Bordas v. Washtenaw County
| Citation | 987 F.Supp. 979 |
| Decision Date | 12 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 97-40074. |
| Parties | Mark L. BORDAS, Plaintiff, v. WASHTENAW COUNTY, Washtenaw County Sheriff Ronald Schebil, Marlene Ralph, Steven Armstrong, Michael Hellman, Joon Hur and Matthew Berchert, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Thomas R. Present, Bendure & Thomas, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Ian J. Reach, Reach & Hollenshead, Ann Arbor, MI, for Defendants.
The instant suit involves claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Before the court is a motion by defendants, Washtenaw County, Washtenaw County Sheriff Ronald Schebil and a group of Washtenaw County sheriff's deputies,2 framed as both a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. For the reasons set forth below, this court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss as to the claims against Washtenaw County and Sheriff Schebil, and grant defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to all claims against the sheriff's deputies except the plaintiff's claims that the deputies violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The facts in this case are in some dispute. For the purposes of the instant motion, this court will sketch briefly the facts according to the plaintiff.
On April 11, 1996, Washtenaw County Sheriff's Deputy Marlene Ralph was engaged in a routine traffic stop when she witnessed a vehicle driven by plaintiff proceed past her. Plaintiff claims to have been driving between 25-35 miles an hour. Deputy Ralph, however, believed that plaintiff was speeding, and hurried to her vehicle and attempted to follow plaintiff. Deputy Ralph activated her emergency lights and siren, but plaintiff did not pull over. Plaintiff then pulled into the driveway of his home on McKean Road. Upon exiting his vehicle, plaintiff hurried through an open garage door into the house, leaving his vehicle door ajar and the vehicle running.
Deputy Ralph called by radio for backup and waited outside the house. Deputy Ralph claims that she was concerned for the safety of the inhabitants of the house, not knowing if plaintiff lived there or if plaintiff was armed. Shortly thereafter, four other Washtenaw County sheriff's deputies arrived on the scene.3 The deputies announced themselves as the "sheriff's department" and knocked repeatedly on the door. Plaintiff claims that the deputies were banging on the door with such force that the house was shaking. Plaintiff did not come to the door because he claims to have been fearful of the officers. Subsequently, the officers entered the house and discovered plaintiff in a second floor hallway.
After Deputy Ralph identified plaintiff as the driver of the vehicle, plaintiff was arrested and handcuffed. This happened apparently without incident. However, as the deputies led plaintiff out of the house, plaintiff apparently yelled at some of the officers to "get off [his] carpet." At this moment, one of the officers holding plaintiff lost his balance, and believing that it was due to resistance by plaintiff, yelled out to the other officers to "get him." The officers then threw plaintiff against a table, injuring his elbow, forcibly restrained him on the floor and thrust his head against the ground. The officers then led plaintiff out of the house and threw him off of the front porch.
When the plaintiff arrived at the police station, he was asked if he needed medical attention and he answered in the negative. Plaintiff was released from jail at approximately seven a.m. on the same day. At about 4:30 p.m. that day, plaintiff presented himself to the hospital complaining of pain. Plaintiff sustained injuries to his arm, clavicle and neck.
On November 21, 1996, plaintiff was found guilty of fleeing and eluding a police officer. On April 1, 1997, plaintiff filed his complaint in this action. On September 19, 1997, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the district courts to dismiss any complaint which fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Rule 12(b)(6) affords the defendants in this case an opportunity to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief on his complaint even if everything alleged in the complaint is true. In applying the standards under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must presume all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the non-moving party. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.1993); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir.1995). The court need not, however, accord the presumption of truthfulness to any legal conclusion, opinions or deductions, even if they are couched as factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 629 (9th Cir.1980); Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc., 573 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1978); Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1956). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is disfavored:
[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). See also Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 270 (6th Cir. 1994) ().
Defendants argue that plaintiff has an obligation to present his § 1983 claims under a "heightened pleading standard" so that defendants' substantive right to claim qualified immunity is not impaired by the otherwise liberal pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). In Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917 (6th Cir.1995), the Sixth Circuit noted:
For if it is the task of the district court `expeditiously to weed out suits ... without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits,' ... then certainly some degree of pleading specificity is essential when the defense is raised by a motion to dismiss ....
Id. at 921 (citations omitted). The court went on to state that "if the original complaint alleged that a police officer `used excessive force,' and qualified immunity is asserted, then plaintiff would be required to amend [his complaint] with allegations of evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the force used against him was, indeed, unreasonable." Id. at 922. As noted by the court in Golyar v. McCausland, 738 F.Supp. 1090 (W.D.Mich. 1990), conclusory allegations, where plaintiff pleads no facts to support the legal conclusions, are insufficient to state a claim for relief.
In the instant case, plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any specific factual allegations supporting his legal conclusions that his constitutional rights were violated. As a result, the complaint does not pass muster under the "heightened pleading standard" required in § 1983 actions. The remedy contemplated by the court in Veney was to dismiss the complaint and grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint with specific factual allegations. However in this case, plaintiff has submitted the trial testimony of plaintiff and plaintiff's nephew from the state court criminal action. This testimony contains plaintiff's version of the events at issue and provides the necessary factual basis for his claims against the sheriff's deputies. Because plaintiff has indicated that he would just transport these allegations from the trial transcript to the complaint, in the interest of judicial economy this court will take those facts as true and decide the instant motion, as it pertains to the claims against the sheriff's deputies, as a motion for summary judgment.
However, the trial testimony submitted by plaintiff offers no specific factual averments that would support a claim against Washtenaw County or Sheriff Schebil. This court notes at the outset that claims against municipalities and police department heads are notoriously difficult to make out. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). At oral argument, plaintiff admitted that, other than this incident, he has no factual support for the claim that there was a policy or practice in the Washtenaw County sheriff's department to allow the deprivation of the constitutional rights of citizens. Plaintiff asks this court to allow him to take the deposition of Sheriff Schebil so that plaintiff can question the sheriff directly about a possible policy or practice in the Washtenaw County sheriff's department of violating citizens' constitutional rights. However, this misconstrues plaintiff's burden in pleading his claims under § 1983. The purpose of the "heightened pleading standard" in § 1983 actions is to "weed out" frivolous suits without requiring those who would rightly claim qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time-consuming defense of suits, including an appearance at a deposition. To be entitled even to take Sheriff's Schebil's deposition, plaintiff must come forth with specific factual averments that would state a cause of action against Washtenaw County or Sheriff Schebil. To date, plaintiff has come forth with no such claims.
As a result, ...
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