Bordelon v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.
| Decision Date | 03 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–3240.,14–3240. |
| Citation | 811 F.3d 984 |
| Parties | Lionel BORDELON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Paul John Bargiel, Attorney, Law Office of Paul J. Bargiel, Terri Smith Blanchard, Attorney, Barclay Law Group, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Lee A. Lowder, Attorney, Chicago Board of Education Law Department, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before BAUER, POSNER, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
On January 28, 2011, the Local School Council in charge of Kozminski Community Academy voted to not renew the contract of long-tenured principal Lionel Bordelon. Bordelon, who was 63 at the time, believed that his supervisor and Chief Area Officer for the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Dr. Judith Coates, manipulated and exercised undue influence over the Council's decision. Bordelon alleges that Coates did so because of his age, which, if true, would violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623. The district court granted summary judgment to the Board on Bordelon's claim of age discrimination. We affirm.
In 1993, Bordelon became the Principal of Kozminski Community Academy, a kindergarten through eighth grade school in the Chicago Public School system. Although the Board of Education of the City of Chicago ("Board") supervises schools within its system, the Local School Council ("Council") is responsible for hiring, evaluating, and renewing contracts for principals in its area. The Board employs a Chief Area Officer to supervise the principals assigned to his or her area.
In October 2009, the Board hired Coates to serve as Chief Area Officer for Area 15, making her Bordelon's supervisor. According to Bordelon, Coates immediately "began taking steps to remove [him] from his position at Kozminski." (Appellant's Br. at 4.)
When Coates began her new job, she inherited from her predecessor a list of five or six principals. According to Tawana Sanders, Coates's former executive assistant, it was a list of "older black principals to be disciplined." Sanders recalled that the list included Bordelon; Lori Lennox, principal of Doolittle Elementary; and Mary Rogers, principal of Emmett Till Academy. All three principals were in charge of schools that were performing in the bottom of Area 15 schools.
In February 2010, Coates and the Board fired Sanders. Sanders testified that she "just felt that the Board wanted someone younger and brighter." Brighter, she explained, meant that the replacement "has got more education, or maybe she has a field in that position, she could do a better job."
Coates's efforts to remove Bordelon did not begin in earnest until November 2010. On November 16, 2010, Coates sent Bordelon notice of a pre-discipline hearing based on insubordination from September through November 2010. The notice contained the following allegations: (1) failing to respond to a parent issue raised on November 2; (2) failing to comply with a request from September 20 to set up a parent meeting in October; (3) failing to schedule a meeting requested in an October 25 email regarding the arrest of several Kozminski students; and (4) failing to respond to Coates's email from November 4 regarding resolution of the three aforementioned matters. As a result of his hearing, Bordelon received a five-day suspension without pay, which he appealed and never served.
On December 7, 2010, Coates issued an evaluation of Bordelon that said he "needs improvement," noting that Kozminski was on academic probation for the second year in a row with test scores trending downward.
In December 2010, the Council had a meeting, which only five of the nine members attended. At this meeting, Council member Everhart testified that Coates "more or less suggested ... [t]hat it was time for [Bordelon] to give it up." Everhart clarified, however, that he thought Coates was not referring to Bordelon's age but to Kozminski's declining test scores.
Next, in a letter dated December 29, 2010, Coates reassigned Bordelon to home with full pay pending the outcome of an investigation into the following misconduct: (1) improperly replacing asbestos-containing tile at Kozminski; (2) purchasing irregularities; and (3) tampering with school computers in a manner that impeded access to Kozminski's records by the Board. James Ciesel, deputy general counsel for the Board, testified that he intended to prepare dismissal charges depending on the resolution of the investigation.
Instead, on January 28, 2011, while Bordelon was still suspended with pay, the Council voted not to renew Bordelon's contract. Three members voted against renewal, three voted in favor of renewal, and three abstained.1 The Council informed Bordelon that the decision not to renew was based on the following reasons: (1) "[f]ailure to provide adequate principal reports" to the Council; (2) not being evaluated as "highly qualified"; (3) "not meet [ing] the requirements needed to have an effective and safe school environment"; (4) "[l]ow test scores"; (5) "[d]isciplinary problems"; and (6) "[p]arents do not feel you are open and receptive to them."
On February 28, 2011, Bordelon submitted his notice of retirement effective June 30, 2011, the end of his non-renewed contract.
On November 16, 2011, Bordelon filed suit against the Board alleging (1) discrimination on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623 ; (2) discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII, the ADEA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; (4) constructive discharge; and (5) deprivation of due process.
The Board moved for summary judgment on all of Bordelon's claims, which the district court granted.2 With respect to Bordelon's age discrimination claim, the district court found that the evidence Bordelon claimed was direct proof of age discrimination "do[es] not support a finding of discriminatory intent."
Bordelon then filed a motion for reconsideration in which he pointed to more evidence that he thought supported his age discrimination claim. The district court excluded the additional evidence as inadmissible hearsay, lacking foundation, or too conclusory to withstand summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Bordelon's sole issue on appeal is whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Board on his claim of age discrimination. We hold that it did.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo Sartor v. Spherion Corp., 388 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir.2004). We view the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 278. A district court's evidentiary ruling to strike certain factual allegations, however, "is reviewed under a deferential abuse of discretion standard even on a motion for summary judgment." Lucas v. Chi. Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir.2004).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This requires that "there be no genuine issue of material fact," and "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute" will not defeat summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
We have made clear that "[t]he evidence supporting a factual assertion must represent admissible evidence." Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 (7th Cir.2008) (emphasis added). "[C]onclusory statements, not grounded in specific facts, are not sufficient to avoid summary judgment." Lucas, 367 F.3d at 726 ; see also Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest–Chi. Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir.2003) .
The ADEA prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual ... because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Bordelon, however, has not sued the entity responsible for not renewing his contract—the Council3 —instead choosing to sue the Board, relying on a "cat's paw" theory of liability. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415–16, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011).
Therefore, to withstand summary judgment, Bordelon must point to evidence upon which a trier of fact could conclude that Coates (1) harbored discriminatory animus based on his age and (2) gave the Council information that influenced its decision not to renew his contract.
A plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent under the ADEA by relying on either the direct method of proof or the indirect method of proof.4 Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir.2008).
Under the direct method of proof, the plaintiff may rely on either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence to show discriminatory motivation. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 720–21 (7th Cir.2005).
Direct evidence, which is quite rare, is "an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the defendant." Id. (quoting Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.1994) ).
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that "allows the trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker." Id. (quotation marks omitted). We have recognized four types of circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination:
(1) suspicious...
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