leaning towards black jurors.

THE COURT: [Counsel for Snead]?

COUNSEL FOR SNEAD: I join the motion. I agree.

THE COURT: All right. State?

THE STATE: Your Honor, I did not like his attitude towards me. I made certain observations of him, because, at first, I thought he would be good, because I thought he would be a strong foreman. I always pay attention to the first juror, because a lot of times they're going to be a foreman. But there were some things about him and the way he interacted with me that were negative. So, that's why I took him off, especially because he's going to be sitting next to me for a whole week or more.

THE COURT: [Counsel for Booze]?

COUNSEL FOR BOOZE: I think that...

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