Borck v. Michigan Bolt & Nut Works

• Decision Date: 09 December 1896
• Citation: 69 N.W. 254,111 Mich. 129
• Parties: BORCK v. MICHIGAN BOLT & NUT WORKS.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

69 N.W. 254

111 Mich. 129

BORCK v. MICHIGAN BOLT & NUT WORKS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 9, 1896

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Willard M. Lillibridge Judge.

Action by Anthony Borck, by next friend, against the Michigan Bolt &amp Nut Works. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

W. H. Turner and Moore & Moore, for appellant.

Gray &amp Gray, for appellee.

LONG C.J.

Plaintiff was injured by falling into the cogwheels in a machine used by the defendant in its shop. He was about 12 1/2 years old at the time he entered defendant's employ, and had worked in the shop about 3 months when the accident happened. The defendant's shop is about 50 feet wide and some 250 feet long. It is well lighted, and the accident occurred in the daytime. The machines are arranged in the shop in three rows the space between the rows being about six feet. The machines are about four feet square, and some consist of cogwheels, and others of twisted blades. The cogwheels are about one foot in diameter, three at the bottom and four at the top of the machine. They were uncovered, and plain to the view. Plaintiff's work was at one end of the shop and his duty was to place nuts on the bolts. On the day of the injury he had passed through the center space, got a pail of the nuts, and was returning to his place. He testifies in relation to the injury as follows: "The machine I was hurt on was next to the last towards the river in the middle row. I went to the machine to get a pail of nuts. They were standing alongside of the machine. I picked up the pail, and had it in my hand. Then Fred Lampke came up. He is a boy about my size and age. He says, 'Give me the nuts;' and I said: 'No, sir; I will not. I use them as well as you do. I need them more than you do, because I am further behind;' and then he jerked, and said he wanted them, and I said I wouldn't let him have them. He was trying to get them away from me. I resisted, and we both pulled on the pail. Then he jerked it, and gave me a shove, and I fell backward right into the cogwheels. He struck me at the time with his hands like that, and he let go of the pail at the same time. At the time he let go I fell. We were both pulling then. I fell into the cogwheels, and my hand got into the cogwheel, and I fell onto the box." On cross-examination he testified that he went up and down between these machines every day for three months; that he was familiar with the construction of machines, knew how they ran, had seen the cogwheels in motion before, but never saw anybody hurt there; that he knew if any one got his fingers between the cogs his fingers would be smashed; that he knew enough to keep away from the machines while they were in motion; that they were in plain sight as he went up and down the passageway; and that it was light. It was shown that both the father and mother of the plaintiff knew of his employment there, and never objected to it, though no written consent was given by either of the parents. It is contended that the defendant was negligent in employing the plaintiff without the written consent of his parents. Section 1997c3 of 3 How. Ann. St. provides: "It shall be unlawful for any factory, manufacturing or mercantile establishment to hire or employ any child under the age of fourteen years without first receiving the permission in writing of the parent or guardian, stating the name and age of said child." The next section provides: "No place where less than ten persons or children are employed shall be deemed a manufacturing establishment." It may be said as to this claim that there is nothing in the record showing how many persons or children were employed in defendant's factory; but counsel for plaintiff insists that it is plain that more than 10 persons were employed when the number of machines are considered, and that they are all in motion. There is some force in this contention, and, if the case rested upon this question alone, we should hesitate to hold that the statute had been complied with. The question must be determined therefore, upon other grounds. The act itself, by section 8, provides a penalty for its violation. It is apparent that the noncompliance with the terms of the statute was not the proximate cause of the injury. The failure to comply with the statute by obtaining the written consent of the parents had nothing to do with the injury, as it was not one of the natural results of such failure to obtain the consent. There is no count in the declaration for negligence in employing the plaintiff, and it counts only upon the failure of the defendant to obtain the consent of the parents. The damages claimed are for the...